-
2
-
-
77956106740
-
-
note
-
Like Gruber"s notion of "go-it-alone power," states here have leverage to renegotiate the terms of cooperation when they can make a credible threat to abandon the existing terms of cooperation. However, the term "go-it-alone power" suggests that a state's alternative to cooperation is always noncooperation. As I explain later, I have a more expansive notion of what constitutes alternatives to cooperation that includes cooperating in other fora or with other partners.
-
-
-
-
3
-
-
77956119387
-
-
This is, of course, not to deny that other conceptions of power may be appropriate for answering other questions
-
This is, of course, not to deny that other conceptions of power may be appropriate for answering other questions.
-
-
-
-
5
-
-
0004003394
-
-
For examples of political science research exploring the design of international agreements, see, analyzing how power configurations affect the probability of war
-
ROBERT POWELL, IN THE SHADOW OF POWER: STATES AND STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999) (analyzing how power configurations affect the probability of war).
-
(1999)
The Shadow of Power States and Strategies in International Politics
-
-
-
6
-
-
0034408291
-
Hard and soft law in international governance
-
446-47
-
For examples of political science research exploring the design of international agreements, see Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 446-47 (2000);
-
(2000)
Int'l Org
, vol.54
, pp. 421
-
-
Abbott, K.W.1
Snidal, D.2
-
7
-
-
0035625844
-
Loosening the ties that bind: A learning model of agreement flexibility
-
Barbara Koremenos, Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility, 55 INT'L ORG. 289 (2001).
-
(2001)
Int'l Org
, vol.55
, pp. 289
-
-
Koremenos, B.1
-
8
-
-
27844609036
-
The design of international agreements
-
hereinafter Guzman, Design
-
See generally Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 579 (2005) [hereinafter Guzman, Design]
-
(2005)
Eur. J. Int'l L.
, vol.16
, pp. 579
-
-
Guzman, A.T.1
-
9
-
-
27844488612
-
Form and substance in international agreements
-
Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581 (2005).
-
(2005)
Am. J. Int'l L.
, vol.99
, pp. 581
-
-
Raustiala, K.1
-
11
-
-
77956111903
-
-
See GRUBER, supra note 1, at 38-40
-
See GRUBER, supra note 1, at 38-40.
-
-
-
-
12
-
-
77956101762
-
-
See infra Part III.C.2
-
See infra Part III.C.2.
-
-
-
-
13
-
-
77956128786
-
-
See infra Part IV
-
See infra Part IV.
-
-
-
-
14
-
-
77956110939
-
-
See infra Part IV
-
See infra Part IV.
-
-
-
-
15
-
-
77956119011
-
-
note
-
The effects of power-but not shifts in power-on international law generally have, of course, been a subject of great discussion in international law for decades. These discussions have generally drawn on the study of international institutions by political scientists and scholars of international relations.
-
-
-
-
16
-
-
33645938616
-
Power and international law
-
See, e.g., Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 64 (2006).
-
(2006)
Am. J. Int'l L.
, vol.100
, pp. 64
-
-
Steinberg, R.H.1
Zasloff, J.M.2
-
17
-
-
77956119386
-
-
Notable studies that do deal with the creation and evolution of international agreements include GRUBER, supra note 1
-
Notable studies that do deal with the creation and evolution of international agreements include GRUBER, supra note 1;
-
-
-
-
18
-
-
0036083447
-
In the shadow of law or power? Consensus-based bargaining and outcomes in the gatt/wto
-
Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339 (2002).
-
(2002)
Int'l Org
, vol.56
, pp. 339
-
-
Steinberg, R.H.1
-
19
-
-
77956105739
-
-
Raustiala, supra note 5, at 583
-
Raustiala, supra note 5, at 583.
-
-
-
-
20
-
-
77956120726
-
-
See generally id; Guzman, Design, supra note 5
-
See generally id; Guzman, Design, supra note 5.
-
-
-
-
21
-
-
77956096573
-
Soft law as delegation
-
926, (discussing the safeguard requirements for the transfer of certain nuclear technology) [hereinafter Meyer, Delegation}
-
Timothy Meyer, Soft Law as Delegation, 32 BORDHAM INT'L L.J. 888, 926 (2009) (discussing the safeguard requirements for the transfer of certain nuclear technology) [hereinafter Meyer, Delegation}
-
(2009)
Bordham Int'l L.J.
, vol.32
, pp. 888
-
-
Meyer, T.1
-
22
-
-
77956099464
-
-
Guzman, Design, supra note 5, at 602-03; Raustiala, supra note 5, at 584
-
Guzman, Design, supra note 5, at 602-03; Raustiala, supra note 5, at 584.
-
-
-
-
23
-
-
84967335313
-
Customary international law in the 21st century
-
Rebecca Bratspies & Russell Miller eds.
-
Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, Customary International Law in the 21st Century, in PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 214-15 (Rebecca Bratspies & Russell Miller eds., 2008).
-
(2008)
Progress in International Law 214-15
-
-
Guzman, A.T.1
Meyer, T.L.2
-
24
-
-
77956104385
-
-
Guzman, Design, supra note 5, at 603
-
Guzman, Design, supra note 5, at 603.
