CEO turnover, firm performance and corporate governance: Empirical evidence on Danish firms

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 391-414

  Lausten, Mette ^a  

^a DANISH INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH   (Denmark)

Author keywords

CEO turnover; Corporate governance; Ownership structure

Indexed keywords

EID: 31244432689     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(00)00083-7     Document Type: Article

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