The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 141, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 79-95

  Kriegel, Uriah ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Adverbialism; Intentional objects; Intentionality; Ontological commitment

Indexed keywords

EID: 51749104619     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9264-7     Document Type: Article

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