Collusion and renegotiation in hierarchies: A case of beneficial corruption

International Economic Review

Volumn 39, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 413-438

  Olsen, Trond E ^a   Torsvik, Gaute ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008764194     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2527300     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. BEAUDRY, P. AND M. POITEVIN, "Contract Renegotiation: A Simple Framework and Implications for Organization Theory," Canadian Journal of Economics XXVIII (1995), 302-335.
2. DEWATRIPONT, M., "Renegotiation and Information Revelation over Time in Optimal Labour Contracts," Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (1989), 589-620.
3. _ AND E. MASKIN, "Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies," Review of Economic Studies 62 (1995), 541-555.
4. FUDENBERG, D. AND J. TIROLE, "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Econometrica 58(1990), 1279-1320.
5. HOLMSTROM, B. AND P. MILOROM, "Regulating Trade Among Agents," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146 (1990), 85-105.
6. KHALIL, F. AND J. LAWARREE, "Collusive Auditors," American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 85 (1995), 442-447.
7. KOFMAN, F. AND J. LAWARREE, "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Econometrica 61 (1993), 629-656.
8. _ AND _, "On the Optimality of allowing Collusion," Journal of Public Economics 61 (1996), 383-408.
9. LAFFONT, J.J. AND D. MARTIMORT, "Collusion under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica 65 (1997), 875-912.
10. _ AND J. TIROLE, "Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement," Review of Economic Studies 57 (1990), 597-625.
11. _ AND _, "The Politics of Government Decision Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (1991), 1089-1127.
12. _ AND _, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1993).
13. LAMBERT-MOGLIANSKY, A., "Indirect Monitoring and Optimal Collusion," mimeo, Department of Economics, Stockholm University, 1995.
14. MA, C.-T.A., "Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Review of Economic Studies 61 (1994), 109-130.
15. MARTIMORT, D., "Multiprincipal Charter as a Safeguard against Opportunism in Organizations," mimeo, INRA, Toulouse, 1993.
16. MATTHEWS, S., "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts," Econometrica 63 (1995), 567-589.
17. MEYER, M., T.E. OLSEN, AND G. TORSVIK, "Limited Intertemporal Commitment and Job Design," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 31 (1996), 401-430.
18. _ AND J. VICKERS, "Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives," Journal of Political Economy 105 (1997), 547-581.
19. OLSEN, T.E., "Agency Costs and the Limits of Integration," The RAND Journal of Economics 27 (1996), 479-501.
20. _ AND G. TORSVIK, "The Ratchet Effect in Common Agency: Implications for Privatization and Regulation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 9 (1993), 136-158.
21. _ AND _, "Intertemporal Common Agency and Organizational Design: How much Decentralization?" European Economic Review 39 (1995), 1405-1428.
22. REINGANUM, J.F. AND L.L. WILDE, "Income Tax Compliance in a Principal-Agency Framework," Journal of Public Economics 26 (1985), 1-18.
23. STRAUSZ, R., "Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship," mimeo, Free University of Berlin, 1996.
24. TIROLE, J., "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies; on the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 2 (1986), 181-214.
25. _, "Collusion and the Theory of Organizations," in J.J. Laffont, ed., Advances in Economic Theory, Sixth World Congress Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 151-206).
26. VARIAN, H.R., "Monitoring Agents with other Agents," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146 (1990), 153-174.