Synthetic biology and the ethics of knowledge

Journal of Medical Ethics

Volumn 36, Issue 11, 2010, Pages 687-693

  Douglas, Thomas ^a   Savulescu, Julian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BIOETHICS; BIOTECHNOLOGY; ETHICS; HUMAN; KNOWLEDGE; MALPRACTICE;

BIOETHICAL ISSUES; BIOTECHNOLOGY; HUMANS; KNOWLEDGE; MALPRACTICE;

EID: 78049376252     PISSN: 03066800     EISSN: 14734257     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1136/jme.2010.038232     Document Type: Article

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