Trust, communication and contracts: An experiment

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 70, Issue 1-2, 2009, Pages 106-121

  Ben Ner, Avner ^a   Putterman, Louis ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Commitment; Communication; Reciprocity; Trust; Trust game; Trustworthiness

Indexed keywords

EID: 64249107613     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.01.011     Document Type: Article

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