-
-
-
-
25
-
-
77956124152
-
International soft law
-
forthcoming, (manuscript at 20-21), [hereinafter Guzman & Meyer, International Soft Law]
-
Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEG. ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 20-21), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1353444 [hereinafter Guzman & Meyer, International Soft Law]
-
(2010)
J. Leg. Analysis
, vol.2
-
-
Guzman, A.T.1
Meyer, T.2
-
27
-
-
77956099251
-
-
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. Ill, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 {hereinafter NPT}
-
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. Ill, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 {hereinafter NPT}.
-
-
-
-
28
-
-
77956099819
-
-
Meyer, Delegation, supra note 15, at 924-25
-
Meyer, Delegation, supra note 15, at 924-25.
-
-
-
-
29
-
-
0003993070
-
-
("If two states are worried or uncertain about relative achievement of gains, each will prefer a less durable cooperative arrangement, for each will want to more readily be able to exit from the arrangement in the event that gaps in gains favor the other."); Koremenos, supra note 4, at 291-92
-
See JOSEPH GRIECO, COOPERATION AMONG NATIONS: EUROPE, AMERICA, AND NON-TARIPP BAR. RJERS TO TRADE 228 (1990) ("If two states are worried or uncertain about relative achievement of gains, each will prefer a less durable cooperative arrangement, for each will want to more readily be able to exit from the arrangement in the event that gaps in gains favor the other."); Koremenos, supra note 4, at 291-92.
-
(1990)
Cooperation among Nations Europe America and Non-Taripp Bar. Rjers to Trade
, pp. 228
-
-
Grieco, J.S.1
-
30
-
-
77956100038
-
-
Koremenos, supra note 4, at 309
-
Koremenos, supra note 4, at 309.
-
-
-
-
31
-
-
77956132876
-
Ozone, iteration, and international law
-
213
-
John K. Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 193, 213 (1999).
-
(1999)
Va. J. Int'l L.
, vol.40
, pp. 193
-
-
Setear, J.K.1
-
32
-
-
77956129445
-
-
Koremenos, supra note 4, at 292-93
-
Koremenos, supra note 4, at 292-93.
-
-
-
-
33
-
-
33644999592
-
Regime shifting: The trips agreement and new dynamics of international intellectual property lawmaking
-
5, [hereinafter Heifer, Regime Shifting}
-
Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L. L. 1, 5 (2004) [hereinafter Heifer, Regime Shifting}
-
(2004)
Yale J. int'L. L.
, vol.29
, pp. 1
-
-
Heifer, L.R.1
-
34
-
-
77956104956
-
-
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 Nov. 2001 on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, I 7, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002)
-
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 Nov. 2001 on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, I 7, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002).
-
-
-
-
35
-
-
77956116668
-
-
note
-
For high levels of uncertainty about an agreement's effects, states might still prefer renegotiation in the presence of shifting power. Shifting power, however, reduces the appeal of renegotiation. Koreme- nos, supra note 4, at 296 n.26.
-
-
-
-
37
-
-
0036869474
-
Overlegalizing human rights: International relations theory and the commonwealth caribbean backlash against human rights regimes
-
hereinafter Heifer, Overlegalizing
-
cf. Laurence R. Heifer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002) [hereinafter Heifer, Overlegalizing].
-
(2002)
Colum. L. Rev.
, vol.102
, pp. 1832
-
-
Heifer, L.R.1
-
41
-
-
29444435791
-
Exiting treaties
-
1599-1601, [hereinafter Heifer, Exiting Treaties)
-
Laurence R. Heifer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1599-1601 (2005) [hereinafter Heifer, Exiting Treaties);
-
(2005)
Va. L. Rev.
, vol.91
, pp. 1579
-
-
Laurence, R.1
Heifer2
-
42
-
-
40949159283
-
Protection as a 'safeguard': A positive analysis of the gatt 'escape clause' with normative speculations
-
279
-
Alan O. Sykes, Protection as a 'Safeguard': A Positive Analysis of the GATT 'Escape Clause' with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 279 (1991).
-
(1991)
U. Chi. L. Rev.
, vol.58
, pp. 255
-
-
Sykes, A.O.1
-
43
-
-
77956098314
-
-
Indeed, some treaties explicitly contemplate declines in membership that may render their continuation in force impractical
-
Indeed, some treaties explicitly contemplate declines in membership that may render their continuation in force impractical.
-
-
-
-
44
-
-
77956100798
-
Convention concerning the unification of road signals art. 15, mar. 30, 1931
-
stating that the treaty will terminate if and when fewer than five states remain as parties
-
See, e.g., Convention Concerning the Unification of Road Signals art. 15, Mar. 30, 1931, 150 L.N.T.S. 247 (stating that the treaty will terminate if and when fewer than five states remain as parties).
-
L.N.T.S.
, vol.150
, pp. 247
-
-
-
45
-
-
77956127289
-
-
supra note 34, at 1601-02
-
Heifer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1601-02.
-
Exiting Treaties
-
-
Heifer1
-
46
-
-
77956104585
-
-
Id at 1604
-
Id at 1604.
-
-
-
-
47
-
-
77956096574
-
-
See infra Part III
-
See infra Part III.
-
-
-
-
48
-
-
77956113365
-
-
note
-
Aggregate data on soft law agreements are extraordinarily difficult to obtain or develop. Unlike hard law agreements, which are generally reported to the United Nations or tracked at the national level through mechanisms such as the Case Act, 1 U.S.C. § 112(bXa) (2004), soft law agreements are not subject to any centralized reporting system.
