Complexity of terminating preference elicitation

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 2, Issue , 2008, Pages 949-956

  Walsh, Toby ^a  

^a CSIRO   (Australia)

Author keywords

Complexity; Elicitation; Preferences

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS;

COMPLEXITY; COMPLEXITY THEORY; COMPUTATIONAL ISSUES; ELICITATION; ELICITATION OF PREFERENCES; INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE; PREFERENCE ELICITATION; PREFERENCES;

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY;

EID: 84899941787     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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