Trust in triads: An experimental study

Social Networks

Volumn 32, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 301-312

  Buskens, Vincent ^a,b   Raub, Werner ^a   van der Veer, Joris ^a  

^a UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Control; Embeddedness; Learning; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956900891     PISSN: 03788733     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.socnet.2010.05.001     Document Type: Article

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