Evolution in Bayesian games II: Stability of purified equilibria

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 136, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 641-667

  Sandholm, William H ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

Best response dynamic; Evolutionary game theory; Harsanyi purification

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548026266     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.003     Document Type: Article

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