-
-
-
-
49
-
-
0346980351
-
Managing the evolution of multilateralism
-
See George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N. Barsoom, Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism, 52 INT'L ORG. 397 (1998);
-
(1998)
Int'l Org
, vol.52
, pp. 397
-
-
Downs, G.W.1
Rocke, D.M.2
Barsoom, P.N.3
-
50
-
-
77956130789
-
-
GRUBER, supra note 1, at 38-40
-
GRUBER, supra note 1, at 38-40.
-
-
-
-
51
-
-
77956131368
-
-
GRUBER, supra note 1, at 6-7
-
GRUBER, supra note 1, at 6-7.
-
-
-
-
52
-
-
77956107295
-
-
Id. at 7
-
Id. at 7.
-
-
-
-
53
-
-
77956119010
-
-
Id. at 38-41
-
Id. at 38-41.
-
-
-
-
54
-
-
77956115664
-
-
See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 5, at 604 ("States with veto power may demand a shallow agreement or side payments to cooperate (or both).")
-
See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 5, at 604 ("States with veto power may demand a shallow agreement or side payments to cooperate (or both).").
-
-
-
-
55
-
-
77956120725
-
-
As Steinberg and Zasloff point out, this view has sometimes been attributed to all realists. It is more accurately attributed to neo- or structural realists only
-
As Steinberg and Zasloff point out, this view has sometimes been attributed to all realists. It is more accurately attributed to neo- or structural realists only.
-
-
-
-
56
-
-
77956124759
-
-
See Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 11, at 74-75
-
See Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 11, at 74-75.
-
-
-
-
57
-
-
77956107294
-
-
See, e.g. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6, at 13 ("[U]nder our theory, international law does not pull states toward compliance contrary to their interests ..")
-
See, e.g. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6, at 13 ("[U]nder our theory, international law does not pull states toward compliance contrary to their interests ..");
-
-
-
-
59
-
-
77956126483
-
-
MORGENTHAU, supra note 3
-
MORGENTHAU, supra note 3;
-
-
-
-
60
-
-
0001820768
-
Structural causa and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening variables
-
Stephen Kras- ner ed.
-
Stephen Krasner, Structural Causa and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen Kras- ner ed., 1983).
-
(1983)
International Regimes
-
-
Krasner, S.1
-
62
-
-
77956129167
-
-
note
-
Put differently, the second term is the net benefit a state gets from acting unilaterally, while the first term is the benefit a state gets from the actions of other states. So, for example, in an arms control agreement, the second term would capture those benefits the jth state receives simply from reducing its own arms: costs savings, reduced risk of accidents, etc. The first term would capture the bulk of the security gains which result from the other state's reductions in arms.
-
-
-
-
63
-
-
77956108567
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
64
-
-
77956100238
-
-
note
-
Setear, supra note 25, at 196. This was in part because there were low-cost alternatives available, and also because a few countries contributed disproportionately to the emissions of chlorofluorocarbons and halon, thus reducing tears about cheating. Id
-
-
-
-
65
-
-
77956110523
-
-
note
-
Of course, formal provisions that allocate bargaining power through the prescription of decision rules will often not be as directly vulnerable to exogenous shifts in power. For example, if an agreement gives a specific state a veto, as the U.N. Charter gives the five permanent members of the Security Council, shifts in power may not as directly reallocate bargaining power within the agreement. With such an arrangement, however, the danger is that if de facto power does not translate into some measure of de jure bargaining power, disenfranchised powerful states will undermine the agreement's effectiveness by, for example, establishing a rival agreement or engaging in forum shopping.
-
-
-
-
66
-
-
3042529761
-
The regime complex for plant genetic resources
-
279-80
-
Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT'L ORG. 277, 279-80 (2004).
-
(2004)
Int'l Org
, vol.58
, pp. 277
-
-
Raustiala, K.1
Victor, D.G.2
-
67
-
-
84936219784
-
The transformation of europe
-
2412, noting that "[i]t takes no particular insight to suggest that should a Member State consider withdrawing from the [European Coal and Steel] Community, the legal argument will not be the critical or determining consideration
-
See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403, 2412 (1991) (noting that "[i]t takes no particular insight to suggest that should a Member State consider withdrawing from the [European Coal and Steel] Community, the legal argument will not be the critical or determining consideration").
-
(1991)
Yale L. J.
, vol.100
, pp. 2403
-
-
Weiler, J.H.H.1
-
68
-
-
34547960166
-
Why state consent still matters-non-state actors, treaties, and the changing sources of international law
-
138
-
See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters-Non-State Actors, Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 137, 138 (2005).
-
(2005)
Berkeley J. Int'l L.
, vol.23
, pp. 137
-
-
Duncan, B.1
Hollis2
-
69
-
-
77956102233
-
-
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 56, May 23,1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 {hereinafter VCLT}
-
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 56, May 23,1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 {hereinafter VCLT}.
-
-
-
-
70
-
-
77956123194
-
-
A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless
-
A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless:
-
-
-
-
71
-
-
77956132699
-
-
(a) it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or
-
(a) it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or
-
-
-
-
72
-
-
77956128026
-
-
(b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.
-
(b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.
-
-
-
-
73
-
-
77956125570
-
-
A party shall give not less than twelve months' notice of its intention to denounce or withdraw from a treaty under paragraph 1
-
A party shall give not less than twelve months' notice of its intention to denounce or withdraw from a treaty under paragraph 1.
