A tale of two studies ethics, bioterrorism, and the censorship of science

Hastings Center Report

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 35-43

  Selgelid, Michael J ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 34250647457     PISSN: 00930334     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/hcr.2007.0046     Document Type: Article

References (42)

1. In M. White, Leonardo: The First Scientist (London: Abacus, 2000), 206. I thank John Weckert for directing me to this quotation.
2. P. Kitcher, Science, Truth and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
3. S. Schweber, In the Shadow of the Bomb: Bethe, Oppenheimer, and the Moral Responsibility of the Scientist (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 18.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 64.
6. M.J. Selgelid, "Smallpox Revisited?" American Journal of Bioethics 3, no. 1 (2003): W5-W11.
7. Central Intelligence Agency, "The Darker Bioweapons Future," November 3, 2003, at http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/bw1103.pdf.
8. For specific details of what the CIA has in mind, see J.B. Petro, T.R. Plasse, and J.A. McNulty, "Biotechnology: Impact on Biological Warfare and Biodefense," Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 1, no. 3 (2003): 161-68.
9. J. Miller, S. Engelberg, and W. Broad, Germs: The Ultimate Weapon (London: Simon and Schuster, 2001).
10. National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2004).
11. R.J. Jackson, AJ. Ramsay, C.D. Christensen, et al., "Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mousepox," Journal of Virology 75, no. 3 (2001): 1205-1210.
12. D. MacKenzie, "U.S. Develops Lethal New Viruses," New Scientist Online News, October 29, 2003, at http://www.newscientist.com/ hottopics/bioterrorism/bioterrorism.jsp?id=ns99994318.
13. J. Cello, A.V. Paul, and E. Wimmer, "Chemical Synthesis of Poliovirus cDNA: Generation of Infectious Virus in the Absence of Natural Template," Science 297 (2002): 1016-18.
14. A. Pollack, "Scientists Create a Live Polio Virus," New York Times, July 12, 2002, at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/12/science/10POLI. html?ex=102750869&ei=1&en=9c90f765631fbcd.
15. M.B. Oldstone, Viruses, Plagues, and History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
16. The official Russian samples have since been moved to a facility called VECTOR.
17. Pollack, "Scientists Create a Live Polio Virus."
18. S.P. Westphal, "Virus Synthesized in a Fortnight," New Scientist Online News, November 14, 2003, at http://www.newscientist.com/ hottopics/bioterrorism.jsp?id=ns99994383.
19. J. Randerson, "Revealed: The Lax Laws That Could Allow Assembly of Deadly Virus DNA," The Guardian, June 14, 2006, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,329504239-111274,00.html.
20. J. Kaiser, "Resurrected Influenza Virus Yields Secrets of Deadly 1918 Pandemic," Science 310 (2005): 28-29.
21. For the range of estimates of deaths caused by the 1918 flu, see G. Kolata, Flu (New York: Pan Books, 1999);
22. J.M. Barry, The Great Influenza (New York: Viking, 2004).
23. K. Alibeck and S. Handelman, Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World - Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran It (New York: Delta, 1999).
24. Only a very small number of health care workers volunteered to be vaccinated.
25. J.K. Taubenberger, A.M. Reid, R.M. Lourens, et al., " Characterization of the 1918 Influenza Virus Polymerase Genes," Nature 437 (2005): 889-93;
26. T.M. Tumpey, C.F. Basler, P.V. Aguilar, et al., "Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus," Science 310 (2005): 77-80.
27. National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, 8.
28. Board of Science and Education, British Medical Association, Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity II (London: British Medical Association, 2004). ANU scientist Peter Kerr nonetheless claims that vaccine resistance in the case of the mousepox study was a real surprise. Personal communication.
29. Personal communication.
30. Journal Editors and Authors Group, "Uncensored Exchange of Scientific Results," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 100, no. 4 (February 18, 2003): 1464, at http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/ pnas.0630491100.
31. Stanley Falkow, "'Statement on Scientific Publication and Security' Fails to Provide Necessary Guidelines," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Online 100, no. 10 (preprint), May 12, 2003, at http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/100/10/5575.
32. The Royal Society, United Nations Foundation, "The Individual and Collective Roles Scientists Can Play in Strengthening International Treaties" (policy document), April 2004, p. 3. The emphasis is mine.
33. J. Wilson, "Preventing Test-Tube Terrorism," The Guardian, April 22, 2004, at http://education.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858, 4906769-110865,00.html. The emphasis is mine.
34. National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, 91-92.
35. Ibid., 93.
36. Ibid., 117.
37. Ibid, 8-9.
38. G.J. Annas, American Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 15.
39. For further discussion of policy options for dealing with the dual-use dilemma, see S. Miller and M.J. Selgelid, Ethical and Philosophical Consideration of the Dual-Use Dilemma (Canberra, Australia: Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Australian National University, and Charles Stuart University, 2006).
40. Though the dual-use dilemma is inherendy international, my analysis here is limited to the domestic context. Though I do not offer an international solution, I aim to show that the status quo with regard to the U.S. domestic solution is unacceptable at present. The general idea of a diversely constituted decision-making body could, in any case, in principle be applied to the international arena. Whether that would be politically feasible (and whether there is any good or feasible international solution) is a separate matter.
41. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. See http://www. biosecurity-board.gov.
42. D. Kennedy, "Better Never Than Late," Science 310 (2005): 195.