Taking due care: Moral obligations in dual use research

Bioethics

Volumn 22, Issue 9, 2008, Pages 477-487

  Kuhlau, Frida ^a,b   Eriksson, Stefan ^c   Evers, Kathinka ^b   HÖglund, Anna T ^b  

^a UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^b UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^c NONE

Author keywords

Bioethics; Biological weapons; Dual use; Duty; Obligation; Research ethics

Indexed keywords

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE; MORALITY; RESEARCH ETHICS; REVIEW; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

BIOTERRORISM; ETHICS, RESEARCH; MORAL OBLIGATIONS; SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY;

EID: 54049115097     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: 14678519     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2008.00695.x     Document Type: Review

References (62)

1. R.M. Atlas M.R. Dando. The Dual-use Dilemma for the Life Sciences: Perspectives, Conundrums, and Global Solutions. Biosecur Bioterror 2006 4 : 276 286 : 276.
2. According to Brian Rappert, professional codes can be classified according to aim. Often, codes of ethics are aspiring, codes of conduct advisory or educational, and codes of practice are enforceable. Available at: http://www.projects.ex.ac.uk/codesofconduct/Examples/index.htm [Accessed 27 Apr 2008]. Examples of practical guidelines can be found at the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), which lists research areas of concern. The Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) recently published a code of conduct for biosecurity requesting practical implementation of the code. Several other professional organizations have formulated codes of ethics and conduct such as the World Medical Association (WMA) and the InterAcademy Panel (IAP).
3. See for example, M.A. Somerville M.R. Atlas. Ethics: A Weapon to Counter Bioterrorism. Science 2005 307 : 1881 1882
4. D.B. Resnik A.E. Shamoo. Bioterrorism and the Responsible Conduct of Biomedical Research. Drug Dev Res 2005 63 : 121 133
5. D. Cressey. Not so Secure After All - How Safe are Our Microbiology Labs? Nature 2007 448 : 732 733.
6. This is acknowledged as the first general principle in the European Charter for Researchers. Commission of the European Communities. 2005. Commission Recommendation on the European Charter for Researchers and a Code of Conduct for the Recruitment of Researchers. Brussels: Commission: 11. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eracareers/pdf/am509774CEE_EN_E4.pdf [Accessed 8 May 2008].
7. National Intelligence Council (NIC). 2004. Mapping the Global Future - Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2010 Project. Washington, DC: NIC: 95. Available at: http://www.biosecurityboard.gov/ Framework%20for%20transmittal%200807_Sept07.pdf [Accessed 23 Oct 2007]. See also National Intelligence Council website. Available at: http://www.dni.gov/nic/ NIC_home.html [Accessed 6 Dec 2007].
8. Commission of the European Communities. 2007. Green Paper on Biopreparedness. Brussels: Commission: 2. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa. eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2007/com2007_0399en01.pdf [Accessed 27 Nov 2007].
9. It is beyond the scope of this article to present a definition of the multifaceted concept of terrorism. Bioterrorism can be defined as '[t]he intentional release of biological agents or toxins for the purpose of harming and killing humans, animals and plants with the intent to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population to further political or social objectives'. Interpol. 2007. Bioterrorism Incident Pre-Planning & Response Guide. Lyon: ICPO-Interpol: 7. Available at: http://www.interpol.int/Public/BioTerrorism/ default.asp [Accessed 16 Nov 2007].
10. F. Kuhlau. 2006. Disease Outbreaks: Managing Threats to Health and Security. In Health and Conflict Prevention. Anders Mellbourn, ed. Hedemora: Gidlunds förlag: 63-79.
11. M. Wheelis M. Dando. Neurobiology: A Case Study of the Imminent Militarization of Biology. International Review of the Red Cross 2005 87 : 553 571.
12. J. Tucker A. Sands. An Unlikely Threat. Bul At Sci 1999 55, 4 : 46 52.
