The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb

International Security

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 45-86

  Liberman, Peter ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035603890     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228801753191132     Document Type: Article

References (275)

1. Interview-based studies following the March 1993 disclosure of the program include David Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 50, No. 4 (July-August 1994), pp. 37-47; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to Deterrent," Nuclear Fuel, May 10, 1993, pp. 3-6; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: The Dismantling," Nuclear Fuel, May 24, 1993, pp. 9-13; Frank V. Pabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program: Lessons for Nonproliferation Policy," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Fall 1995), pp. 1-19; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 7-44; and an article by a South African nuclear energy official who reviewed the documents, Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 10 (December-January 1995/96), pp. 3-8.
2. Interview-based studies following the March 1993 disclosure of the program include David Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 50, No. 4 (July-August 1994), pp. 37-47; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to Deterrent," Nuclear Fuel, May 10, 1993, pp. 3-6; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: The Dismantling," Nuclear Fuel, May 24, 1993, pp. 9-13; Frank V. Pabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program: Lessons for Nonproliferation Policy," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Fall 1995), pp. 1-19; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 7-44; and an article by a South African nuclear energy official who reviewed the documents, Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 10 (December-January 1995/96), pp. 3-8.
3. Interview-based studies following the March 1993 disclosure of the program include David Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 50, No. 4 (July-August 1994), pp. 37-47; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to Deterrent," Nuclear Fuel, May 10, 1993, pp. 3-6; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: The Dismantling," Nuclear Fuel, May 24, 1993, pp. 9-13; Frank V. Pabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program: Lessons for Nonproliferation Policy," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Fall 1995), pp. 1-19; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 7-44; and an article by a South African nuclear energy official who reviewed the documents, Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 10 (December-January 1995/96), pp. 3-8.
4. Interview-based studies following the March 1993 disclosure of the program include David Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 50, No. 4 (July-August 1994), pp. 37-47; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to Deterrent," Nuclear Fuel, May 10, 1993, pp. 3-6; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: The Dismantling," Nuclear Fuel, May 24, 1993, pp. 9-13; Frank V. Pabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program: Lessons for Nonproliferation Policy," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Fall 1995), pp. 1-19; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 7-44; and an article by a South African nuclear energy official who reviewed the documents, Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 10 (December-January 1995/96), pp. 3-8.
5. Interview-based studies following the March 1993 disclosure of the program include David Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 50, No. 4 (July-August 1994), pp. 37-47; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to Deterrent," Nuclear Fuel, May 10, 1993, pp. 3-6; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: The Dismantling," Nuclear Fuel, May 24, 1993, pp. 9-13; Frank V. Pabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program: Lessons for Nonproliferation Policy," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Fall 1995), pp. 1-19; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 7-44; and an article by a South African nuclear energy official who reviewed the documents, Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 10 (December-January 1995/96), pp. 3-8.
6. Interview-based studies following the March 1993 disclosure of the program include David Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 50, No. 4 (July-August 1994), pp. 37-47; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to Deterrent," Nuclear Fuel, May 10, 1993, pp. 3-6; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: The Dismantling," Nuclear Fuel, May 24, 1993, pp. 9-13; Frank V. Pabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program: Lessons for Nonproliferation Policy," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Fall 1995), pp. 1-19; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 7-44; and an article by a South African nuclear energy official who reviewed the documents, Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 10 (December-January 1995/96), pp. 3-8.
7. William J. Long and Suzette R. Grillot, "Ideas, Beliefs, and Nuclear Policies: The Cases of South Africa and Ukraine," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 24-40; T.V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 2000), pp. 113-117; and Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 494-495.
8. William J. Long and Suzette R. Grillot, "Ideas, Beliefs, and Nuclear Policies: The Cases of South Africa and Ukraine," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 24-40; T.V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 2000), pp. 113-117; and Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 494-495.
9. William J. Long and Suzette R. Grillot, "Ideas, Beliefs, and Nuclear Policies: The Cases of South Africa and Ukraine," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 24-40; T.V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 2000), pp. 113-117; and Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 494-495.
10. Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," Security Studies, Vol. 2, Nos. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 37-78; and Thayer, "Causes of Nuclear Proliferation."
11. Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," Security Studies, Vol. 2, Nos. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 37-78; and Thayer, "Causes of Nuclear Proliferation."
12. Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation Revisited," Security Studies, Vol. 2, Nos. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 100-124; Steve Chan, "Incentives for Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of International Pariahs," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (May 1980), pp. 26-43; and Robert E. Harkavy, "Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation," International Organization, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter 1981), pp. 135-163.
13. Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation Revisited," Security Studies, Vol. 2, Nos. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 100-124; Steve Chan, "Incentives for Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of International Pariahs," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (May 1980), pp. 26-43; and Robert E. Harkavy, "Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation," International Organization, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter 1981), pp. 135-163.
14. Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation Revisited," Security Studies, Vol. 2, Nos. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 100-124; Steve Chan, "Incentives for Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of International Pariahs," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (May 1980), pp. 26-43; and Robert E. Harkavy, "Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation," International Organization, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter 1981), pp. 135-163.
15. The insecurity explanation for nuclear acquisition is derived from balance-of-power theory, which also predicts that states will adopt more-or-less rational strategies within their resource and informational constraints. See Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 59-79.
16. Steven Flank, "Exploding the Black Box: The Historical Sociology of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 259-294; and Peter R. Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies, Vol. 2, Nos. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 192-212. For theoretical underpinnings, see Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1974).
17. Steven Flank, "Exploding the Black Box: The Historical Sociology of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 259-294; and Peter R. Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies, Vol. 2, Nos. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 192-212. For theoretical underpinnings, see Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1974).
18. Steven Flank, "Exploding the Black Box: The Historical Sociology of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 259-294; and Peter R. Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies, Vol. 2, Nos. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 192-212. For theoretical underpinnings, see Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1974).
19. Nuclear secrecy (or "opacity") has many possible origins: fear of precipitating arms races or preventive attack, prior bureaucratic turf struggles, and international nonproliferation pressures. Whatever the reason, keeping potential bureaucratic opponents - such as foreign or finance ministries - in the dark about nuclear issues makes it harder, in some cases impossible, for them to mobilize opposition. See Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3 (September 1990), pp. 13-43; and Thayer, "Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," pp. 508-517.
20. Nuclear secrecy (or "opacity") has many possible origins: fear of precipitating arms races or preventive attack, prior bureaucratic turf struggles, and international nonproliferation pressures. Whatever the reason, keeping potential bureaucratic opponents - such as foreign or finance ministries - in the dark about nuclear issues makes it harder, in some cases impossible, for them to mobilize opposition. See Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3 (September 1990), pp. 13-43; and Thayer, "Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," pp. 508-517.
21. The title of the South African head of government changed from prime minister to president in the 1984 constitution.
22. On nuclear possession norms, see Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 73-85. See also Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy, and the Postcolonial State (London: Zed, 1998); Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 50-55, 72, 91-111; and Thayer, "Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," pp. 468-474. On the application and effectiveness of economic sanctions against proliferators, which have been quite uneven, see Glenn Chafetz, "The Political Psychology of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 3 (August 1995), pp. 743-775; Peter Clausen, Nonproliferation and the National Interest: America's Response to the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: HarperCollins, 1993); Daniel Morrow and Michael Carriere, "The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanctions on India and Pakistan," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 1-16; and T.V. Paul, "Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime: The Role of Coercive Sanctions," International Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 440-465. I bundle normative with economic pressure here because they were applied in parallel to South Africa, and because the political economy theory examined below suggests that state sensitivities to both NPT norms and trade linkages are shaped by common factors.
23. On nuclear possession norms, see Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 73- 85. See also Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy, and the Postcolonial State (London: Zed, 1998); Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 50-55, 72, 91-111; and Thayer, "Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," pp. 468-474. On the application and effectiveness of economic sanctions against proliferators, which have been quite uneven, see Glenn Chafetz, "The Political Psychology of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 3 (August 1995), pp. 743-775; Peter Clausen, Nonproliferation and the National Interest: America's Response to the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: HarperCollins, 1993); Daniel Morrow and Michael Carriere, "The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanctions on India and Pakistan," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 1-16; and T.V. Paul, "Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime: The Role of Coercive Sanctions," International Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 440-465. I bundle normative with economic pressure here because they were applied in parallel to South Africa, and because the political economy theory examined below suggests that state sensitivities to both NPT norms and trade linkages are shaped by common factors.
24. On nuclear possession norms, see Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 73- 85. See also Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy, and the Postcolonial State (London: Zed, 1998); Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 50-55, 72, 91-111; and Thayer, "Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," pp. 468-474. On the application and effectiveness of economic sanctions against proliferators, which have been quite uneven, see Glenn Chafetz, "The Political Psychology of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 3 (August 1995), pp. 743-775; Peter Clausen, Nonproliferation and the National Interest: America's Response to the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: HarperCollins, 1993); Daniel Morrow and Michael Carriere, "The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanctions on India and Pakistan," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 1-16; and T.V. Paul, "Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime: The Role of Coercive Sanctions," International Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 440-465. I bundle normative with economic pressure here because they were applied in parallel to South Africa, and because the political economy theory examined below suggests that state sensitivities to both NPT norms and trade linkages are shaped by common factors.
25. On nuclear possession norms, see Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 73- 85. See also Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy, and the Postcolonial State (London: Zed, 1998); Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 50-55, 72, 91-111; and Thayer, "Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," pp. 468-474. On the application and effectiveness of economic sanctions against proliferators, which have been quite uneven, see Glenn Chafetz, "The Political Psychology of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 3 (August 1995), pp. 743-775;Peter Clausen, Nonproliferation and the National Interest: America's Response to the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: HarperCollins, 1993); Daniel Morrow and Michael Carriere, "The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanctions on India and Pakistan," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 1-16; and T.V. Paul, "Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime: The Role of Coercive Sanctions," International Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 440-465. I bundle normative with economic pressure here because they were applied in parallel to South Africa, and because the political economy theory examined below suggests that state sensitivities to both NPT norms and trade linkages are shaped by common factors.
26. On nuclear possession norms, see Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 73- 85. See also Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy, and the Postcolonial State (London: Zed, 1998); Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 50-55, 72, 91-111; and Thayer, "Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," pp. 468-474. On the application and effectiveness of economic sanctions against proliferators, which have been quite uneven, see Glenn Chafetz, "The Political Psychology of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 3 (August 1995), pp. 743-775; Peter Clausen, Nonproliferation and the National Interest: America's Response to the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: HarperCollins, 1993); Daniel Morrow and Michael Carriere, "The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanctions on India and Pakistan," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 1-16; and T.V. Paul, "Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime: The Role of Coercive Sanctions," International Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 440-465. I bundle normative with economic pressure here because they were applied in parallel to South Africa, and because the political economy theory examined below suggests that state sensitivities to both NPT norms and trade linkages are shaped by common factors.
27. On nuclear possession norms, see Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 73- 85. See also Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy, and the Postcolonial State (London: Zed, 1998); Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 50-55, 72, 91-111; and Thayer, "Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," pp. 468-474. On the application and effectiveness of economic sanctions against proliferators, which have been quite uneven, see Glenn Chafetz, "The Political Psychology of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 3 (August 1995), pp. 743-775; Peter Clausen, Nonproliferation and the National Interest: America's Response to the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: HarperCollins, 1993); Daniel Morrow and Michael Carriere, "The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanctions on India and Pakistan," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 1-16; and T.V. Paul, "Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime: The Role of Coercive Sanctions," International Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 440-465. I bundle normative with economic pressure here because they were applied in parallel to South Africa, and because the political economy theory examined below suggests that state sensitivities to both NPT norms and trade linkages are shaped by common factors.
