The trust paradox: A survey of economic inquiries into the nature of trust and trustworthiness

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 47, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 291-307

  James Jr , Harvey S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

Author keywords

Prisoner's dilemma; Rationally; Social norms; Transaction costs; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036200608     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00214-1     Document Type: Article

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