-
1
-
-
3843134038
-
Abandonment options and information system design
-
Arya, A., J. Glover. 2003. Abandonment options and information system design. Rev. Accounting Stud. 8 29-45.
-
(2003)
Rev. Accounting Stud
, vol.8
, pp. 29-45
-
-
Arya, A.1
Glover, J.2
-
2
-
-
84977730652
-
Why hang on to losers? Divestitures and takeovers
-
Boot, A. 1992. Why hang on to losers? Divestitures and takeovers. J. Finance 47 1401-1424.
-
(1992)
J. Finance
, vol.47
, pp. 1401-1424
-
-
Boot, A.1
-
3
-
-
0742269353
-
Empirical research on CEO turnover and firm-performance: A discussion
-
Brickley, J. 2003. Empirical research on CEO turnover and firm-performance: A discussion. J. Accounting Econom. 36 227-233.
-
(2003)
J. Accounting Econom
, vol.36
, pp. 227-233
-
-
Brickley, J.1
-
4
-
-
0002861826
-
Escalation errors and the sunk cost effect: An explanation based on reputation and information asymmetries
-
Bushman, R., C. Kanodia, J. Dickhaut. 1989. Escalation errors and the sunk cost effect: An explanation based on reputation and information asymmetries. J. Accounting Res. 27 59-77.
-
(1989)
J. Accounting Res
, vol.27
, pp. 59-77
-
-
Bushman, R.1
Kanodia, C.2
Dickhaut, J.3
-
5
-
-
84993897491
-
Performance changes following top management dismissals
-
Denis, D., D. Denis. 1995. Performance changes following top management dismissals. J. Finance 50 1029-1057.
-
(1995)
J. Finance
, vol.50
, pp. 1029-1057
-
-
Denis, D.1
Denis, D.2
-
6
-
-
38549117576
-
-
Mimeo, Stern School of Business, New York University, New York
-
Dezsö, C. L. 2004. Scapegoating and firm reputation. Mimeo, Stern School of Business, New York University, New York.
-
(2004)
Scapegoating and firm reputation
-
-
Dezsö, C.L.1
-
7
-
-
1342328634
-
Management turnover across the corporate hierarchy
-
Fee, C., C. Hadlock. 2004. Management turnover across the corporate hierarchy. J. Accounting Econom. 37 3-38.
-
(2004)
J. Accounting Econom
, vol.37
, pp. 3-38
-
-
Fee, C.1
Hadlock, C.2
-
8
-
-
0242468548
-
Board efficiency and internal corporate control mechanisms
-
Graziano, C., A. Luporini. 2003. Board efficiency and internal corporate control mechanisms. J. Econom. Management Strategy 12 495-530.
-
(2003)
J. Econom. Management Strategy
, vol.12
, pp. 495-530
-
-
Graziano, C.1
Luporini, A.2
-
9
-
-
38549147206
-
-
Handelsblatt. 1999. Drama in Munich: BMW's board dismisses its two best managers. (February 8) 12.
-
Handelsblatt. 1999. Drama in Munich: BMW's board dismisses its two best managers. (February 8) 12.
-
-
-
-
10
-
-
0348194856
-
Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO
-
Hermalin, B., M. Weisbach. 1998. Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO. Amer. Econom. Rev. 88 96-118.
-
(1998)
Amer. Econom. Rev
, vol.88
, pp. 96-118
-
-
Hermalin, B.1
Weisbach, M.2
-
11
-
-
0000855326
-
Managerial performance, board of directors and takeover bidding
-
Hirshleifer, D., A. Thakor. 1994. Managerial performance, board of directors and takeover bidding. J. Corporate Finance 1 63-90.
-
(1994)
J. Corporate Finance
, vol.1
, pp. 63-90
-
-
Hirshleifer, D.1
Thakor, A.2
-
12
-
-
0032263313
-
Corporate control through board dismissals and takeovers
-
Hirshleifer, D., A. Thakor. 1998. Corporate control through board dismissals and takeovers. J. Econom. Management Strategy 7 489-520.
-
(1998)
J. Econom. Management Strategy
, vol.7
, pp. 489-520
-
-
Hirshleifer, D.1
Thakor, A.2
-
13
-
-
38549106265
-
Why humans care about sunk costs while animals don't
-
Working paper, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany
-
Hoeffler, F. 2005. Why humans care about sunk costs while animals don't. An evolutionary explanation. Working paper, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany.
-
(2005)
An evolutionary explanation
-
-
Hoeffler, F.1
-
14
-
-
0141744966
-
Do new brooms sweep clean?-When and why dismissing a manager increases the subordinates' performance
-
Hoeffler, F., D. Sliwka. 2003. Do new brooms sweep clean?-When and why dismissing a manager increases the subordinates' performance. Eur. Econom. Rev. 47 877-890.
-
(2003)
Eur. Econom. Rev
, vol.47
, pp. 877-890
-
-
Hoeffler, F.1
Sliwka, D.2
-
15
-
-
4243442002
-
Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective
-
Holmström, B. 1999. Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective. Rev. Econom. Stud. 66 169-182.
-
(1999)
Rev. Econom. Stud
, vol.66
, pp. 169-182
-
-
Holmström, B.1
-
16
-
-
0001649619
-
Managerial incentives and capital management
-
Holmström, B., J. Ricart i Costa. 1986. Managerial incentives and capital management. Quart. J. Econom. 101 835-860.
-
(1986)
Quart. J. Econom
, vol.101
, pp. 835-860
-
-
Holmström, B.1
Ricart i Costa, J.2
-
17
-
-
11844289617
-
Information revelation, incentives, and the value of a real option
-
Mittendorf, B. 2004. Information revelation, incentives, and the value of a real option. Management Sci. 50 1638-1645.
-
(2004)
Management Sci
, vol.50
, pp. 1638-1645
-
-
Mittendorf, B.1
-
18
-
-
0001163724
-
CEO turnover and the firm's investment decisions
-
Weisbach, M. 1995. CEO turnover and the firm's investment decisions. J. Financial Econom. 37 159-188.
-
(1995)
J. Financial Econom
, vol.37
, pp. 159-188
-
-
Weisbach, M.1
|