28. On nuclear possession norms, see Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 73- 85. See also Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy, and the Postcolonial State (London: Zed, 1998); Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 50-55, 72, 91-111; and Thayer, "Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," pp. 468-474. On the application and effectiveness of economic sanctions against proliferators, which have been quite uneven, see Glenn Chafetz, "The Political Psychology of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 3 (August 1995), pp. 743-775; Peter Clausen, Nonproliferation and the National Interest: America's Response to the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: HarperCollins, 1993); Daniel Morrow and Michael Carriere, "The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanctions on India and Pakistan," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 1-16; and T.V. Paul, "Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime: The Role of Coercive Sanctions," International Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 440-465. I bundle normative with economic pressure here because they were applied in parallel to South Africa, and because the political economy theory examined below suggests that state sensitivities to both NPT norms and trade linkages are shaped by common factors.
29. On nuclear possession norms, see Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 73- 85. See also Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy, and the Postcolonial State (London: Zed, 1998); Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 50-55, 72, 91-111; and Thayer, "Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," pp. 468-474. On the application and effectiveness of economic sanctions against proliferators, which have been quite uneven, see Glenn Chafetz, "The Political Psychology of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 3 (August 1995), pp. 743-775; Peter Clausen, Nonproliferation and the National Interest: America's Response to the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: HarperCollins, 1993); Daniel Morrow and Michael Carriere, "The Economic Impacts of the 1998 Sanctions on India and Pakistan," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Fall 1999), pp. 1-16; and T.V. Paul, "Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime: The Role of Coercive Sanctions," International Journal, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 440-465. I bundle normative with economic pressure here because they were applied in parallel to South Africa, and because the political economy theory examined below suggests that state sensitivities to both NPT norms and trade linkages are shaped by common factors.
30. Etel Solingen, "The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 126-169. For a broader application of the theory, see Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).
31. Etel Solingen, "The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 126-169. For a broader application of the theory, see Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).
32. Interviews with W.L. Grant, Pretoria, January 28, 1999; and André Buys, Pretoria, August 25, 1999. See also Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 4.
33. The AEB's 1970 proposal recommended the development of gun-type, implosion, boosted fission, and thermonuclear PNE designs; paper studies on the last of these were approved later, in 1973. Telephone conversation with David Albright, May 30, 2001.
34. Interview with Buys. On U.S. and other PNE programs, see Trevor Findlay, Nuclear Dynamite: The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Fiasco (Rushcutters Bay: Brassey's Australia, 1990); Paul R. Josephson, Red Atom: Russia's Nuclear Power Program from Stalin to Today (New York: W.H. Freeman, 2000), pp. 243-250; and Vladislav Larin and Eugeny Tar, "A Legacy of Contamination: The Soviet Union's Peaceful Nuclear Explosions," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 3 (May-June 1999), pp. 18-20.
35. Interview with Buys. On U.S. and other PNE programs, see Trevor Findlay, Nuclear Dynamite: The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Fiasco (Rushcutters Bay: Brassey's Australia, 1990); Paul R. Josephson, Red Atom: Russia's Nuclear Power Program from Stalin to Today (New York: W.H. Freeman, 2000), pp. 243-250; and Vladislav Larin and Eugeny Tar, "A Legacy of Contamination: The Soviet Union's Peaceful Nuclear Explosions," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 3 (May-June 1999), pp. 18-20.
36. Interview with Buys. On U.S. and other PNE programs, see Trevor Findlay, Nuclear Dynamite: The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Fiasco (Rushcutters Bay: Brassey's Australia, 1990); Paul R. Josephson, Red Atom: Russia's Nuclear Power Program from Stalin to Today (New York: W.H. Freeman, 2000), pp. 243-250; and Vladislav Larin and Eugeny Tar, "A Legacy of Contamination: The Soviet Union's Peaceful Nuclear Explosions," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 3 (May-June 1999), pp. 18-20.
37. Comments of an anonymous reviewer. According to David Albright, however, the design was also well suited as a technology test bed for commercial enrichment development. Telephone conversation with Albright.
38. Whether this was a foregone conclusion is unclear. On the one hand, a junior scientist's skeptical internal report on the economic feasibility of enrichment was buried by the AEB, and commercial mining interests had little interest in enrichment. Secondhand anecdote from A. David Rosin, telephone conversation, June 21, 1999; and correspondence with David Fischer, April 5, 2001. For retrospective critiques of commercial potential, see A.A Eberhard, "Policy Options for the Nuclear Industry in South Africa," Raw Materials Report, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1994), pp. 24-31; and David Fig, "Apartheid's Nuclear Arsenal: Deviation from Development," in Jacklyn Cock and Penny MacKenzie, eds., From Defence to Development: Redirecting Military Resources in South Africa (Ottowa, Ontario: International Development Research Centre, 1998), pp. 163-180. On the other hand, negotiations with West Germany from 1970 to 1976 over uranium enrichment collaboration do suggest the plausibility of commercial potential; David Fig, "Sanctions and the Nuclear Industry," in Neta C. Crawford and Audie Klotz, eds., How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), pp. 75-102, especially pp. 81-84; and Barbara Rogers and Zdenek Cervenka, The Nuclear Axis: Secret Collaboration between West Germany and South Africa (New York: Times Books, 1978).
39. Whether this was a foregone conclusion is unclear. On the one hand, a junior scientist's skeptical internal report on the economic feasibility of enrichment was buried by the AEB, and commercial mining interests had little interest in enrichment. Secondhand anecdote from A. David Rosin, telephone conversation, June 21, 1999; and correspondence with David Fischer, April 5, 2001. For retrospective critiques of commercial potential, see A.A Eberhard, "Policy Options for the Nuclear Industry in South Africa," Raw Materials Report, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1994), pp. 24-31; and David Fig, "Apartheid's Nuclear Arsenal: Deviation from Development," in Jacklyn Cock and Penny MacKenzie, eds., From Defence to Development: Redirecting Military Resources in South Africa (Ottowa, Ontario: International Development Research Centre, 1998), pp. 163-180. On the other hand, negotiations with West Germany from 1970 to 1976 over uranium enrichment collaboration do suggest the plausibility of commercial potential; David Fig, "Sanctions and the Nuclear Industry," in Neta C. Crawford and Audie Klotz, eds., How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), pp. 75-102, especially pp. 81-84; and Barbara Rogers and Zdenek Cervenka, The Nuclear Axis: Secret Collaboration between West Germany and South Africa (New York: Times Books, 1978).
40. Whether this was a foregone conclusion is unclear. On the one hand, a junior scientist's skeptical internal report on the economic feasibility of enrichment was buried by the AEB, and commercial mining interests had little interest in enrichment. Secondhand anecdote from A. David Rosin, telephone conversation, June 21, 1999; and correspondence with David Fischer, April 5, 2001. For retrospective critiques of commercial potential, see A.A Eberhard, "Policy Options for the Nuclear Industry in South Africa," Raw Materials Report, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1994), pp. 24-31; and David Fig, "Apartheid's Nuclear Arsenal: Deviation from Development," in Jacklyn Cock and Penny MacKenzie, eds., From Defence to Development: Redirecting Military Resources in South Africa (Ottowa, Ontario: International Development Research Centre, 1998), pp. 163-180. On the other hand, negotiations with West Germany from 1970 to 1976 over uranium enrichment collaboration do suggest the plausibility of commercial potential; David Fig, "Sanctions and the Nuclear Industry," in Neta C. Crawford and Audie Klotz, eds., How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), pp. 75-102, especially pp. 81-84; and Barbara Rogers and Zdenek Cervenka, The Nuclear Axis: Secret Collaboration between West Germany and South Africa (New York: Times Books, 1978).
41. Whether this was a foregone conclusion is unclear. On the one hand, a junior scientist's skeptical internal report on the economic feasibility of enrichment was buried by the AEB, and commercial mining interests had little interest in enrichment. Secondhand anecdote from A. David Rosin, telephone conversation, June 21, 1999; and correspondence with David Fischer, April 5, 2001. For retrospective critiques of commercial potential, see A.A Eberhard, "Policy Options for the Nuclear Industry in South Africa," Raw Materials Report, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1994), pp. 24-31; and David Fig, "Apartheid's Nuclear Arsenal: Deviation from Development," in Jacklyn Cock and Penny MacKenzie, eds., From Defence to Development: Redirecting Military Resources in South Africa (Ottowa, Ontario: International Development Research Centre, 1998), pp. 163-180. On the other hand, negotiations with West Germany from 1970 to 1976 over uranium enrichment collaboration do suggest the plausibility of commercial potential; David Fig, "Sanctions and the Nuclear Industry," in Neta C. Crawford and Audie Klotz, eds., How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), pp. 75-102, especially pp. 81-84; and Barbara Rogers and Zdenek Cervenka, The Nuclear Axis: Secret Collaboration between West Germany and South Africa (New York: Times Books, 1978).
42. Interview with Joerg Menzel, former technical adviser to the U.S. ambassador-at-large for nuclear affairs, Washington, D.C., December 16, 1999.
43. Buys explains the secrecy surrounding the PNE program as follows: "We were initially very naive. We did seriously think that this was just an alternative use for nuclear energy. . . . So although we thought everybody's doing it, and its not a big issue, we were still a little bit worried that the reaction if South Africa would do it would be different. So the program was classified top secret right from the first day. . . . But things can change, so we won't stop the program." Interview with Buys.
44. F.W. de Klerk, "Speech on the Nonproliferation Treaty to a Joint Session of Parliament, March 24, 1993," in Joint Publications Research Service, Proliferation Issues, March 29, 1993. J.W. de Villiers, AEB chief executive officer (1979-90), agreed with the 1974 date and was de Klerk's source. Interview with Jeremy Schearer, former South African foreign affairs official, Pretoria, January 28, 1999; and Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," p. 43. A Central Intelligence Agency report asserts that "South Africa formally launched a weapons program in 1973," but its evidence for this is unclear. Directorate of Intelligence, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, New Information on South Africa's Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation, secret document, March 30, 1983, partially released May 7, 1996, http://www.foia.ucia.gov.
45. F.W. de Klerk, "Speech on the Nonproliferation Treaty to a Joint Session of Parliament, March 24, 1993," in Joint Publications Research Service, Proliferation Issues, March 29, 1993. J.W. de Villiers, AEB chief executive officer (1979-90), agreed with the 1974 date and was de Klerk's source. Interview with Jeremy Schearer, former South African foreign affairs official, Pretoria, January 28, 1999; and Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," p. 43. A Central Intelligence Agency report asserts that "South Africa formally launched a weapons program in 1973," but its evidence for this is unclear. Directorate of Intelligence, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, New Information on South Africa's Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation, secret document, March 30, 1983, partially released May 7, 1996, http://www.foia.ucia.gov.
46. F.W. de Klerk, "Speech on the Nonproliferation Treaty to a Joint Session of Parliament, March 24, 1993," in Joint Publications Research Service, Proliferation Issues, March 29, 1993. J.W. de Villiers, AEB chief executive officer (1979-90), agreed with the 1974 date and was de Klerk's source. Interview with Jeremy Schearer, former South African foreign affairs official, Pretoria, January 28, 1999; and Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," p. 43. A Central Intelligence Agency report asserts that "South Africa formally launched a weapons program in 1973," but its evidence for this is unclear. Directorate of Intelligence, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, New Information on South Africa's Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation, secret document, March 30, 1983, partially released May 7, 1996, http://www.foia.ucia.gov.
47. Interview with Grant.
48. Interview with Waldo Stumpf, Pretoria, January 27, 1999; and Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 4.
49. Interview with Buys.
50. Court of South Africa, Cape Province Division, The State versus Johann Philip Derk Blaauw, case no. 270/87, top secret, September 9, 1988, p. 24.
