The happiness of the fish: Evidence for a common theory of one’s own and others’ actions

Handbook of Imagination and Mental Simulation

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 257-265

  Saxe, Rebecca ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85008212605     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203809846-26     Document Type: Chapter

References (49)

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