An experimental study of the repeated trust game with incomplete information

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 48, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 197-216

  Anderhub, Vital ^a   Engelmann, Dirk ^a   Güth, Werner ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Experimental economics; Reputation; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036215608     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(01)00216-5     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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