51. Interview and December 10, 1999, correspondence with Buys. The date is from Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 9.
52. Interview with Buys.
53. Ibid.; and L.J. Van der Westhuizen and J.H. le Roux, Armscor: A Will to Win (Bloemfontein: Institute for Contemporary History, University of the Orange Free State, 1997), pp. 174-175. (This Armscor-commissioned history is, based on interviews as well as published sources.) Sources differ over whether the Committee was formed in early or late 1978 and whether certain officials were on the committee.
54. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 9.
55. Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," pp. 42-45; and Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 11-12.
56. Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," pp. 42-45; and Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 11-12.
57. Interview and November 1, 1999, correspondence with Buys. The H2 was remotely guided to a target by video from an aircraft, with a range of 60 kilometers; it may have been based on a similar Israeli system. See Ronen Bergman, "Treasons of Conscience," Ha'aretz (English ed.), April 7, 2000; and Helmoed-Romer Heitman, "Raptor Dodges the Defences" Jane's Missiles and Rockets, July 1, 1998, p. 10.
58. Interview and November 1, 1999, correspondence with Buys. The H2 was remotely guided to a target by video from an aircraft, with a range of 60 kilometers; it may have been based on a similar Israeli system. See Ronen Bergman, "Treasons of Conscience," Ha'aretz (English ed.), April 7, 2000; and Helmoed-Romer Heitman, "Raptor Dodges the Defences" Jane's Missiles and Rockets, July 1, 1998, p. 10.
59. Interviews with D.W. Steyn, minister of minerals and energy (1984-89), Pretoria, April 10, 1999; Buys; and Max Sisulu, deputy chief executive officer of Denel, Pretoria, August 23, 1999. One official says that Armscor unveiled a missile in 1987 that could reach Nairobi, with an accuracy of within 300 yards of the target; interview with W.N. Breytenbach, deputy defense minister (1987-90), Fish Hoek, South Africa, August 18, 1999. See also David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, Vol. 1, No. 4 (May 1994), pp. 15-16; Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, South Africa's Nuclear-Tipped Ballistic Missile Capability (New York: United Nations, 1991); Directorate of Intelligence, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Africa Review - South Africa: Igniting a Missile Race? secret document, December 8, 1989, partially released April 27, 1997, http://www.foia.ucia.gov; Van der Westhuizen and le Roux, Armscor, pp. 179-180; and Mark Wade, "RSA," Encyclopedia Astronautica, http://www.friends-partners.org/mwade/lvfam/rsa. htm.
60. Interviews with D.W. Steyn, minister of minerals and energy (1984-89), Pretoria, April 10, 1999; Buys; and Max Sisulu, deputy chief executive officer of Denel, Pretoria, August 23, 1999. One official says that Armscor unveiled a missile in 1987 that could reach Nairobi, with an accuracy of within 300 yards of the target; interview with W.N. Breytenbach, deputy defense minister (1987- 90), Fish Hoek, South Africa, August 18, 1999. See also David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, Vol. 1, No. 4 (May 1994), pp. 15-16; Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, South Africa's Nuclear-Tipped Ballistic Missile Capability (New York: United Nations, 1991); Directorate of Intelligence, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Africa Review - South Africa: Igniting a Missile Race? secret document, December 8, 1989, partially released April 27, 1997, http://www.foia.ucia.gov; Van der Westhuizen and le Roux, Armscor, pp. 179-180; and Mark Wade, "RSA," Encyclopedia Astronautica, http://www.friends-partners.org/mwade/lvfam/rsa. htm.
61. Interviews with D.W. Steyn, minister of minerals and energy (1984-89), Pretoria, April 10, 1999; Buys; and Max Sisulu, deputy chief executive officer of Denel, Pretoria, August 23, 1999. One official says that Armscor unveiled a missile in 1987 that could reach Nairobi, with an accuracy of within 300 yards of the target; interview with W.N. Breytenbach, deputy defense minister (1987- 90), Fish Hoek, South Africa, August 18, 1999. See also David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, Vol. 1, No. 4 (May 1994), pp. 15-16; Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, South Africa's Nuclear-Tipped Ballistic Missile Capability (New York: United Nations, 1991); Directorate of Intelligence, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Africa Review - South Africa: Igniting a Missile Race? secret document, December 8, 1989, partially released April 27, 1997, http://www.foia.ucia.gov; Van der Westhuizen and le Roux, Armscor, pp. 179-180; and Mark Wade, "RSA," Encyclopedia Astronautica, http://www.friends-partners.org/mwade/lvfam/rsa. htm.
62. Interviews with D.W. Steyn, minister of minerals and energy (1984-89), Pretoria, April 10, 1999; Buys; and Max Sisulu, deputy chief executive officer of Denel, Pretoria, August 23, 1999. One official says that Armscor unveiled a missile in 1987 that could reach Nairobi, with an accuracy of within 300 yards of the target; interview with W.N. Breytenbach, deputy defense minister (1987- 90), Fish Hoek, South Africa, August 18, 1999. See also David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, Vol. 1, No. 4 (May 1994), pp. 15-16; Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, South Africa's Nuclear-Tipped Ballistic Missile Capability (New York: United Nations, 1991); Directorate of Intelligence, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Africa Review - South Africa: Igniting a Missile Race? secret document, December 8, 1989, partially released April 27, 1997, http://www.foia.ucia.gov; Van der Westhuizen and le Roux, Armscor, pp. 179-180; and Mark Wade, "RSA," Encyclopedia Astronautica, http://www.friends-partners.org/mwade/lvfam/rsa. htm.
63. Interviews with D.W. Steyn, minister of minerals and energy (1984-89), Pretoria, April 10, 1999; Buys; and Max Sisulu, deputy chief executive officer of Denel, Pretoria, August 23, 1999. One official says that Armscor unveiled a missile in 1987 that could reach Nairobi, with an accuracy of within 300 yards of the target; interview with W.N. Breytenbach, deputy defense minister (1987- 90), Fish Hoek, South Africa, August 18, 1999. See also David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, Vol. 1, No. 4 (May 1994), pp. 15-16; Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, South Africa's Nuclear-Tipped Ballistic Missile Capability (New York: United Nations, 1991); Directorate of Intelligence, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Africa Review - South Africa: Igniting a Missile Race? secret document, December 8, 1989, partially released April 27, 1997, http://www.foia.ucia.gov; Van der Westhuizen and le Roux, Armscor, pp. 179-180; and Mark Wade, "RSA," Encyclopedia Astronautica, http://www.friends-partners.org/mwade/lvfam/rsa. htm.
64. Correspondence with Buys, December 10, 1999. On the longer-range RSA-4 missile, see Wade, "RSA."
65. Armscor fact sheet provided by Buys; and Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program, p. 6. Another source mentioning the 800 million rand figure reports that it did include fissile material costs, and that Armscor's weaponization efforts from 1980 to 1990 cost only 145 million rand. Hibbs, "Dismantling," p. 12. According to AEC Chief Waldo Stumpf, the 680 million figure included 85 percent of the Y-plant's capital and running costs (since 15 percent of its capacity was used to fuel the Safari I research reactor) plus Armscor's costs of producing the devices. Overhead costs that "fell through the cracks," he states, were balanced by the uncredited value of The Y-plant for designing the Z-plant build to fuel South Africa's Koeberg nuclear power station, located near Cape Town. Interview an April 25, 2001, correpondence with Stumpf.
66. Armscor fact sheet provided by Buys; and Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program, p. 6. Another source mentioning the 800 million rand figure reports that it did include fissile material costs, and that Armscor's weaponization efforts from 1980 to 1990 cost only 145 million rand. Hibbs, "Dismantling," p. 12. According to AEC Chief Waldo Stumpf, the 680 million figure included 85 percent of the Y-plant's capital and running costs (since 15 percent of its capacity was used to fuel the Safari I research reactor) plus Armscor's costs of producing the devices. Overhead costs that "fell through the cracks," he states, were balanced by the uncredited value of The Y-plant for designing the Z-plant build to fuel South Africa's Koeberg nuclear power station, located near Cape Town. Interview an April 25, 2001, correpondence with Stumpf.
67. Rober Scott Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options, Adelphi Paper 159 (London: Internationa Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 16; U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 76; and World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985-1995 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 90.
68. Rober Scott Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options, Adelphi Paper 159 (London: Internationa Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 16; U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 76; and World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985-1995 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 90.
69. Rober Scott Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options, Adelphi Paper 159 (London: Internationa Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 16; U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 76; and World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985-1995 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 90.
70. Correspondence with Buys, December 10, 1999.
71. Interview and December 10, 1999, correspondence with Buys.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid. The Namibian threshold is reported in Pabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program," pp. 7-8. Prior official accounts of the strategy did not acknowledge the threat of battlefield use; see Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," pp. 8-9; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 15- 17; and Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 5. Some sources indicate that the three-phase strategy emerged in 1978, though Buys thinks that this is the result of confusion between Huyser's three options and the strategy developed by the working group. Correspondence with Buys, December 10, 1999.
74. Ibid. The Namibian threshold is reported in Pabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program," pp. 7-8. Prior official accounts of the strategy did not acknowledge the threat of battlefield use; see Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," pp. 8-9; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 15- 17; and Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 5. Some sources indicate that the three-phase strategy emerged in 1978, though Buys thinks that this is the result of confusion between Huyser's three options and the strategy developed by the working group. Correspondence with Buys, December 10, 1999.
75. Ibid. The Namibian threshold is reported in Pabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program," pp. 7-8. Prior official accounts of the strategy did not acknowledge the threat of battlefield use; see Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," pp. 8-9; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 15-17; and Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 5. Some sources indicate that the three-phase strategy emerged in 1978, though Buys thinks that this is the result of confusion between Huyser's three options and the strategy developed by the working group. Correspondence with Buys, December 10, 1999.
76. Ibid. The Namibian threshold is reported in Pabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program," pp. 7-8. Prior official accounts of the strategy did not acknowledge the threat of battlefield use; see Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," pp. 8-9; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 15- 17; and Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 5. Some sources indicate that the three-phase strategy emerged in 1978, though Buys thinks that this is the result of confusion between Huyser's three options and the strategy developed by the working group. Correspondence with Buys, December 10, 1999.
77. Interview with Buys.
78. Correspondence with Stumpf, repeating a story from J.W. de Villiers. P.W. Botha told me that we said amongst ourselves that for a country like South Africa to use nuclear weapons would be disastrous." Interview, Wilderness, South Africa April 8, 1999.
79. Interview with Gen. Magnus Malan, SADF chief (1976-80) and defense minister (1980-89), Pretoria, August 27, 1999.
80. Interview and December 10, 1999, correspondence with Buys.
81. Interview with Breytenbach.
82. Interview with Buys. Also giving a 1987 date is Hibbs, "From a PNE to Deterrent," p. 6.
83. According to Reiss, the test site activity occurred from June through October 1988. But Buys recalls that the test site activity occurred in 1986 or 1987, and Stumpf also gives a 1987 date. Interview with Buys; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 13-14; and Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 6.
84. According to Reiss, the test site activity occurred from June through October 1988. But Buys recalls that the test site activity occurred in 1986 or 1987, and Stumpf also gives a 1987 date. Interview with Buys; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 13-14; and Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 6.
85. Interviews with Pik Botha, Pretoria, April 9, 1999; Malan; Breytenbach; and Grant (repeating a story he heard from J.W. de Villiers). The story was discounted in interviews with Buys; Stumpf; and Gen. Jan Geldenhuys, Pretoria, August 24, 1999.
