Lavish returns on cheap talk: Two-way communication in trust games

Journal of Socio-Economics

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 1-13

  Ben Ner, Avner ^a   Putterman, Louis ^b   Ren, Ting ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c PEKING UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Cheap talk; Commitment; Communication; Reciprocity; Trust; Trust game; Trustworthiness

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650992292     PISSN: 10535357     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2010.09.009     Document Type: Article

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