Designing monetary policy when unemployment persists

Economica

Volumn 65, Issue 259, 1998, Pages 327-345

  Lockwood, Ben ^a   Miller, Marcus ^a   Zhang, Lei ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; ECONOMIC POLICY; MONETARY POLICY; UNEMPLOYMENT;

EID: 0031765944     PISSN: 00130427     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0335.00132     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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