86. The South African government's threat environment and perceptions in this period are analyzed in David E. Albright, The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980's (New York: Praeger, 1983); Chris Alden, Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State (New York: St. Martin's, 1996); Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb? South Africa's Nuclear Potential," in Joseph A. Yager, ed., Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1980), pp. 283-305; Neta C. Crawford, "The Domestic Sources and Consequences of Aggressive Foreign Policies: The Folly of South Africa's 'Total Strategy,'" Centre for Southern African Studies Working Paper, No. 41 (Bellville, South Africa: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1995). Chester A. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992); Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options; Robert Scott Jaster, The Defence of White Power: South African Foreign Policy under Pressure (New York: St. Martin's, 1989); Annette D. Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996); and Jack E. Spence, The Soviet Union, the Third World, and Southern Africa, Bradlow Series No. 5 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1988).
87. The South African government's threat environment and perceptions in this period are analyzed in David E. Albright, The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980's (New York: Praeger, 1983); Chris Alden, Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State (New York: St. Martin's, 1996); Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb? South Africa's Nuclear Potential," in Joseph A. Yager, ed., Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1980), pp. 283-305; Neta C. Crawford, "The Domestic Sources and Consequences of Aggressive Foreign Policies: The Folly of South Africa's 'Total Strategy,'" Centre for Southern African Studies Working Paper, No. 41 (Bellville, South Africa: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1995). Chester A. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992); Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options; Robert Scott Jaster, The Defence of White Power: South African Foreign Policy under Pressure (New York: St. Martin's, 1989); Annette D. Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996); and Jack E. Spence, The Soviet Union, the Third World, and Southern Africa, Bradlow Series No. 5 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1988).
88. The South African government's threat environment and perceptions in this period are analyzed in David E. Albright, The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980's (New York: Praeger, 1983); Chris Alden, Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State (New York: St. Martin's, 1996); Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb? South Africa's Nuclear Potential," in Joseph A. Yager, ed., Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1980), pp. 283-305; Neta C. Crawford, "The Domestic Sources and Consequences of Aggressive Foreign Policies: The Folly of South Africa's 'Total Strategy,'" Centre for Southern African Studies Working Paper, No. 41 (Bellville, South Africa: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1995). Chester A. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992); Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options; Robert Scott Jaster, The Defence of White Power: South African Foreign Policy under Pressure (New York: St. Martin's, 1989); Annette D. Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996); and Jack E. Spence, The Soviet Union, the Third World, and Southern Africa, Bradlow Series No. 5 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1988).
89. The South African government's threat environment and perceptions in this period are analyzed in David E. Albright, The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980's (New York: Praeger, 1983); Chris Alden, Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State (New York: St. Martin's, 1996); Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb? South Africa's Nuclear Potential," in Joseph A. Yager, ed., Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1980), pp. 283-305; Neta C. Crawford, "The Domestic Sources and Consequences of Aggressive Foreign Policies: The Folly of South Africa's 'Total Strategy,'" Centre for Southern African Studies Working Paper, No. 41 (Bellville, South Africa: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1995). Chester A. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992); Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options; Robert Scott Jaster, The Defence of White Power: South African Foreign Policy under Pressure (New York: St. Martin's, 1989); Annette D. Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996); and Jack E. Spence, The Soviet Union, the Third World, and Southern Africa, Bradlow Series No. 5 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1988).
90. The South African government's threat environment and perceptions in this period are analyzed in David E. Albright, The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the
91. The South African government's threat environment and perceptions in this period are analyzed in David E. Albright, The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980's (New York: Praeger, 1983); Chris Alden, Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State (New York: St. Martin's, 1996); Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb? South Africa's Nuclear Potential," in Joseph A. Yager, ed., Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1980), pp. 283-305; Neta C. Crawford, "The Domestic Sources and Consequences of Aggressive Foreign Policies: The Folly of South Africa's 'Total Strategy,'" Centre for Southern African Studies Working Paper, No. 41 (Bellville, South Africa: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1995). Chester A. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992); Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options; Robert Scott Jaster, The Defence of White Power: South African Foreign Policy under Pressure (New York: St. Martin's, 1989); Annette D. Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996); and Jack E. Spence, The Soviet Union, the Third World, and Southern Africa, Bradlow Series No. 5 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1988).
92. The South African government's threat environment and perceptions in this period are analyzed in David E. Albright, The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980's (New York: Praeger, 1983); Chris Alden, Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State (New York: St. Martin's, 1996); Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb? South Africa's Nuclear Potential," in Joseph A. Yager, ed., Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1980), pp. 283-305; Neta C. Crawford, "The Domestic Sources and Consequences of Aggressive Foreign Policies: The Folly of South Africa's 'Total Strategy,'" Centre for Southern African Studies Working Paper, No. 41 (Bellville, South Africa: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1995). Chester A. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992); Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options; Robert Scott Jaster, The Defence of White Power: South African Foreign Policy under Pressure (New York: St. Martin's, 1989); Annette D. Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996); and Jack E. Spence, The Soviet Union, the Third World, and Southern Africa, Bradlow Series No. 5 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1988).
93. The South African government's threat environment and perceptions in this period are analyzed in David E. Albright, The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980's (New York: Praeger, 1983); Chris Alden, Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State (New York: St. Martin's, 1996); Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb? South Africa's Nuclear Potential," in Joseph A. Yager, ed., Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1980), pp. 283-305; Neta C. Crawford, "The Domestic Sources and Consequences of Aggressive Foreign Policies: The Folly of South Africa's 'Total Strategy,'" Centre for Southern African Studies Working Paper, No. 41 (Bellville, South Africa: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1995). Chester A. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992); Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options; Robert Scott Jaster, The Defence of White Power: South African Foreign Policy under Pressure (New York: St. Martin's, 1989); Annette D. Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996); and Jack E. Spence, The Soviet Union, the Third World, and Southern Africa, Bradlow Series No. 5 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1988).
94. The South African government's threat environment and perceptions in this period are analyzed in David E. Albright, The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980's (New York: Praeger, 1983); Chris Alden, Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State (New York: St. Martin's, 1996); Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb? South Africa's Nuclear Potential," in Joseph A. Yager, ed., Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1980), pp. 283-305; Neta C. Crawford, "The Domestic Sources and Consequences of Aggressive Foreign Policies: The Folly of South Africa's 'Total Strategy,'" Centre for Southern African Studies Working Paper, No. 41 (Bellville, South Africa: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1995). Chester A. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992); Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options; Robert Scott Jaster, The Defence of White Power: South African Foreign Policy under Pressure (New York: St. Martin's, 1989); Annette D. Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996); and Jack E. Spence, The Soviet Union, the Third World, and Southern Africa, Bradlow Series No. 5 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1988).
95. Interview with P.W. Botha.
96. De Klerk, "Speech on the Nonproliferation Treaty," p. 27. Also interview with Malan; and Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 5.
97. De Klerk, "Speech on the Nonproliferation Treaty," p. 27. Also interview with Malan; and Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 5.
98. On Taiwan's early ambitions, however, see David Albright and Corey Gay, "Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54, No. 1 (January-February 1998), pp. 54-60; and William Burr, New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese "Nuclear Intentions,'" 1966-1976, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB20/.
99. On Taiwan's early ambitions, however, see David Albright and Corey Gay, "Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54, No. 1 (January-February 1998), pp. 54-60; and William Burr, New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese "Nuclear Intentions,'" 1966-1976, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB20/.
100. Albright, USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 100; and Directorate of Intelligence, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Trends in South Africa's Nuclear Policies and Programs, secret document, October 4, 1984, partially released April 27, 1997, http://www.foia.ucia.gov.
101. Albright, USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 100; and Directorate of Intelligence, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Trends in South Africa's Nuclear Policies and Programs, secret document, October 4, 1984, partially released April 27, 1997, http://www.foia.ucia.gov.
102. Interview with Geldenhuys, August 24, 1999.
103. Quoted in Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 28.
104. Interview with Pik Botha, April 9, 1999. See also Margot Light and Philip Nel, "South African Research on Soviet Foreign Policy," Politikon, Vol. 17, No. 1 (June 1990), pp. 66-72.
105. Interview and December 10, 1999, correspondence with Buys. Botha "acted immediately" to authorize reopening the test site after the Soviet deployment of air defense systems in southern Angola negated Pretoria's air superiority, according to Hibbs, "PNE to Deterrent," p. 6.
106. Interview with Breytenbach.
107. Reiss argues that the satellite-observable activity around the test site was intended as a signal to persuade the superpowers to secure the removal of Cuban troops in an overall Angolan-Namibian settlement. But the undetectable checking of the test shaft beneath the newly constructed shed suggests an attempt to provide an actual option to test, as Buys and Pabian contend. In a more anodyne interpretation, Stumpf suggests that the test preparations were merely the culmination of a strategic planning process unrelated to the Angolan conflict. See Pabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program," pp. 8-9; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 13-14; and Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 6.
108. Reiss argues that the satellite-observable activity around the test site was intended as a signal to persuade the superpowers to secure the removal of Cuban troops in an overall Angolan- Namibian settlement. But the undetectable checking of the test shaft beneath the newly constructed shed suggests an attempt to provide an actual option to test, as Buys and Pabian contend. In a more anodyne interpretation, Stumpf suggests that the test preparations were merely the culmination of a strategic planning process unrelated to the Angolan conflict. See Pabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program," pp. 8-9; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 13-14; and Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 6.
109. Reiss argues that the satellite-observable activity around the test site was intended as a signal to persuade the superpowers to secure the removal of Cuban troops in an overall Angolan- Namibian settlement. But the undetectable checking of the test shaft beneath the newly constructed shed suggests an attempt to provide an actual option to test, as Buys and Pabian contend. In a more anodyne interpretation, Stumpf suggests that the test preparations were merely the culmination of a strategic planning process unrelated to the Angolan conflict. See Pabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program," pp. 8-9; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 13-14; and Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 6.
110. Interviews with Breytenbach; and Niel Barnard, Cape Town August 18, 1999.
111. South African strategists believed that maintaining absolute secrecy about the existence and location of South Africa's arsenal minimized the latter danger. Interview with Buys.
112. Correspondence with Buys, December 10, 1999.
113. For critiques of the strategy, see Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb?" pp. 297-302; David Fischer, "South Africa," in Robert Litwak and Mitchell Reiss, eds., Nuclear Proliferations after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), p. 216; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 28; and Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" p. 70. For a more favorable assessment, see Richard J. Harknett, "Nuclear Weapons and Territorial Integrity in the Post-Cold War World," in Ken R. Dark, ed., New Studies in Post-Cold War Security (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1996), pp. 49-65.
114. For critiques of the strategy, see Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb?" pp. 297-302; David Fischer, "South Africa," in Robert Litwak and Mitchell Reiss, eds., Nuclear Proliferations after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), p. 216; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 28; and Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" p. 70. For a more favorable assessment, see Richard J. Harknett, "Nuclear Weapons and Territorial Integrity in the Post-Cold War World," in Ken R. Dark, ed., New Studies in Post-Cold War Security (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1996), pp. 49-65.
115. For critiques of the strategy, see Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb?" pp. 297-302; David Fischer, "South Africa," in Robert Litwak and Mitchell Reiss, eds., Nuclear Proliferations after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), p. 216; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 28; and Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" p. 70. For a more favorable assessment, see Richard J. Harknett, "Nuclear Weapons and Territorial Integrity in the Post-Cold War World," in Ken R. Dark, ed., New Studies in Post-Cold War Security (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1996), pp. 49-65.
