The perils of predicting proliferation

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 53, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 302-328

  Montgomery, Alexander H ^a   Sagan, Scott D ^b  

^a REED COLLEGE   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Kargil; Nonproliferation treaty; Nuclear weapons proliferation; Policy relevance; Robustness

Indexed keywords

EID: 62949128180     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: 15528766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002708330581     Document Type: Article

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