Chapter 22 Political economics and macroeconomic policy

Handbook of Macroeconomics

Volumn 1, Issue PART C, 1999, Pages 1397-1482

  Persson, Torsten ^a   Tabellini, Guido ^b  

^a STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^b BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

budget deficits; credibility; fiscal policy; monetary policy; politics

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956742853     PISSN: 15740048     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0048(99)10035-1     Document Type: Review

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