-
-
-
-
75
-
-
77956132481
-
-
note
-
Of course, if the good produced by cooperation is a public good, reciprocity is not available as a sanction for a very different reason. To withdraw the benefits of the agreement from the now-exited state would mean ceasing cooperation entirely.
-
-
-
-
76
-
-
77956101555
-
-
note
-
Where retaliation is concerned, it is important to distinguish between retaliation that occurs because the exit is illegal, and retaliation that would have occurred regardless of whether the exit was illegal. The latter is really a political sanction; it does not depend on the terms of the agreement being exited.
-
-
-
-
77
-
-
77956121857
-
-
Heifer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1582
-
Heifer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1582.
-
-
-
-
78
-
-
77956096390
-
-
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144
-
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144.
-
-
-
-
79
-
-
77956107501
-
-
NPT, supra note 21, art. X(l)
-
NPT, supra note 21, art. X(l).
-
-
-
-
80
-
-
77956122605
-
-
Heifer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1590. Treaty withdrawal, of course, can have non-legal consequences, such as political or information consequences
-
Heifer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1590. Treaty withdrawal, of course, can have non-legal consequences, such as political or information consequences.
-
-
-
-
81
-
-
77956122211
-
-
note
-
See id. at 1608. My study is in this respect both narrower and broader than prior work on treaty exit. This paper is broader in the sense that it focuses on all provisions that affect the legal cost of permanently exiting an agreement, but it is narrower in the sense that it only focuses on "legal" costs, such as reputational sanctions that are based on the legality of an agreement or whether certain actions are deemed "legal" as judged against an agreement's rules.
-
-
-
-
82
-
-
72549086591
-
International investment law between commitment and flexibility: A contract theory analysis
-
533 & nn.l 13-14
-
Anne van Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract Theory Analysis, 12 J. INT'L ECON. L. 507, 533 & nn.l 13-14 (2009).
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(2009)
J. Int'l Econ. L.
, vol.12
, pp. 507
-
-
Van Aaken, A.1
-
85
-
-
69249205649
-
Revisiting history: How the past matters for the present backlash against the foreign investment regime
-
493
-
Asha Kaushal, Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the Foreign Investment Regime, 50 HARV. INT'L L. J. 491, 493 (2009).
-
(2009)
Harv. Int'l L. J.
, vol.50
, pp. 491
-
-
Kaushal, A.1
-
86
-
-
85050833343
-
International common law: The soft law of international tribunals
-
519
-
Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy Meyer, International Common Law: The Soft Law of International Tribunals, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 515, 519 (2009).
-
(2009)
Chi. J. Int'l L.
, vol.9
, pp. 515
-
-
Guzman, A.T.1
Meyer, T.2
-
88
-
-
77956095767
-
-
Meyer, Delegation, supra note 15, at 890
-
Meyer, Delegation, supra note 15, at 890.
-
-
-
-
89
-
-
77956111144
-
-
Guzman & Meyer, International Soft Law, supra note 19, at 23
-
Guzman & Meyer, International Soft Law, supra note 19, at 23.
-
-
-
-
90
-
-
77956099818
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
91
-
-
77956114894
-
-
Meyer, Delegation, supra note 15, at 915
-
Meyer, Delegation, supra note 15, at 915.
-
-
-
-
92
-
-
77956106739
-
-
VCLT, supra note 53
-
VCLT, supra note 53.
-
-
-
-
93
-
-
77956096761
-
-
note
-
Soft law agreements are also not "treaties" and are thus not governed by the rules in the VCLT, including the default rule that withdrawal is generally not permitted unless explicitly authorized. It is possible, therefore, that exiting soft law agreements are governed by a different default rule or no default rule at all.
-
-
-
-
94
-
-
77956105738
-
-
Automatic renewals unless a state objects are another possibility
-
Automatic renewals unless a state objects are another possibility.
-
-
-
-
95
-
-
77956126482
-
-
NPT, supra note 21, art. X(2)
-
NPT, supra note 21, art. X(2).
-
-
-
-
96
-
-
77956102843
-
-
note
-
Another less obvious type of sunset provision is one in which a state commits to completing a certain action by a certain date but does not covenant to continue the action after the date has passed. For example, the Moscow Treaty of 2002 commits the United States and Russia to reduce their arsenal of strategic nuclear warheads to between 1700 and 2200 by December 31, 2012. Regardless of whether that obligation is met, though, the parties have no further obligations under the Moscow Treaty after 2012; indeed, to remove any doubt on this score article IV provides that the treaty shall only remain in force until December 31, 2012-the last day the parties have to complete their obligations under the treaty.
-
-
-
-
97
-
-
77956097544
-
-
See Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, U.S.-Russ., aits. 1, 4, May 24, 2002, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 107-8
-
See Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, U.S.-Russ., aits. 1, 4, May 24, 2002, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 107-8.
-
-
-
-
98
-
-
77956118615
-
-
Heifer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1613
-
Heifer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1613.
-
-
-
-
99
-
-
77956125981
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
100
-
-
77956121111
-
-
Id at 1616-17
-
Id at 1616-17.
-
-
-
-
101
-
-
77956096188
-
-
note
-
Id at 1613-15. In some instances, withdrawing does not mean a total loss of voice in rule-making procedures. Some international institutions, such as the International Criminal Court, still allow nonparties to participate as "observers.