116. For critiques of the strategy, see Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb?" pp. 297-302; David Fischer, "South Africa," in Robert Litwak and Mitchell Reiss, eds., Nuclear Proliferations after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), p. 216; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 28; and Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" p. 70. For a more favorable assessment, see Richard J. Harknett, "Nuclear Weapons and Territorial Integrity in the Post-Cold War World," in Ken R. Dark, ed., New Studies in Post-Cold War Security (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1996), pp. 49-65.
117. For critiques of the strategy, see Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb?" pp. 297-302; David Fischer, "South Africa," in Robert Litwak and Mitchell Reiss, eds., Nuclear Proliferations after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), p. 216; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 28; and Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" p. 70. For a more favorable assessment, see Richard J. Harknett, "Nuclear Weapons and Territorial Integrity in the Post-Cold War World," in Ken R. Dark, ed., New Studies in Post-Cold War Security (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1996), pp. 49-65.
118. Interview with Buys.
119. Correspondence with Buys, December 10, 1999. An anonymous South African defense official also stated in 1993 that the South African strategy was similar to that of Israel, which "used its bomb as a bargaining chip to get concessions from the U.S." Hibbs, "From a PNE to Deterrent," p. 10. On the 1973 episode, see Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Vintage, 1991), pp. 225-231.
120. Correspondence with Buys, December 10, 1999. An anonymous South African defense official also stated in 1993 that the South African strategy was similar to that of Israel, which "used its bomb as a bargaining chip to get concessions from the U.S." Hibbs, "From a PNE to Deterrent," p. 10. On the 1973 episode, see Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Vintage, 1991), pp. 225-231.
121. P.W. Botha repeated his affinity for Israel in an interview. Another potential source of strategic ideas was French Gen. André Beaufre, whose writings on "total strategy" for counterinsurgency warfare strongly influenced SADF and P.W. Botha's thinking. Beaufre also wrote a book on nuclear strategy that discussed how small power nuclear arsenals could leverage great power assistance but Buys says that his working group was not familiar with it. Correspondence with Buys, December 10, 1999. See also André Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy, trans. R.H. Barry (New York: Praeger 1965), p. 84.
122. Shimon Peres, the chief architect and strategist of Israel's nuclear weapons program met with Vorster and P.W. Botha in November 1974, and Vorster visited Israel in April 1976. Bergman "Treasons of Conscience"; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 448-466; and Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 259-283. Other sources on South African-Israeli military collaboration include James Adams, The Unnatural Alliance (London: Quartet, 1984); Benjamin M. Joseph, Besieged Bedfellows: Israel and the Land of Apartheid (New York: Greenwood, 1987); U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, New Information on South Africa's Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation. On Peres's role in the Israeli program, see Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 17-21. For a look back at the suspected 1979 test, see David Albright and Corey Gay, "A Flash from the Past," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 6 (November-December 1997), pp. 15-17.
123. Shimon Peres, the chief architect and strategist of Israel's nuclear weapons program met with Vorster and P.W. Botha in November 1974, and Vorster visited Israel in April 1976. Bergman "Treasons of Conscience"; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 448-466; and Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 259-283. Other sources on South African-Israeli military collaboration include James Adams, The Unnatural Alliance (London: Quartet, 1984); Benjamin M. Joseph, Besieged Bedfellows: Israel and the Land of Apartheid (New York: Greenwood, 1987); U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, New Information on South Africa's Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation. On Peres's role in the Israeli program, see Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 17-21. For a look back at the suspected 1979 test, see David Albright and Corey Gay, "A Flash from the Past," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 6 (November-December 1997), pp. 15-17.
124. Shimon Peres, the chief architect and strategist of Israel's nuclear weapons program met with Vorster and P.W. Botha in November 1974, and Vorster visited Israel in April 1976. Bergman "Treasons of Conscience"; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 448-466; and Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 259-283. Other sources on South African-Israeli military collaboration include James Adams, The Unnatural Alliance (London: Quartet, 1984); Benjamin M. Joseph, Besieged Bedfellows: Israel and the Land of Apartheid (New York: Greenwood, 1987); U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, New Information on South Africa's Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation. On Peres's role in the Israeli program, see Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 17-21. For a look back at the suspected 1979 test, see David Albright and Corey Gay, "A Flash from the Past," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 6 (November-December 1997), pp. 15-17.
125. Shimon Peres, the chief architect and strategist of Israel's nuclear weapons program met with Vorster and P.W. Botha in November 1974, and Vorster visited Israel in April 1976. Bergman "Treasons of Conscience"; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 448-466; and Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 259-283. Other sources on South African-Israeli military collaboration include James Adams, The Unnatural Alliance (London: Quartet, 1984); Benjamin M. Joseph, Besieged Bedfellows: Israel and the Land of Apartheid (New York: Greenwood, 1987); U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, New Information on South Africa's Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation. On Peres's role in the Israeli program, see Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 17-21. For a look back at the suspected 1979 test, see David Albright and Corey Gay, "A Flash from the Past," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 6 (November-December 1997), pp. 15-17.
126. Shimon Peres, the chief architect and strategist of Israel's nuclear weapons program met with Vorster and P.W. Botha in November 1974, and Vorster visited Israel in April 1976. Bergman "Treasons of Conscience"; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 448-466; and Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 259-283. Other sources on South African-Israeli military collaboration include James Adams, The Unnatural Alliance (London: Quartet, 1984); Benjamin M. Joseph, Besieged Bedfellows: Israel and the Land of Apartheid (New York: Greenwood, 1987); U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, New Information on South Africa's Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation. On Peres's role in the Israeli program, see Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 17-21. For a look back at the suspected 1979 test, see David Albright and Corey Gay, "A Flash from the Past," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 6 (November-December 1997), pp. 15-17.
127. Shimon Peres, the chief architect and strategist of Israel's nuclear weapons program met with Vorster and P.W. Botha in November 1974, and Vorster visited Israel in April 1976. Bergman "Treasons of Conscience"; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 448-466; and Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 259-283. Other sources on South African-Israeli military collaboration include James Adams, The Unnatural Alliance (London: Quartet, 1984); Benjamin M. Joseph, Besieged Bedfellows: Israel and the Land of Apartheid (New York: Greenwood, 1987); U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, New Information on South Africa's Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation. On Peres's role in the Israeli program, see Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 17-21. For a look back at the suspected 1979 test, see David Albright and Corey Gay, "A Flash from the Past," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 6 (November-December 1997), pp. 15-17.
128. Shimon Peres, the chief architect and strategist of Israel's nuclear weapons program met with Vorster and P.W. Botha in November 1974, and Vorster visited Israel in April 1976. Bergman "Treasons of Conscience"; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 448-466; and Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 259-283. Other sources on South African-Israeli military collaboration include James Adams, The Unnatural Alliance (London: Quartet, 1984); Benjamin M. Joseph, Besieged Bedfellows: Israel and the Land of Apartheid (New York: Greenwood, 1987); U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, New Information on South Africa's Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation. On Peres's role in the Israeli program, see Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 17-21. For a look back at the suspected 1979 test, see David Albright and Corey Gay, "A Flash from the Past," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 6 (November-December 1997), pp. 15-17.
129. Shimon Peres, the chief architect and strategist of Israel's nuclear weapons program met with Vorster and P.W. Botha in November 1974, and Vorster visited Israel in April 1976. Bergman "Treasons of Conscience"; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 448-466; and Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 259-283. Other sources on South African-Israeli military collaboration include James Adams, The Unnatural Alliance (London: Quartet, 1984); Benjamin M. Joseph, Besieged Bedfellows: Israel and the Land of Apartheid (New York: Greenwood, 1987); U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, New Information on South Africa's Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation. On Peres's role in the Israeli program, see Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 17-21. For a look back at the suspected 1979 test, see David Albright and Corey Gay, "A Flash from the Past," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 6 (November-December 1997), pp. 15-17.
130. According to Stumpf, AEB Chief A.J. Roux initially refused to collect the tritium shipment until ordered to do so by Minister of Mines S.P. Botha. Telephone conversation with Waldo Stumpf, June 4, 2001.
131. The South African-Israeli alliance could have influenced South African nuclear policy through nonsecurity mechanisms as well as through strategic learning. For example, Israel's possession of a bomb in the basement" might have burnished the status appeal of going nuclear to the South African leadership.
132. The roles of Prime Minister Vorster and Roux are emphasized in Donald B. Sole, "The South African Nuclear Case in the Light of Recent Revelations," in James Brown, ed., New Horizons and Challenges in Arms Control and Verification (Amsterdam: V.U. University Press, 1994), pp. 71-80, p. 75. But Botha's involvement was clear from his commission of a delivery feasibility study and of Huyser's memorandum (discussed above).
133. This is the assessment of a "well-placed" source quoted by Hibbs, "From a PNE to Deterrent," p. 5. A former foreign affairs director-general surmises that P.W. Botha persuaded Roux to support a nuclear weapons program, because Roux was not particularly interested in military affairs. Interview with Neil van Heerden, Johannesburg, April 6, 1999. Botha's general influence increased in the last years of the Vorster administration, according to Jaster, Defence of White Power, p. 80.
134. This is the assessment of a "well-placed" source quoted by Hibbs, "From a PNE to Deterrent," p. 5. A former foreign affairs director-general surmises that P.W. Botha persuaded Roux to support a nuclear weapons program, because Roux was not particularly interested in military affairs. Interview with Neil van Heerden, Johannesburg, April 6, 1999. Botha's general influence increased in the last years of the Vorster administration, according to Jaster, Defence of White Power, p. 80.
135. Supreme Court of South Africa, State versus Blaauw, pp. 21-25. Van den Bergh was a close confidant of Vorster's, but van den Bergh did not inform his own staff about the nuclear program; telephone conversation with George Gruwar, former deputy director-general of the Bureau of State Security, August 24, 1999.
136. Jaster, Defence of White Power, pp. 25-26.
137. Interview with Grant; correspondence with Stumpf; Reiss, Bridled Ambition; and Sole, "South African Nuclear Case," p. 75. See also A.R. Newby-Fraser, Chain Reaction: Twenty Years of Nuclear Research and Development in South Africa (Pretoria: Atomic Energy Board, 1979), pp. 36-42, 197.
138. Interview with Grant; correspondence with Stumpf; Reiss, Bridled Ambition; and Sole, "South African Nuclear Case," p. 75. See also A.R. Newby-Fraser, Chain Reaction: Twenty Years of Nuclear Research and Development in South Africa (Pretoria: Atomic Energy Board, 1979), pp. 36-42, 197.
139. Interview with Grant; correspondence with Stumpf; Reiss, Bridled Ambition; and Sole, "South African Nuclear Case," p. 75. See also A.R. Newby-Fraser, Chain Reaction: Twenty Years of Nuclear Research and Development in South Africa (Pretoria: Atomic Energy Board, 1979), pp. 36-42, 197.
140. Interviews with Buys; and an Armscor official, Pretoria, August 1999. On the Pelinduna reactor program, see also Newby-Fraser, Chain Reaction, pp. 115-125; and Renfrew Christie, Electricity, Industry, and Class in South Africa (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), p. 182.
141. Interviews with Buys; and an Armscor official, Pretoria, August 1999. On the Pelinduna reactor program, see also Newby-Fraser, Chain Reaction, pp. 115-125; and Renfrew Christie, Electricity, Industry, and Class in South Africa (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), p. 182.
142. Correspondence with Stumpf; and interviews with Piet Koornhof, minister of minerals and energy, 1976-79, Cape Town, August 16, 1999; Grant; and S.P. Botha, Pretoria, August 20, 1999.
