Small coalitions cannot manipulate voting

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Volumn 3570, Issue , 2005, Pages 285-297

  Elkind, Edith ^a   Lipmaa, Helger ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TARTU   (Estonia)

Author keywords

Electronic voting; One way functions; Vote manipulation

Indexed keywords

HARDNESS; SECURITY OF DATA; VOTING MACHINES;

ELECTRONIC VOTING; ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS; VOTE MANIPULATION; VOTING SYSTEMS;

NETWORK PROTOCOLS;

EID: 26444621356     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1007/11507840_25     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (5)

1. [BO91] John J. Bartholdi, III and James B. Orlin. Single Transferable Vote Resists Strategic Voting. Social Choice and Welfare, 8(4):341-354, 1991.
2. [CS02] Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Fourteenth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, pages 314-319, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, July 28 - August 1 2002. AAAI Press.
3. [CS03] Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. In In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 781-788, Acapulco, Mexico, August 9-15 2003.
4. [Gib73] Allan F. Gibbard. Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result. Econometrica, 41:597-601, 1973.
5. [Sat73] Mark A. Satterthwaite. The Existence of Strategy-Proof Voting Procedures: A Topic in Social Choice Theory. PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1973.