-
-
-
-
102
-
-
77956114314
-
Keynote address: The future U.S. Relationship with the international criminal court
-
Set, 175
-
Set David Scheffer, Keynote Address: The Future U.S. Relationship with the International Criminal Court, 17 PACE INT'L L. REV. 161, 175 (2005).
-
(2005)
Pace Int'l L. Rev.
, vol.17
, pp. 161
-
-
Scheffer, D.1
-
103
-
-
77956104036
-
-
note
-
At some point the costs of violation-be they reputational or retaliatory-will be large enough to demonstrate the violating state's resolve to hold out for renegotiation. In most cases, however, the costs associated with violation will be small enough to leave states uncertain as to the violating state's resolve.
-
-
-
-
104
-
-
77956131556
-
-
See Heifer, Overlegalhing, supra note 30, at 1881
-
See Heifer, Overlegalhing, supra note 30, at 1881.
-
-
-
-
105
-
-
77956118801
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
106
-
-
77956110938
-
-
note
-
Id In another example, when Iceland sought to rejoin the International Whaling Commission ("IWC") it did so with a contentious reservation to the IWC's moratorium on whaling. This reservation, and thus Iceland's reaccession to the IWC, was twice rejected before ultimately being approved in a convoluted series of procedural votes.
-
-
-
-
107
-
-
85055301832
-
Iceland's reservation at the international whaling commission
-
977-78
-
Alexander Gillespie, Iceland's Reservation at the International Whaling Commission, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 977, 977-78 (2003).
-
(2003)
Eur. J. Int'l L.
, vol.14
, pp. 977
-
-
Gillespie, A.1
-
108
-
-
77956103249
-
-
See Meyer, Delegation, supra note 15, at 892
-
See Meyer, Delegation, supra note 15, at 892.
-
-
-
-
109
-
-
77956122035
-
-
Id at 892-93
-
Id at 892-93.
-
-
-
-
110
-
-
77956130030
-
-
These assumptions are widely used to study international legal behavior
-
These assumptions are widely used to study international legal behavior.
-
-
-
-
111
-
-
77956099659
-
-
See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6, at 4
-
See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 6, at 4;
-
-
-
-
112
-
-
77956103628
-
-
GUZMAN, supra note 54, at 17
-
GUZMAN, supra note 54, at 17;
-
-
-
-
114
-
-
0001222122
-
Modern international relations theory: A prospectus for international lawyers
-
348-51
-
Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALB J. INT'L L. 335, 348-51 (1989);
-
(1989)
Yalb J. Int'l L.
, vol.14
, pp. 335
-
-
Abbott, K.W.1
-
115
-
-
0041728057
-
Economic analysis of international law
-
2
-
Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALB J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1999);
-
(1999)
Yalb J. Int'l L.
, vol.24
, pp. 1
-
-
Dunoff, J.L.1
Trachtman, J.P.2
-
116
-
-
26944444936
-
Adjudicating in anarchy: An expressive theory of international dispute resolution
-
1330
-
Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1330 (2004);
-
(2004)
Wm. and Mary L. Rev.
, vol.45
, pp. 1229
-
-
Ginsburg, T.1
McAdams, R.H.2
-
117
-
-
0347052944
-
Responses to breach of a treaty and rationalist international relations theory: The rules of release and remediation in the law of treaties and the law of state responsibility
-
3
-
John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1997);
-
(1997)
Va. L. Rev.
, vol.83
, pp. 1
-
-
Setear, J.K.1
-
118
-
-
0038107114
-
Rational custom
-
560-62
-
Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKB L.J. 559, 560-62 (2002);
-
(2002)
Dukb L.J.
, vol.52
, pp. 559
-
-
Swaine, E.T.1
-
119
-
-
77956112496
-
-
Koremenos, supra note 4, at 293-94
-
Koremenos, supra note 4, at 293-94.
-
-
-
-
120
-
-
77956125361
-
-
GRUBER, supra note 1, at 7
-
GRUBER, supra note 1, at 7.
-
-
-
-
121
-
-
77952968803
-
Monetary policy coordination and hierarchy
-
(David M. Andrews ed.)
-
David M. Andrews, Monetary Policy Coordination and Hierarchy, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POWER 91, 102 (David M. Andrews ed., 2006);
-
(2006)
International Monetary Power
, vol.91
, pp. 102
-
-
Andrews, D.M.1
-
122
-
-
0001094692
-
Involuntary unemployment as a perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model
-
1355, see also
-
see also Avner Snaked & John Sutton, Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 52 ECONOMETRICA 1351, 1355 (1984).
-
(1984)
Econometrica
, vol.52
, pp. 1351
-
-
Snaked, A.1
Sutton, J.2
-
123
-
-
77956095766
-
-
In the language of game theory, a "threat" is a "promise to carry out a certain action if another player deviates from his equilibrium actions
-
In the language of game theory, a "threat" is a "promise to carry out a certain action if another player deviates from his equilibrium actions." ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 83 (1989).
-
(1989)
Eric Rasmusen Games and Information An Introduction to Game Theory
, vol.83
-
-
-
124
-
-
84922160076
-
Playing games with the law
-
1306
-
A threat is "credible" only if the strategy is an equilibrium on all possible paths in a game. Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1306 (1990).
-
(1990)
Stan. L. Rev.
, vol.42
, pp. 1291
-
-
Ayres, I.1
-
125
-
-
77956122210
-
-
note
-
A declining state's next best alternative could be to carry out the agreement without the ascendant state. This is not really an "outside option" because it is not outside of the existing agreement, but rather is a forced modification of it.
