-
1
-
-
38249010608
-
How hard is it to control an election?
-
Bartholdi, III, J.; Tovey, C; and Trick, M. 1992. How hard is it to control an election? Mathematical and Computer Modeling 16(8-9):27-40.
-
(1992)
Mathematical and Computer Modeling
, vol.16
, Issue.8-9
, pp. 27-40
-
-
Bartholdi Iii, J.1
Tovey, C.2
Trick, M.3
-
2
-
-
77958600891
-
Computational aspects of covering in dominance graphs
-
Brandt, R, and Fischer, F. 2007. Computational aspects of covering in dominance graphs. In Proc. of AAAI-07.
-
(2007)
Proc. of AAAI-07
-
-
Brandt, R.1
Fischer, F.2
-
3
-
-
78751682864
-
Preference functions that score rankings and maximum likelihood estimation
-
Conitzer, V.; Rognlie, M.; and Xia, L. 2009. Preference functions that score rankings and maximum likelihood estimation. In Proc. of IJCAI-09.
-
(2009)
Proc. of IJCAI-09
-
-
Conitzer, V.1
Rognlie, M.2
Xia, L.3
-
4
-
-
68349104997
-
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
-
Faliszewski, P.; Hemaspaandra, E.; Hemaspaandra, L.; and Rothe, J. 2009. Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control. JAIR 35:275-341.
-
(2009)
JAIR
, vol.35
, pp. 275-341
-
-
Faliszewski, P.1
Hemaspaandra, E.2
Hemaspaandra, L.3
Rothe, J.4
-
7
-
-
21844517785
-
Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
-
Laffond, G.; Laine, J.; and Laslier, J. 1996. Composition consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions. Social Choice and Welfare 13( 1 ):75-93. (Pubitemid 126818421)
-
(1996)
Social Choice and Welfare
, vol.13
, Issue.1
, pp. 75-93
-
-
Laffond, G.1
Laine, J.2
Laslier, J.-F.3
-
9
-
-
85056022440
-
Possible winners when new candidates are added: The case of scoring rules
-
To appear
-
Maudet, N.; Lang, J.; Chevaleyre, Y.; and Monnot, J. 2010. Possible winners when new candidates are added: The case of scoring rules. In Proc. of AAAl-10. To appear.
-
(2010)
Proc. of AAAl-10
-
-
Maudet, N.1
Lang, J.2
Chevaleyre, Y.3
Monnot, J.4
-
10
-
-
0000129264
-
Graph theoretical approaches to the theory of voting
-
Miller, N. 1977. Graph theoretical approaches to the theory of voting. Am J Polit Sci 21(4):769-803.
-
(1977)
Am J Polit Sci
, vol.21
, Issue.4
, pp. 769-803
-
-
Miller, N.1
-
12
-
-
38049098599
-
A new monotonic and clone-independent single-winner election method
-
Schulze, M. 2003. A new monotonic and clone-independent single-winner election method. Voting Matters 17:9-19.
-
(2003)
Voting Matters
, vol.17
, pp. 9-19
-
-
Schulze, M.1
-
13
-
-
0347346950
-
Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
-
Tideman, T. 1987. Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules. Social Choice and Welfare 4(3): 185-206.
-
(1987)
Social Choice and Welfare
, vol.4
, Issue.3
, pp. 185-206
-
-
Tideman, T.1
-
14
-
-
34249969734
-
Complete independence of clones in the ranked pairs rule
-
Zavist, T., and Tideman, T. 1989. Complete independence of clones in the ranked pairs rule. Social Choice and Welfare 64(2): 167-173.
-
(1989)
Social Choice and Welfare
, vol.64
, Issue.2
, pp. 167-173
-
-
Zavist, T.1
Tideman, T.2
|