Sympathy and subjectivity

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 77, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 465-482

  Carruthers, Peter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 18844379644     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00048409912349231     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. For detailed explanation and defence of Assumptions 1 and 2, see my The animals issue: moral theory in practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), chs. 6 and 8; my Language,1 thought and consciousness: an essay in philosophical psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), chs. 5-7; and my 'Natural theories of consciousness1, European Journal of Philosophy 6 (1998), pp. 203-222.
2. For a classic defence of Assumption 3, see J. Mackie, Ethics:inventing right and wrong (London: Penguin Press, 1977), Part One.
3. See D. Rosenthal, 'Two concepts of consciousness', Philosophical Studies 49 (1986), pp. 329-59;
4. and 'Thinking that one thinks', in M. Davies and G. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 197-223;
5. my Language, thought and consciousness and 'Natural theories of consciousness';
6. and W. Lycan, Consciousness and experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).
7. And see D. Dennett, Consciousness explained (London: Penguin Press, 1991), who also endorses a higher-order account, only with linguistic descriptions substituted in place of thoughts.
8. See, e.g., papers in R. Byrne and A. Whiten (eds.), Machiavellian intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988);
9. and D. Povinelli, 'Chimpanzee theory of mind?' in P. Carruthers and P. K. Smith (eds.), Theories of theories of mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 293-329.
10. See my Language, thought and consciousness, chapter. 7; and my Phenomenal consciousness: a naturalistic theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
11. See D. Parfit, Reasons and persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), Appendix I.
12. See Mackie, Ethics, Part One.
13. See P. Singer, Practical ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979; second edition,1993).
14. See T. Scanlon, 'Contractualism and utilitarianism'in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds.),Utilitarianism and beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 103-128.
15. See my Animals Issue, chapter. 7.
16. See V. Warren, 'Explaining masochism', Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 15 (1985), pp.103-129.
17. See D. Dennett, 'Why you can't make a computer that feels pain' in his Brainstorms (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978), pp. 190-229. This is the second of the considerations in support of A5 which I spoke of above.
18. See, for example, J. Young, Philosophy and the brain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
19. See T. Nagel, 'Death' in his Mortal questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp.1-10;
20. and J. Feinberg, 'Harm and self-interest' in P. Hacker and J. Raz (eds.), Law, morality and society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 285-308.
21. See J. Feinberg, 'Psychological egoism' in his Reasons and responsibility (New York: Wadsworth, 1985), pp. 78-96, for example.
22. Of course, Davidson has famously maintained that belief requires the concept of belief, in part on the grounds that surprise presupposes an awareness, on the part of the subject, of what one had previously believed; see D. Davidson, 'Thought and talk' in S. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 7-24.