-
-
-
-
126
-
-
77956131369
-
-
GRUBER, supra note 1, at 6-7
-
GRUBER, supra note 1, at 6-7.
-
-
-
-
127
-
-
77956117645
-
-
I am grateful to Jide Nzelibe for this example
-
I am grateful to Jide Nzelibe for this example.
-
-
-
-
128
-
-
77956126278
-
-
Heifer, Exiling Treaties, supra note 34, at 1583
-
Heifer, Exiling Treaties, supra note 34, at 1583;
-
-
-
-
129
-
-
77956125360
-
-
Raustiala & Victor, supra note 50, at 295
-
Raustiala & Victor, supra note 50, at 295.
-
-
-
-
130
-
-
77956123564
-
-
Raustiala & Victor, supra note 50, at 283-84
-
Raustiala & Victor, supra note 50, at 283-84.
-
-
-
-
131
-
-
84937295049
-
The international whaling commission and the north atlantic marine mammal commission: The institutional risks of coercion in consensual structures
-
155
-
See David D. Caron, The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 154, 155 (1995).
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(1995)
Am. J. Int'L L.
, vol.89
, pp. 154
-
-
Caron, D.D.1
-
132
-
-
77956122209
-
-
Heifer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1583
-
Heifer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1583.
-
-
-
-
133
-
-
77956120934
-
-
Steinberg, supra note 12, at 359-60
-
Steinberg, supra note 12, at 359-60.
-
-
-
-
134
-
-
77956128594
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
135
-
-
77956128027
-
-
Id. at 359
-
Id. at 359.
-
-
-
-
136
-
-
77956122400
-
-
Id. at 358-59
-
Id. at 358-59.
-
-
-
-
137
-
-
84972264695
-
Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy coordination
-
(Peter M. Haas ed.)
-
Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, in KNOWLEDGE, POWER, AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY COORDINATION 1-3 (Peter M. Haas ed., 1992);
-
(1992)
Knowledge Power and International Policy Coordination
, pp. 1-3
-
-
Haas, P.M.1
-
138
-
-
24344458092
-
How to influence states: Socialization and international human rights law
-
see also, 626
-
see also Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L. J. 621,626 (2004).
-
(2004)
Duke L. J.
, vol.54
, pp. 621
-
-
Goodman, R.1
Jinks, D.2
-
140
-
-
69249118169
-
Unpacking the state's reputation
-
See, 257, (discussing the reputational consequences of changes in government)
-
See Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State's Reputation, 50 HARV. INT'L L. J. 231, 257 (2009) (discussing the reputational consequences of changes in government).
-
(2009)
Harv. Int'l L. J.
, vol.50
, pp. 231
-
-
Brewster, R.1
-
141
-
-
0041743204
-
Unsigning
-
Set, 2061-62, 2064
-
Set Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2061-62, 2064 (2003).
-
(2003)
Stan. L. Rev.
, vol.55
, pp. 2061
-
-
Swaine, E.T.1
-
142
-
-
77956104035
-
-
note
-
Of course, in attempting to develop a nuclear weapons capability while in the nonproliferation regime, states such as Iran and North Korea will typically be violating their nonproliferation obligations.
-
-
-
-
143
-
-
77956102439
-
U.S. and other powers reach tentative understanding on north korea's nuclear program
-
See generally, 914-16
-
See generally U.S. and Other Powers Reach Tentative Understanding on North Korea's Nuclear Program, 99 AM. J. INT'L. L. 889, 914-16 (2005).
-
(2005)
Am. J. int'L. L.
, vol.99
, pp. 889
-
-
-
144
-
-
77956130237
-
-
Raustiala & Victor, supra note 50, at 295-97
-
Raustiala & Victor, supra note 50, at 295-97;
-
-
-
-
145
-
-
77956123943
-
-
Heifer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1583
-
Heifer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1583.
-
-
-
-
146
-
-
77956110327
-
Us agrees climate deal with asia
-
available at, See, July 28
-
See US agrees climate deal with Asia, BBC NEWS, July 28, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/sci/tech/4723305.stm.
-
(2005)
BBC News
-
-
-
147
-
-
77956119385
-
-
Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 27, at 20
-
Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 27, at 20.
-
-
-
-
148
-
-
84962992220
-
Contract renegotiation and coasian dynamics
-
See, e.g
-
See, e.g., Oliver D. Hart & Jean Tirole, Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics, 55 REV. ECON. STUD. 509 (1988).
-
(1988)
Rev. Econ. Stud.
, vol.55
, pp. 509
-
-
Hart, O.D.1
Tirole, J.2
-
149
-
-
77956103050
-
-
See Guzman & Meyer, International Soft Law, supra note 19, at 20-21
-
See Guzman & Meyer, International Soft Law, supra note 19, at 20-21.
-
-
-
-
150
-
-
77956128408
-
-
Id at 22-24
-
Id at 22-24.
-
-
-
-
151
-
-
0009037768
-
Contract remedies, renegotiation, and the theory of efficient breach
-
See, e.g., 633-42
-
See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629, 633-42 (1988).
-
(1988)
S. Cal. L. Rev.
, vol.61
, pp. 629
-
-
Craswell, R.1
-
152
-
-
77956095983
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
153
-
-
4344671883
-
Contract theory and the limits of contract law
-
See, e.g. 594-95, ("These considerations imply that contracts will inevitably be incomplete.")
