Learning in perturbed asymmetric games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 133-152

  Hofbauer, Josef ^a   Hopkins, Ed ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Best response dynamics; Games; Learning; Mixed strategy equilibria; Potential games; Stochastic fictitious play; Zero sum games

Indexed keywords

EID: 20344390000     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.006     Document Type: Article

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