143. Interview with Laurence Alberts, Pretoria, August 26, 1999.
144. Interview with Buys.
145. Interview with Alberts.
146. Interview with Koornhof.
147. Interviews with Gen. H. de V. du Toit, Pretoria, January 27, 1999; Buys; and Malan.
148. Interview with Pik Botha, Pretoria, August 25, 1999. The foreign ministry was kept in the dark about other security matters as well, such as the SADF's 1975 intervention in Angola. Interview with van Heerden; and Alden, Apartheid's Last Stand. The weak position of the diplomats also limited their ability to sell their more sanguine view of the Soviet threat, and hence the need for a deerrent in the first place. "We diplomats thought Russian policy was mischief making," says a former South African ambassador, "but the military people believed the total onslaught." Interview with Donald B. Sole, Cape Town, April 7, 1999.
149. Interview with Grant. He was less politically connected than Roux, but highly respected as a scientist. Buys thinks that Roux was not a driving force in the weaponization decision. Interview with Buys.
150. Interview with Buys.
151. Interviews with Niel Barnard, Cape Town, January 22, 1999; and various former cabinet members.
152. Interviews with du Toit; and Gen. Jan Geldenhuys, Pretoria, January 25, 1999.
153. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb; and George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
154. Interview with Buys.
155. Ibid.; and correspondence with Buys, December 10, 1999.
156. Botha continued to favor the military after becoming prime minister in 1978; in fact, he retained the defense portfolio until 1980, when he took the unprecedented step of promoting the SADF chief to defense minister. Botha also tapped military officers for important positions in the strengthened State Security Council and for his own staff. The SADF, however, was always loyal to its civilian overseers. For analyses of the rising influence of the military, see Philip H. Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1984); Deon Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making (Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1984); Kenneth W. Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986); and Jaster, Defence of White Power. Some observers even allege that Botha owed his political ascent in 1978 to the military's leaking of information damaging to his cabinet rivals; cf. Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948-1994 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996), pp. 246-247.
157. Botha continued to favor the military after becoming prime minister in 1978; in fact, he retained the defense portfolio until 1980, when he took the unprecedented step of promoting the SADF chief to defense minister. Botha also tapped military officers for important positions in the strengthened State Security Council and for his own staff. The SADF, however, was always loyal to its civilian overseers. For analyses of the rising influence of the military, see Philip H. Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1984); Deon Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making (Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1984); Kenneth W. Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986); and Jaster, Defence of White Power. Some observers even allege that Botha owed his political ascent in 1978 to the military's leaking of information damaging to his cabinet rivals; cf. Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948-1994 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996), pp. 246-247.
158. Botha continued to favor the military after becoming prime minister in 1978; in fact, he retained the defense portfolio until 1980, when he took the unprecedented step of promoting the SADF chief to defense minister. Botha also tapped military officers for important positions in the strengthened State Security Council and for his own staff. The SADF, however, was always loyal to its civilian overseers. For analyses of the rising influence of the military, see Philip H. Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1984); Deon Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making (Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1984); Kenneth W. Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986); and Jaster, Defence of White Power. Some observers even allege that Botha owed his political ascent in 1978 to the military's leaking of information damaging to his cabinet rivals; cf. Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948-1994 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996), pp. 246-247.
159. Botha continued to favor the military after becoming prime minister in 1978; in fact, he retained the defense portfolio until 1980, when he took the unprecedented step of promoting the SADF chief to defense minister. Botha also tapped military officers for important positions in the strengthened State Security Council and for his own staff. The SADF, however, was always loyal to its civilian overseers. For analyses of the rising influence of the military, see Philip H. Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1984); Deon Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making (Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1984); Kenneth W. Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986); and Jaster, Defence of White Power. Some observers even allege that Botha owed his political ascent in 1978 to the military's leaking of information damaging to his cabinet rivals; cf. Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948-1994 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996), pp. 246-247.
160. Botha continued to favor the military after becoming prime minister in 1978; in fact, he retained the defense portfolio until 1980, when he took the unprecedented step of promoting the SADF chief to defense minister. Botha also tapped military officers for important positions in the strengthened State Security Council and for his own staff. The SADF, however, was always loyal to its civilian overseers. For analyses of the rising influence of the military, see Philip H. Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1984); Deon Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making (Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1984); Kenneth W. Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986); and Jaster, Defence of White Power. Some observers even allege that Botha owed his political ascent in 1978 to the military's leaking of information damaging to his cabinet rivals; cf. Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948-1994 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996), pp. 246-247.
161. Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 128-144; Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians; O'Meara, Forty Lost Years, p. 266; and Spence, Soviet Union, the Third World, and Southern Africa.
162. Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 128-144; Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians; O'Meara, Forty Lost Years, p. 266; and Spence, Soviet Union, the Third World, and Southern Africa.
163. Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 128-144; Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians; O'Meara, Forty Lost Years, p. 266; and Spence, Soviet Union, the Third World, and Southern Africa.
164. Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 128-144; Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians; O'Meara, Forty Lost Years, p. 266; and Spence, Soviet Union, the Third World, and Southern Africa.
165. On blowback, see Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).
166. Sole, "South African Nuclear Case," p. 75.
167. Interview with Geldenhuys, August 24, 1999.
168. Interview with van Heerden.
169. Correspondence with Stumpf.
170. Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 4. On the heightened international anti-apartheid campaign, see Crawford and Klotz, How Sanctions Work; and Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995).
171. Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 4. On the heightened international anti-apartheid campaign, see Crawford and Klotz, How Sanctions Work; and Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995).
172. Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 5. Pretoria's ambassador to the United States from 1977 to 1982 concurred; Donald B. Sole, "The Rise of Nuclear Sanctions against South Africa," American Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Autumn 1986), p. 4.
173. Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 5. Pretoria's ambassador to the United States from 1977 to 1982 concurred; Donald B. Sole, "The Rise of Nuclear Sanctions against South Africa," American Review, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Autumn 1986), p. 4.
174. Fig, "Sanctions and the Nuclear Industry"; Fabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program"; and Sole, "Rise of Nuclear Sanctions."
175. Fig, "Sanctions and the Nuclear Industry"; Fabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program"; and Sole, "Rise of Nuclear Sanctions."
176. Fig, "Sanctions and the Nuclear Industry"; Fabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program"; and Sole, "Rise of Nuclear Sanctions."
177. Interview with Barnard, January 22, 1999; and correspondence with Stumpf.
178. Interview with P.W. Botha.
179. Interview with Barnard, January 22, 1999.
180. Correspondence with Buys, December 10, 1999.
181. One British observer speculated in 1987 that "the development of nuclear weapons might provide a much needed moral boost" to the embattled regime. Christopher Coker, South Africa's Security Dilemmas, Washington Papers No. 126 (New York: Praeger, 1987), p. 91.
182. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb?" pp. 202-203.
183. As one cabinet member puts it, "We knew we were in a minefield." Interview with H.J. "Kobie" Coetsee, deputy defense minister (1978-80), Cape Town, August 16, 1999.
184. Telephone conversation with Stumpf.
185. Adam and Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized; and O'Meara, Forty Lost Years.
186. Adam and Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized; and O'Meara, Forty Lost Years.
187. Robert Schrire, Adapt or Die: The End of White Politics in South Africa, South Africa Update Series (New York: Ford Foundation and Foreign Policy Association, 1991), p. 36.
188. By 1970, 27 percent of white workers (predominantly Afrikaners) were employed by the state or its parastatal industries. Merle Lipton and Charles Simkins, "Introduction," in Lipton and Simkins, State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 1-34, p. 6. See also Adam and Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized, pp. 145-176; Milton J. Esman, "Ethnic Politics and Economic Power," Comparative Politics, Vol. 19, No. 4 (July 1987), pp. 395-418; Merle Lipton, Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa, 1910-84 (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985); and O'Meara, Forty Lost Years.
189. By 1970, 27 percent of white workers (predominantly Afrikaners) were employed by the state or its parastatal industries. Merle Lipton and Charles Simkins, "Introduction," in Lipton and Simkins, State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 1-34, p. 6. See also Adam and Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized, pp. 145-176; Milton J. Esman, "Ethnic Politics and Economic Power," Comparative Politics, Vol. 19, No. 4 (July 1987), pp. 395-418; Merle Lipton, Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa, 1910-84 (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985); and O'Meara, Forty Lost Years.
190. By 1970, 27 percent of white workers (predominantly Afrikaners) were employed by the state or its parastatal industries. Merle Lipton and Charles Simkins, "Introduction," in Lipton and Simkins, State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 1-34, p. 6. See also Adam and Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized, pp. 145-176; Milton J. Esman, "Ethnic Politics and Economic Power," Comparative Politics, Vol. 19, No. 4 (July 1987), pp. 395-418; Merle Lipton, Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa, 1910-84 (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985); and O'Meara, Forty Lost Years.
191. By 1970, 27 percent of white workers (predominantly Afrikaners) were employed by the state or its parastatal industries. Merle Lipton and Charles Simkins, "Introduction," in Lipton and Simkins, State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 1-34, p. 6. See also Adam and Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized, pp. 145-176; Milton J. Esman, "Ethnic Politics and Economic Power," Comparative Politics, Vol. 19, No. 4 (July 1987), pp. 395-418; Merle Lipton, Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa, 1910-84 (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985); and O'Meara, Forty Lost Years.
192. By 1970, 27 percent of white workers (predominantly Afrikaners) were employed by the state or its parastatal industries. Merle Lipton and Charles Simkins, "Introduction," in Lipton and Simkins, State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 1-34, p. 6. See also Adam and Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized, pp. 145-176; Milton J. Esman, "Ethnic Politics and Economic Power," Comparative Politics, Vol. 19, No. 4 (July 1987), pp. 395-418; Merle Lipton, Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa, 1910-84 (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985); and O'Meara, Forty Lost Years.
193. Modest trade liberalization occurred in 1972-76, but the government remained highly protectionist and interventionist at the time that it decided to build nuclear weapons. Botha's government favored market reforms more than did Vorster's, but did little more than loosen several racial labor and financial restrictions that had become highly burdensome to industry. Trevor Bell, "Should South Africa Further Liberalise Its Foreign Trade?" in Lipton and Simkins, State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa, pp. 81-128; Graham A. Davis, South African Managed Trade Policy: The Wasting of a Mineral Endowment (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); and Stephen R. Lewis, Jr., The Economics of Apartheid (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990).
194. Modest trade liberalization occurred in 1972-76, but the government remained highly protectionist and interventionist at the time that it decided to build nuclear weapons. Botha's government favored market reforms more than did Vorster's, but did little more than loosen several racial labor and financial restrictions that had become highly burdensome to industry. Trevor Bell, "Should South Africa Further Liberalise Its Foreign Trade?" in Lipton and Simkins, State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa, pp. 81-128; Graham A. Davis, South African Managed Trade Policy: The Wasting of a Mineral Endowment (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); and Stephen R. Lewis, Jr., The Economics of Apartheid (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990).
195. Modest trade liberalization occurred in 1972-76, but the government remained highly protectionist and interventionist at the time that it decided to build nuclear weapons. Botha's government favored market reforms more than did Vorster's, but did little more than loosen several racial labor and financial restrictions that had become highly burdensome to industry. Trevor Bell, "Should South Africa Further Liberalise Its Foreign Trade?" in Lipton and Simkins, State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa, pp. 81-128; Graham A. Davis, South African Managed Trade Policy: The Wasting of a Mineral Endowment (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); and Stephen R. Lewis, Jr., The Economics of Apartheid (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990).
196. Neta C. Crawford, "Oil Sanctions against Apartheid," in Crawford and Klotz, How Sanctions Work, pp. 103-126; and Fig, "Sanctions and the Nuclear Industry."
197. Neta C. Crawford, "Oil Sanctions against Apartheid," in Crawford and Klotz, How Sanctions Work, pp. 103-126; and Fig, "Sanctions and the Nuclear Industry."