-
See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L. J. 541, 594-95 (2003) ("These considerations imply that contracts will inevitably be incomplete.");
-
(2003)
Yale L. J.
, vol.113
, pp. 541
-
-
Schwartz, A.1
Scott, R.E.2
-
154
-
-
77949919958
-
The 'incomplete contracts' literature and efficient precautions
-
(noting that "'complete' contracts are rarely if ever observed") 156
-
Richard Craswell, The 'Incomplete Contracts' Literature and Efficient Precautions, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 151, 156 n.12 (2005) (noting that "'complete' contracts are rarely if ever observed").
-
(2005)
Case W. Res. L. Rev.
, vol.56
, Issue.12
, pp. 156
-
-
Craswell, R.1
-
155
-
-
77956130995
-
-
note
-
Set Schwartz & Scott, supra note 115, at 595 ("There is an infinite number of possible future states and a very large set of possible partner types. When the sum of possible states and partner types is infinite and contracting is costly, contracts must contain gaps. Parties cannot write contracts about everything.").
-
-
-
-
156
-
-
77956098316
-
-
note
-
There is also an agency problem. The initial negotiators may not be in power during the renegotiation, and so by deferring negotiations over contingencies into the future, they may entirely avoid the transaction costs of trying to write a complete contract.
-
-
-
-
157
-
-
77956121287
-
-
Set Steinberg, supra note 12, at 339-40
-
Set Steinberg, supra note 12, at 339-40.
-
-
-
-
158
-
-
77956105533
-
-
note
-
I assume throughout most of this discussion that all possible agreements are on the Pareto frontier. This assumption allows me to highlight distributional issues.
-
-
-
-
159
-
-
77956110522
-
-
note
-
For purposes of this thought experiment, I assume that sanctioning opportunistic noncompliance is a separate and distinct mechanism from sanctioning exit. Thus, one can assume that levels of compliance are the same regardless of the chosen level of exit costs. In reality, of course, factors such as the legality of an agreement affect the sanctions applied both for permanently and publicly exiting an agreement and for opportunistically violating an agreement. However, other mechanisms that influence exit costs, such as withdrawal provisions and sunset provisions, do not affect sanctions for violating an agreement.
-
-
-
-
160
-
-
77956110731
-
-
See Powell, supra note 3, at 93-97
-
See Powell, supra note 3, at 93-97.
-
-
-
-
161
-
-
84974486152
-
Constitutions and commitment: The evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century england
-
See ("For economic growth to occur the sovereign or government must not merely establish the relevant set of rights, but must also make a credible commitment to them.")
-
See Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803 (1989) ("For economic growth to occur the sovereign or government must not merely establish the relevant set of rights, but must also make a credible commitment to them.").
-
(1989)
J. Econ. Hist.
, vol.49
, pp. 803
-
-
North, D.C.1
Weingast, B.R.2
-
162
-
-
77956114520
-
-
note
-
States' expectations about their own options are, perhaps intuitively, likely to prove more accurate than their forecasts about the fortunes of others. In developing expectations about others, states will have to rely on whatever information they can obtain publicly or through other means. In part due to concerns about the information on which they base their beliefs about the future, states may discount their expectations according to how reliable they think their forecasts are. In particular, states may discount expectations that reach further into the future on the grounds that such expectations are less likely to be accurate than short-term expectations.
-
-
-
-
163
-
-
77956114133
-
-
I choose a fifty-fifty division in this example only because it corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution
-
I choose a fifty-fifty division in this example only because it corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution.
-
-
-
-
164
-
-
77956127481
-
-
note
-
This analysis assumes that D has all of che structural bargaining power in a renegotiation, such that A receives only its outside option. In most bargaining protocols, however, A would do better than its outside option, thereby even further improving the position of the ascendant state.
-
-
-
-
165
-
-
77956113760
-
-
note
-
This example can be expressed more formally as a game with two phases in which states bargain over and implement an agreement characterized by a distribution of benefits, x, and a level of exit costs, c. Because a formal model does not improve significantly on the insights discussed above, I only sketch what such a model would look like. In each phase, states have the opportunity to negotiate or renegotiate
-
-
-
-
166
-
-
77956114703
-
-
note
-
Again, one can see this intuition worked out somewhat more formally by inspecting equations (3) and (4). Set supra note 126. In order for an agreement to be possible, both equations (3) and (4) must be satisfied; that is, both states must have an incentive to participate in the agreement. Recall that in equation (3), increasing exit costs reduces A's utility, while in equation (4) c is a benefit to D. Because c only matters in the second period, it is always modified by a state's discount rate. Thus, as D becomes more impatient and A becomes more patient, higher exit costs become less valuable for both parties
-
-
-
-
167
-
-
77956127088
-
-
Powell, supra note 3, at 86-88
-
See, e.g., Powell, supra note 3, at 86-88.
-
-
-
-
168
-
-
0346018115
-
Treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems
-
U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, T.I.A.S.
-
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
-
(1972)
U.S.T.
, vol.23
, Issue.7503
, pp. 3435
-
-
-
169
-
-
77956131960
-
Treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms
-
July 31, 1991, App. II at 450
-
Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991, 16 U.N. Disarmament Y.B., App. II at 450 (1991).
