The causes of nuclear weapons proliferation

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 14, Issue , 2011, Pages 225-244

  Sagan, Scott D ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT); nuclear latency; plutonium reprocessing; uranium enrichment

Indexed keywords

EID: 79955949040     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-052209-131042     Document Type: Article

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