Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 71, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 100-120

  Fudenberg, Drew ^a   Takahashi, Satoru ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650868877     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.014     Document Type: Article

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