13. The most cited cases of successful and attempted events include the Rajneesh using salmonella on food in Dalles, Oregon in 1984, the Japanese group Aum Shinrikyo, which unsuccessfully attempted to procure, produce, and disseminate anthrax and botulinum toxin in 1990-94, the unsuccessful efforts by al-Qaida to obtain anthrax and prepare a facility in which to do microbiological work in 1999 and 2001, and the successful distribution of high-quality dry powder anthrax spores in 2001. (J. Tucker A. Sands. An Unlikely Threat. Bul At Sci 55, 4: Ibid. 2004: 22).
14. J.P. Zanders. Assessing the Risk of Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation to Terrorists. The Non-Proliferation Review 1999 6 (4 17 34.
15. rd edition). Geneva: WHO.
16. WHO. 2006. Biorisk Management: Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance. Geneva, Switzerland: WHO.
17. For example in 2006 the World Health Organization (WHO) published a report on bio-risk management and laboratory bio-security guidance where the assistance of bioethics as one of three strategic approaches to prevent bioterrorism is suggested. In 2008, the EU Council adopted an Joint Action which supports the WHO approach and requires the EU to promote bio-risk reduction practices through, among other things, bioethics.
18. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) 1972. Documents from the meetings in 2005 are available at: http://www.opbw.org [Accessed 27 Apr 2008]. Information about the meetings in 2008 are available at: http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/ F1CD974A1FDE4794C125731A0037D96D?OpenDocument [Accessed 27 Apr 2008].
19. Commission of the European Communities, op. cit. note 6.
20. J.K. Taubenberger et al. Characterization of the 1918 Influenza Virus Polymerase Genes. Nature 2005 437 : 889 893.
21. J. van Aken. When Risk Outweighs Benefit: Dual-use Research Needs a Scientifically Sound Risk-Benefit Analysis and Legally Binding Biosecurity Measures. EMBO rep 2006 7 : 10 13.
22. N.P. Johnson J. Mueller. Updating the Accounts: Global Mortality of the 1918-1920 'Spanish' Influenza Pandemic. Bull Hist Med 2002 76 : 105 115.
23. S.K. Green et al. Guidelines to Prevent Malevolent Use of Biomedical Research. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 2006 15 : 432 439 : 435.
24. th edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
25. th edition). op. cit. note 22.
26. M. Enserink D. Malakoff. Scientific Community: The Trials of Thomas Butler. Science 2003 302 : 2054 2063
27. M. Enserink. Thomas Butler Loses Appeal, Vows to Fight on. Science 2005 310 : 758.
28. The Inter Academy Panel on International Issues (IAP). 2005. IAP Statement on Biosecurity. Trieste: IAP: 1. Available at: http://www.royalsoc.ac. uk/displaypagedoc.asp?id=17463 [Accessed 23 Sep 2007].
29. A. Nordgren. 2001. Responsible Genetics: The Moral Responsibility of Geneticists for the Consequences of Human Genetics Research. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 4.
30. A. Nordgren. 2001. Responsible Genetics: The Moral Responsibility of Geneticists for the Consequences of Human Genetics Research. Ibid.
31. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB). 2007. Proposed Framework for the Oversight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing the Potential Misuse of Research Information. Bethesda, MD: NSABB: 11. Available at: http://www.biosecurityboard.gov/ Framework%20for%20transmittal%200807_Sept07.pdf [Accessed 26 Nov 2007].
32. BTWC, 2007. Proposed Framework for the Oversight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing the Potential Misuse of Research Information. op. cit. note 16.
33. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 1540. 2004. Available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf? OpenElement [Accessed 28 Apr 2008]. This resolution is adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, meaning that it is legally binding and that a breach constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The resolution obliges states to refrain from supporting by any means non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems. Adopting the resolution under Chapter VII sends a clear message that the risk of non-state actors developing these weapons is taken seriously.
34. 2007. Proposed Framework for the Oversight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing the Potential Misuse of Research Information. Ibid. Paras. 2 & 3.
35. This lack of awareness has been revealed in studies among life scientists for example in the UK. See for example M. Dando & B. Rappert. Codes of Conduct for the Life Sciences: Some Insights from UK Academia. Bradford Briefing Paper No. 16 (2nd Series) 2005. Available at: http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/ briefing/BP_16_2ndseries.pdf [Accessed 26 Nov 2007];
