Explaining Western Securities Markets

Corporate Governance and Firm Organization: Microfoundations and Structural Forms

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages

  Roe, Mark J ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency costs; Corporate law; Labour protection; Minority stockholders; Ownership concentration; Political systems

Indexed keywords

EID: 84919683043     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269761.003.0013     Document Type: Chapter

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