198. Interview with F.W. de Klerk, Cape Town, April 7, 1999.
199. Correspondence with Stumpf.
200. Jaster, Defence of White Power, p. 168. The nuclear strategy working group had already concluded that "not signing the NPT but expressing our interest in doing so, and then stalling any negotiations, would be in line with our 'strategy of uncertainty.'" Correspondence with Buys, December 10, 1999.
201. Interviews with Barnard, January 22, 1999; and van Heerden. The group included van Heerden, National Intelligence Service Director-General Niel Barnard, AEC Chairman J.W. de Villiers, and Johannes Steyn of Armscor.
202. Interview with a South African official.
203. Correspondence with Dawid de Villiers, September 6, 2000.
204. Correspondence with Stumpf. Dawid de Villiers recalls that de Klerk's instructions were more open-ended; correspondence, September 6, 2000; cf. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 17.
205. Interview with de Klerk; and F.W. de Klerk, The Last Trek: A New Beginning (London: Macmillan, 1998), p. 273. De Klerk knew about the program from his tenure as minerals and en-ergy minister from 1980 to 1982. After suggesting (during brief remarks at a small ribbon-cutting ceremony) that the government use the nuclear capability "for the benefit of all South Africans," Buys recalls receiving a scowl from RW. Botha but a private appreciation from de Klerk. Interview with Buys.
206. Correspondence with Stumpf.
207. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 17-19.
208. Arguing that a pre-November decision undermines a security explanation is Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" p. 70.
209. Cracker, High Noon in Southern Africa, pp. 373-464; Daniel R. Kempton, "New Thinking and Soviet Policy towards South Africa," tournai of Modern African Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1990), pp. 545-572; and Michael McFaul, "Rethinking the 'Reagan Doctrine' in Angola," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Winter 1989/90), pp. 99-135.
210. Cracker, High Noon in Southern Africa, pp. 373-464; Daniel R. Kempton, "New Thinking and Soviet Policy towards South Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1990), pp. 545-572; and Michael McFaul, "Rethinking the 'Reagan Doctrine' in Angola," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Winter 1989/90), pp. 99-135.
211. Cracker, High Noon in Southern Africa, pp. 373-464; Daniel R. Kempton, "New Thinking and Soviet Policy towards South Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1990), pp. 545-572; and Michael McFaul, "Rethinking the 'Reagan Doctrine' in Angola," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Winter 1989/90), pp. 99-135.
212. Interview with de Klerk; and de Klerk, Last Trek, p. 114.
213. De Klerk, Last Trek, p. 274.
214. Interview with de Klerk.
215. Peter Batchelor and Susan Willett, Disarmament and Defence Industrial Adjicstment in South Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 67-68.
216. Presidential interest often favors clinging to failing policies to avoid admitting error, but sus-tained secrecy would have minimized the domestic fallout from a policy reversal. At most, organi-zational politics might explain Botha's stronger preference for military over diplomatic policy instruments, compared to de Klerk. This strains the theory, however, because it had been nearly a decade since Botha had given up the defense portfolio.
217. Interview with Pik Botha, August 25, 1999. Botha's characterization was echoed in an inter-view with Grant. Skeptical impressions were heard in interviews with Steyn, Malan, and Buys.
218. Interview with van Heerden.
219. Ibid.
220. March 1989 budget speech, quoted in Robert M. Price, The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975-1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 275.
221. Telephone conversation with Barend du Plessis, August 26, 1999.
222. Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," pp. 14-16.
223. Batchelor and Willett, Disarmament and Defence Industrial Adjustment, p. 38.
224. John Walmsley, "The South African Nuclear Industry," Nuclear Engineer, Vol. 38, No. 4 (July 1997), pp. 99-103, at p. 100.
225. Interview with Steyn.
226. Fig. "Sanctions and the Nuclear Industry," p. 96. De Villiers was never as enthusiastic about the weapons program as his predecessor, Ampie Roux. Interview with Grant; and correspondence with Stumpf. One possible incentive to scrap the bomb, pointed out to me by Andrew Marquard, might have been to shed apartheid-era baggage in order to maintain support for the AEB under future black governments. South African nuclear power officials were also eager to join the NPT, though this would have been more in line with their organizational interests, because South Africa's state-owned electricity utility-Eskom-needed international capital and technology to expand power production and was paying exorbitant prices for the AEB's low-enriched uranium; cf. Mark Hibbs, "Eskom Will Not Order New Reactor before 1992," Nucleonics Week, September 6, 1990, p. 14.
227. Fig. "Sanctions and the Nuclear Industry," p. 96. De Villiers was never as enthusiastic about the weapons program as his predecessor, Ampie Roux. Interview with Grant; and correspondence with Stumpf. One possible incentive to scrap the bomb, pointed out to me by Andrew Marquard, might have been to shed apartheid-era baggage in order to maintain support for the AEB under future black governments. South African nuclear power officials were also eager to join the NPT, though this would have been more in line with their organizational interests, because South Africa's state-owned electricity utility-Eskom-needed international capital and technology to expand power production and was paying exorbitant prices for the AEB's low-enriched uranium; cf. Mark Hibbs, "Eskom Will Not Order New Reactor before 1992," Nucleonics Week, September 6, 1990, p. 14.
228. De Klerk, Last Trek, p. 274; and Hibbs, "Dismantling," p. 10.
229. De Klerk, Last Trek, p. 274; and Hibbs, "Dismantling," p. 10.
230. Interview with Malan.
231. Interview with Geldenhuys, January 25, 1999.
232. Ibid. According to Buys, over time "there was a change in attitude. . . . eventually I managed to get very good cooperation from the [military], particularly on the safety and security aspect." Interview with Buys.
233. Interviews with Grant; and Breytenbach. This story, however, was discounted in an interview with Geldenhuys, August 24, 1999.
234. Seegers, Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, pp. 266-268.
235. O'Meara, Forty Lost Years, p. 398.
236. Interview with van Heerden; but see Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 32.
237. Fig, "Sanctions and the Nuclear Industry," pp. 87-89; and Fabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program," pp. 6-7.
238. Fig, "Sanctions and the Nuclear Industry," pp. 87-89; and Fabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program," pp. 6-7.
239. Interviews with van Heerden; Pik Botha, August 25, 1999; and Richard J.K. Stratford, former special assistant to the U.S. ambassador-at-large for nuclear affairs, Washington, D.C., December 13, 1999. On additional nuclear sanctions in the 1980s, see Fig, "Sanctions and the Nuclear Industry," pp. 88-89. The South African government did press the United States for a new peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement soon after signing the NPT. Correspondence with Fred McGoldrick, former U.S. State Department official, May 31, 2001.
240. Paul Rich, "Changing Relations with the United States," in Greg Mills, ed., From Pariah to Participant: South Africa's Evolving Foreign Relations, 1990-1994 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1994), pp. 98-104.
241. Interview with Steyn.
242. Interview with de Klerk.
243. Sanctions and isolation were important reasons for the change, but probably not the main ones. Black political resistance, apartheid's economic inefficiency, defections of hard-liners from the National Party to the Conservative Party, an eroding white demographic base, Soviet retrenchment (including withdrawal of support for the ANC), and de Klerk's personality all had an impact. Debating the impact of sanctions are Crawford and Klotz, How Sanctions Work; and Anton D. Lowenberg and William H. Kaempfer, The Origins and Demise of South African Apartheid; A Public Choice Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). For fuller explanations of democratization, see Hermann Giliomee, "Democratization in South Africa," Political Science Quarterly Vol. 110, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 83-105; O'Meara, Forty Lost Years; Price, Apartheid State in Crisis; Timothy D. Sisk, Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).
244. Sanctions and isolation were important reasons for the change, but probably not the main ones. Black political resistance, apartheid's economic inefficiency, defections of hard-liners from the National Party to the Conservative Party, an eroding white demographic base, Soviet retrenchment (including withdrawal of support for the ANC), and de Klerk's personality all had an impact. Debating the impact of sanctions are Crawford and Klotz, How
245. Sanctions and isolation were important reasons for the change, but probably not the main ones. Black political resistance, apartheid's economic inefficiency, defections of hard-liners from the National Party to the Conservative Party, an eroding white demographic base, Soviet retrenchment (including withdrawal of support for the ANC), and de Klerk's personality all had an impact. Debating the impact of sanctions are Crawford and Klotz, How Sanctions Work; and Anton D. Lowenberg and William H. Kaempfer, The Origins and Demise of South African Apartheid; A Public Choice Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). For fuller explanations of democratization, see Hermann Giliomee, "Democratization in South Africa," Political Science Quarterly Vol. 110, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 83-105; O'Meara, Forty Lost Years; Price, Apartheid State in Crisis; Timothy D. Sisk, Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).
246. Sanctions and isolation were important reasons for the change, but probably not the main ones. Black political resistance, apartheid's economic inefficiency, defections of hard-liners from the National Party to the Conservative Party, an eroding white demographic base, Soviet retrenchment (including withdrawal of support for the ANC), and de Klerk's personality all had an impact. Debating the impact of sanctions are Crawford and Klotz, How Sanctions Work; and Anton D. Lowenberg and William H. Kaempfer, The Origins and Demise of South African Apartheid; A Public Choice Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). For fuller explanations of democratization, see Hermann Giliomee, "Democratization in South Africa," Political Science Quarterly Vol. 110, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 83-105; O'Meara, Forty Lost Years; Price, Apartheid State in Crisis; Timothy D. Sisk, Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).
247. Sanctions and isolation were important reasons for the change, but probably not the main ones. Black political resistance, apartheid's economic inefficiency, defections of hard-liners from the National Party to the Conservative Party, an eroding white demographic base, Soviet retrenchment (including withdrawal of support for the ANC), and de Klerk's personality all had an impact. Debating the impact of sanctions are Crawford and Klotz, How Sanctions Work; and Anton D. Lowenberg and William H. Kaempfer, The Origins and Demise of South African Apartheid; A Public Choice Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). For fuller explanations of democratization, see Hermann Giliomee, "Democratization in South Africa," Political Science Quarterly Vol. 110, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 83-105; O'Meara, Forty Lost Years; Price, Apartheid State in Crisis; Timothy D. Sisk, Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).
248. Sanctions and isolation were important reasons for the change, but probably not the main ones. Black political resistance, apartheid's economic inefficiency, defections of hard-liners from the National Party to the Conservative Party, an eroding white demographic base, Soviet retrenchment (including withdrawal of support for the ANC), and de Klerk's personality all had an impact. Debating the impact of sanctions are Crawford and Klotz, How Sanctions Work; and Anton D. Lowenberg and William H. Kaempfer, The Origins and Demise of South African Apartheid; A Public Choice Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). For fuller explanations of democratization, see Hermann Giliomee, "Democratization in South Africa," Political Science Quarterly Vol. 110, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 83-105; O'Meara, Forty Lost Years; Price, Apartheid State in Crisis; Timothy D. Sisk, Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).
249. Allister Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa's Road to Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 91-108.
250. Interview with Pik Botha, April 9, 1999.
251. Interview with de Klerk. Also making this point is Giliomee, "Democratization in South Africa.
252. Interview with van Heerden.
253. Interview with de Klerk. Du Plessis also made this argument; Patti Waldmeir, "Born Again into Capitalism," Financial Times, June 11, 1990, Survey, p. 2.
254. Interviews with Barnard, January 22, 1999; Breytenbach; and Coetsee. De Klerk's eagerness, in his own words, to fully "rejoin the international community" does suggest the importance of international norms, to him at least. Interview with de Klerk.
255. Correspondence with Dawid de Villiers, May 16, 2001; and telephone conversation with Stumpf.
256. Political leaders can select policies that advance the coalition's overall interests even in the absence of overt mobilization. Thus the lack of antinuclear mobilization by South African business and other societal liberalizers does not contradict the theory.