36. M. Dando J. Revill. A Hippocratic-Style Oath in the Life Sciences Could Help Educate Researchers About the Dangers of Dual-Use Research. EMBO Rep 2006 7 : 55 60
37. See lists of participants attending the BTWC meetings. Available at: http://www.opbw.org/
38. D.B. Resnik & A.E. Shamoo, A Hippocratic-Style Oath in the Life Sciences Could Help Educate Researchers About the Dangers of Dual-Use Research. EMBO Rep 2006 7: op. cit. note 3, p. 125.
39. S.K. Green et al. A Hippocratic-Style Oath in the Life Sciences Could Help Educate Researchers About the Dangers of Dual-Use Research. EMBO Rep 2006 7: op. cit. note 21.
40. D.B. Resnik & A.E. Shamoo, A Hippocratic-Style Oath in the Life Sciences Could Help Educate Researchers About the Dangers of Dual-Use Research. EMBO Rep 2006 7: op. cit. note 3.
41. United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2007. High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories: Preliminary Observations on the Oversight of the Proliferation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 Laboratories in the United States. Washington, DC: GAO.
42. I. Hunger. 2007. More Transparency for a Secure Biodefense. In Bioterrorism: Confronting a Complex Threat. A. Wenger & R. Wollenmann, eds. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers: 179-196.
43. H.W. Cohen, et al. The Pitfalls of Bioterrorism Preparedness: the Anthrax and Smallpox Experiences. Am J Public Health 2004 94 : 1667 1671.
44. D.B Resnik & A.E. Shamoo, The Pitfalls of Bioterrorism Preparedness: the Anthrax and Smallpox Experiences. Am J Public Health 2004 94 : 1667 1671. op. cit. note 3.
45. World Medical Association (WMA). 2002. The WMA Declaration of Washington Biological Weapons. (Initiated in 2001 and adopted in 2002 by the General Assembly). Washington: WMA. Available at: http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b1.htm [Accessed 15 Oct 2007].
46. IAP, 2002. The WMA Declaration of Washington Biological Weapons. op. cit. note 25.
47. K. Nixdorff W. Bender. Ethics of University Research, Biotechnology and Potential Military Spin-Off. Minerva 2002 40, 1 : 15 35
48. NSABB, Ethics of University Research, Biotechnology and Potential Military Spin-Off. Minerva 2002 40, 1 : 15 35 op. cit. note 28.
49. M.A. Somerville & M.R. Atlas, Ethics of University Research, Biotechnology and Potential Military Spin-Off. Minerva 2002 40, 1 : 15 35 op. cit. note 3.
50. See for example a proposal currently discussed within the European Union. D. Cressey. Europe Ponders Restrictions on Life Sciences - Plan for Two-Tier Publications Gets Cool Reception. Nature 2007 449 : 646 647.
51. Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) official website. Available at http://www.publicationethics.org.uk/cases [Accessed 15 Nov 2007].
52. Journal Editors and Authors Group. Statement on the Consideration of Biodefence and Biosecurity. Nature 2003 421.
53. R.J. Jackson, et al. Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mousepox. J Virol 2001 75 : 1205 1210.
54. R.M. Atlas. National Security and the Biological Research Community. Science 2002 298 : 753 754.
55. S. Miller M.J. Selgelid. Ethical and Philosophical Consideration of the Dual-use Dilemma in the Biological Sciences. Sci Eng Ethics 2007 13 : 523 580.
56. S. Miller M.J. Selgelid. Ethical and Philosophical Consideration of the Dual-use Dilemma in the Biological Sciences. Sci Eng Ethics 2007 13 : 523 580. Ibid.
57. M.A. Somerville & R.M. Atlas, Ethical and Philosophical Consideration of the Dual-use Dilemma in the Biological Sciences. Sci Eng Ethics 2007 13: op. cit. note 3, p. 1882.
58. One Hundred Seventh Congress of the United States of America. 2002. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act. H.R. 3448: 44-52.
59. For more information on US biosecurity measures see for example J.E. Fischer. 2006. Stewardship or Censorship: Balancing Biosecurity, the Public's Health, and the Benefits of Scientific Openness. Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center.
60. American Society for Microbiology (AMS). 2005. Code of Ethics: 2. Available at: http://www.asm.org/ASM/files/ccLibraryFiles/FILENAME/000000001596/ ASMCodeofEthics05.pdf [Accessed 27 Nov 2007].
61. See also M.A. Somerville & R.M. Atlas, Code of Ethics: 2. op. cit. note 3, p. 1882.
62. B.E. Rollin. 2006. Science and Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press: 268-270.