Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness

Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 1-288

  Stoljar, Daniel ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Conceivability; Consciousness; Experience; Ignorance; Imagination; Naturalism; Phenomenal Experience; Philosophy of Mind; Physicalism

Indexed keywords

EID: 27844600486     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/0195306589.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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