257. On declining Afrikaner nationalism in the National Party, see Hermann Giliomee, "Broedertwis: Intra-Afrikaner Conflicts in the Transition from Apartheid," African Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 364 (July 1992), pp. 339-364.
258. De Klerk, Last Trek, pp. 151, 154, 228. On business support for de Klerk and political reform, see Robin Lee, Margaret Sutherland, Mark Phillips, and Anne McLennan, "Speaking or Listening? Observers or Agents of Change? Business and Public Policy: 1989/90," in Lee and Lawrence Schlemmer, eds., Transition to Democracy: Policy Perspectives, 1991 (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 95-126; Louwrens Pretorius, "The Head of Government and Organised Business," in Robert Schrire, ed., Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), pp. 209-244; Giliomee, "Democratization in South Africa"; Jan Hofmeyr, The Impact of Sanctions on White South Africa, Part 2, Whites' Political Attitudes (Washington, D.C.: Investor Responsibility Research Center, 1990); O'Meara, Forty Lost Years; and Annette Strauss, "The 1992 Referendum in South Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 339- 360, especially pp. 348-349.
259. De Klerk, Last Trek, pp. 151, 154, 228. On business support for de Klerk and political reform, see Robin Lee, Margaret Sutherland, Mark Phillips, and Anne McLennan, "Speaking or Listening? Observers or Agents of Change? Business and Public Policy: 1989/90," in Lee and Lawrence Schlemmer, eds., Transition to Democracy: Policy Perspectives, 1991 (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 95-126; Louwrens Pretorius, "The Head of Government and Organised Business," in Robert Schrire, ed., Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), pp. 209-244; Giliomee, "Democratization in South Africa"; Jan Hofmeyr, The Impact of Sanctions on White South Africa, Part 2, Whites' Political Attitudes (Washington, D.C.: Investor Responsibility Research Center, 1990); O'Meara, Forty Lost Years; and Annette Strauss, "The 1992 Referendum in South Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 339- 360, especially pp. 348-349.
260. De Klerk, Last Trek, pp. 151, 154, 228. On business support for de Klerk and political reform, see Robin Lee, Margaret Sutherland, Mark Phillips, and Anne McLennan, "Speaking or Listening? Observers or Agents of Change? Business and Public Policy: 1989/90," in Lee and Lawrence Schlemmer, eds., Transition to Democracy: Policy Perspectives, 1991 (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 95-126; Louwrens Pretorius, "The Head of Government and Organised Business," in Robert Schrire, ed., Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), pp. 209-244; Giliomee, "Democratization in South Africa"; Jan Hofmeyr, The Impact of Sanctions on White South Africa, Part 2, Whites' Political Attitudes (Washington, D.C.: Investor Responsibility Research Center, 1990); O'Meara, Forty Lost Years; and Annette Strauss, "The 1992 Referendum in South Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 339- 360, especially pp. 348-349.
261. De Klerk, Last Trek, pp. 151, 154, 228. On business support for de Klerk and political reform, see Robin Lee, Margaret Sutherland, Mark Phillips, and Anne McLennan, "Speaking or Listening? Observers or Agents of Change? Business and Public Policy: 1989/90," in Lee and Lawrence Schlemmer, eds., Transition to Democracy: Policy Perspectives, 1991 (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 95-126; Louwrens Pretorius, "The Head of Government and Organised Business," in Robert Schrire, ed., Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), pp. 209-244; Giliomee, "Democratization in South Africa"; Jan Hofmeyr, The Impact of Sanctions on White South Africa, Part 2, Whites' Political Attitudes (Washington, D.C.: Investor Responsibility Research Center, 1990); O'Meara, Forty Lost Years; and Annette Strauss, "The 1992 Referendum in South Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 339- 360, especially pp. 348-349.
262. De Klerk, Last Trek, pp. 151, 154, 228. On business support for de Klerk and political reform, see Robin Lee, Margaret Sutherland, Mark Phillips, and Anne McLennan, "Speaking or Listening? Observers or Agents of Change? Business and Public Policy: 1989/90," in Lee and Lawrence Schlemmer, eds., Transition to Democracy: Policy Perspectives, 1991 (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 95-126; Louwrens Pretorius, "The Head of Government and Organised Business," in Robert Schrire, ed., Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), pp. 209-244; Giliomee, "Democratization in South Africa"; Jan Hofmeyr, The Impact of Sanctions on White South Africa, Part 2, Whites' Political Attitudes (Washington, D.C.: Investor Responsibility Research Center, 1990); O'Meara, Forty Lost Years; and Annette Strauss, "The 1992 Referendum in South Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 339- 360, especially pp. 348-349.
263. De Klerk, Last Trek, pp. 151, 154, 228. On business support for de Klerk and political reform, see Robin Lee, Margaret Sutherland, Mark Phillips, and Anne McLennan, "Speaking or Listening? Observers or Agents of Change? Business and Public Policy: 1989/90," in Lee and Lawrence Schlemmer, eds., Transition to Democracy: Policy Perspectives, 1991 (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 95-126; Louwrens Pretorius, "The Head of Government and Organised Business," in Robert Schrire, ed., Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), pp. 209-244; Giliomee, "Democratization in South Africa"; Jan Hofmeyr, The Impact of Sanctions on White South Africa, Part 2, Whites' Political Attitudes (Washington, D.C.: Investor Responsibility Research Center, 1990); O'Meara, Forty Lost Years; and Annette Strauss, "The 1992 Referendum in South Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 339- 360, especially pp. 348-349.
264. De Klerk, Last Trek, pp. 151, 154, 228. On business support for de Klerk and political reform, see Robin Lee, Margaret Sutherland, Mark Phillips, and Anne McLennan, "Speaking or Listening? Observers or Agents of Change? Business and Public Policy: 1989/90," in Lee and Lawrence Schlemmer, eds., Transition to Democracy: Policy Perspectives, 1991 (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 95-126; Louwrens Pretorius, "The Head of Government and Organised Business," in Robert Schrire, ed., Malan to De Klerk: Leadership in the Apartheid State (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), pp. 209-244; Giliomee, "Democratization in South Africa"; Jan Hofmeyr, The Impact of Sanctions on White South Africa, Part 2, Whites' Political Attitudes (Washington, D.C.: Investor Responsibility Research Center, 1990); O'Meara, Forty Lost Years; and Annette Strauss, "The 1992 Referendum in South Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 339-360, especially pp. 348-349.
265. Bell, "Should South Africa Liberalise Its Foreign Trade?"; Trevor Bell, "Trade Policy," in Jonathan Michie and Vishnu Padayachee, eds., The Political Economy of South Africa's Transition: Policy Perspectives in the Late 1990's (New York: Dryden, 1997), pp. 71-90; W. Duncan Reekie, "Should South African Parastatals Be Privatised?" in Lipton and Simkins, State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa, pp. 129-169; and Waldmeir, "Born Again into Capitalism." Some observers suggest that the ANC persuaded de Klerk in 1990 to slow down privatization, to give a successor democratic government more say over economic policy. As it turned out, the ANC proved more liberal than the National Party.
266. Bell, "Should South Africa Liberalise Its Foreign Trade?"; Trevor Bell, "Trade Policy," in Jonathan Michie and Vishnu Padayachee, eds., The Political Economy of South Africa's Transition: Policy Perspectives in the Late 1990's (New York: Dryden, 1997), pp. 71-90; W. Duncan Reekie, "Should South African Parastatals Be Privatised?" in Lipton and Simkins, State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa, pp. 129-169; and Waldmeir, "Born Again into Capitalism." Some observers suggest that the ANC persuaded de Klerk in 1990 to slow down privatization, to give a successor democratic government more say over economic policy. As it turned out, the ANC proved more liberal than the National Party.
267. Bell, "Should South Africa Liberalise Its Foreign Trade?"; Trevor Bell, "Trade Policy," in Jonathan Michie and Vishnu Padayachee, eds., The Political Economy of South Africa's Transition: Policy Perspectives in the Late 1990's (New York: Dryden, 1997), pp. 71-90; W. Duncan Reekie, "Should South African Parastatals Be Privatised?" in Lipton and Simkins, State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa, pp. 129-169; and Waldmeir, "Born Again into Capitalism." Some observers suggest that the ANC persuaded de Klerk in 1990 to slow down privatization, to give a successor democratic government more say over economic policy. As it turned out, the ANC proved more liberal than the National Party.
268. Bell, "Should South Africa Liberalise Its Foreign Trade?"; Trevor Bell, "Trade Policy," in Jonathan Michie and Vishnu Padayachee, eds., The Political Economy of South Africa's Transition: Policy Perspectives in the Late 1990's (New York: Dryden, 1997), pp. 71-90; W. Duncan Reekie, "Should South African Parastatals Be Privatised?" in Lipton and Simkins, State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa, pp. 129-169; and Waldmeir, "Born Again into Capitalism." Some observers suggest that the ANC persuaded de Klerk in 1990 to slow down privatization, to give a successor democratic government more say over economic policy. As it turned out, the ANC proved more liberal than the National Party.
269. Dawid de Villiers had previously been involved in developing tariff reduction and privatization policy as trade and industry minister, as had du Plessis as minister of finance. Willem "Wim" de Villiers was a former industrialist and leading free marketeer whom de Klerk appointed minister of administration and privatization.
270. Interview with van Heerden.
271. Interview with de Klerk. Stumpf told a reporter in 1991 that "the prospect of black-majority rule . . . was a major consideration" in the government's decision to end the strategic emphasis of the program and join the NPT, but now explains that he believed that the weapons would have been an albatross for a Mandela government. Telephone conversation with Stumpf; and Pabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program," p. 19. Malan, but neither Pik Botha nor van Heerden' says that he heard U.S. contacts argue against an ANC nuclear inheritance. Interviews with Pik Botha, August 25, 1999; Malan; and van Heerden. On this issue, see also David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "South Africa: The ANC and the Atom Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 49, No. 3 (May-June 1993), pp. 32-37, at p. 33; and Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 20-21.
272. Interview with de Klerk. Stumpf told a reporter in 1991 that "the prospect of black-majority rule . . . was a major consideration" in the government's decision to end the strategic emphasis of the program and join the NPT, but now explains that he believed that the weapons would have been an albatross for a Mandela government. Telephone conversation with Stumpf; and Pabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program," p. 19. Malan, but neither Pik Botha nor van Heerden' says that he heard U.S. contacts argue against an ANC nuclear inheritance. Interviews with Pik Botha, August 25, 1999; Malan; and van Heerden. On this issue, see also David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "South Africa: The ANC and the Atom Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 49, No. 3 (May-June 1993), pp. 32-37, at p. 33; and Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 20-21.
273. Interview with de Klerk. Stumpf told a reporter in 1991 that "the prospect of black-majority rule . . . was a major consideration" in the government's decision to end the strategic emphasis of the program and join the NPT, but now explains that he believed that the weapons would have been an albatross for a Mandela government. Telephone conversation with Stumpf; and Pabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program," p. 19. Malan, but neither Pik Botha nor van Heerden' says that he heard U.S. contacts argue against an ANC nuclear inheritance. Interviews with Pik Botha, August 25, 1999; Malan; and van Heerden. On this issue, see also David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "South Africa: The ANC and the Atom Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 49, No. 3 (May-June 1993), pp. 32-37, at p. 33; and Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 20-21.
274. Telephone conversation with Chester Crocker, U.S. assistant secretary of state for Africa (1981-88), February 18, 2000.
275. Sole, "South African Nuclear Case," p. 74.