Trust in triads: Effects of exit, control, and learning

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 235-252

  Buskens, Vincent ^a  

^a UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Non cooperative game theory; Social networks; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038626337     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00563-8     Document Type: Article

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