-
(1991)
U.N. Disarmament Y.B.
, vol.16
-
-
-
171
-
-
77956131183
-
-
Swaine, supra note 104, at 2074 ("Where parties are free to exit a relationship at any point and for any reason, they will under-invest in reliance- that is, fail to depend upon the relationship's perpetuation in ways that might be efficient.")
-
Swaine, supra note 104, at 2074 ("Where parties are free to exit a relationship at any point and for any reason, they will under-invest in reliance- that is, fail to depend upon the relationship's perpetuation in ways that might be efficient.").
-
-
-
-
172
-
-
0000468877
-
The economics of legal conflicts
-
(developing the theory that trials result because of mutual optimism by the parties)
-
Cf. John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973) (developing the theory that trials result because of mutual optimism by the parties);
-
(1973)
J. Legal Stud.
, vol.2
, pp. 279
-
-
Gould, J.P.1
-
173
-
-
85050169518
-
An economic approach to legal procedure and judicial administration
-
(same)
-
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1974) (same).
-
(1974)
J. Legal Stud.
, vol.2
, pp. 399
-
-
Posner, R.A.1
-
174
-
-
85050169518
-
An economic approach to legal procedure and judicial administration
-
Id. Interestingly, having two optimistic parties may cause the space for an agreement to shrink on the substantive terms of an agreement but may also remove exit costs as an issue in the negotiation. If both parties believe they are becoming more powerful, both sides will prefer low exit costs. Similarly, if both sides believe they are declining, both sides will prefer high exit costs, again removing exit costs as an issue
-
Id. Interestingly, having two optimistic parties may cause the space for an agreement to shrink on the substantive terms of an agreement but may also remove exit costs as an issue in the negotiation. If both parties believe they are becoming more powerful, both sides will prefer low exit costs. Similarly, if both sides believe they are declining, both sides will prefer high exit costs, again removing exit costs as an issue.
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See Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821, 1844-45 (2003) (discussing the small difference between the rates at which states with good human rights practices and states with bad human rights practices ratify human rights treaties) [hereinafter Hathaway, Commitment];
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supra note 134, at 1844-45.
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Bargaining in the shadow of violence the NPT IAEA and nuclear non-proliferation negotiations
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See, e.g., Arsalan M. Suleman, Bargaining in the Shadow of Violence: The NPT, IAEA, and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Negotiations, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 206, 231 (2008).
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GUZMAN, supra note 54, at 86
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GUZMAN, supra note 54, at 86.
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181
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Id
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Id.
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182
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supra note 134, at 1824
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Hathaway, Commitment, supra note 134, at 1824.
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Commitment
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Hathaway1
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183
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77956119977
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This example is not meant to suggest that rogue states will necessarily or even usually be ascendant. There is good reason to think that states that highly discount the future are more likely to be declining states. Because they are not concerned with their future, states that discount the future are unlikely to invest in developing outside options that will allow them to renegotiate at a later time
-
This example is not meant to suggest that rogue states will necessarily or even usually be ascendant. There is good reason to think that states that highly discount the future are more likely to be declining states. Because they are not concerned with their future, states that discount the future are unlikely to invest in developing outside options that will allow them to renegotiate at a later time.
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184
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77956098315
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Agreed Framework to Negotiate Resolution of the Nuclear Issue on the Korean Peninsula, U.S.- N. Korea, Oct. 21, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 603 [hereinafter Agreed Framework]
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Agreed Framework to Negotiate Resolution of the Nuclear Issue on the Korean Peninsula, U.S.- N. Korea, Oct. 21, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 603 [hereinafter Agreed Framework].
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185
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Agreement on Supply of a Light-Water Reactor Project to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, KEDO-N. Korea, Dec. 15, 1995, [hereinafter Supply Agreement]
-
Agreement on Supply of a Light-Water Reactor Project to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, KEDO-N. Korea, Dec. 15, 1995, available at http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/ SupplyAgreement.pdf [hereinafter Supply Agreement].
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186
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33645328744
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Arms control law in crisis? A study of the north korean nuclear issue
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Masahiko Asado, Arms Control Law in Crisis? A Study of the North Korean Nuclear Issue, 9 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 331, 338 (2004).
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Asado, M.1
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Id. at 340.
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Asado, M.1
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GUZMAN, supra note 54, at 86
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GUZMAN, supra note 54, at 86.
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189
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77956117073
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The sword in the mirror-the lawfulness of north korea's use and threat of use of nuclear weapons based on the united states' legitimization of nuclear weapons
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1385-86
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North Korea has accused the United States of violations of the Agreed Framework and the Supply Agreement by, inter alia, suspending oil shipments under false pretenses. Charles J. Moxley, Jr., The Sword in the Mirror-The Lawfulness of North Korea's Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons Based on the United States' Legitimization of Nuclear Weapons, 27 BORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1379, 1385-86 (2004).
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77956119208
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Abbott & Snidal, supra note 4, at 446-47
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See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 4, at 446-47;
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191
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0348202099
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Review essay: Constructivism, positivism, and empiricism in international law
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484
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David J. Bederman, Review Essay: Constructivism, Positivism, and Empiricism in International Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 469, 484 (2001).
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Bederman, D.J.1
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77956124345
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-
note
-
These studies often use slightly different terminology than that used in this paper, referring to agreements that have weak formal provisions as "soft law" and those with strong formal mechanisms that constrain behavior as "hard law." For reasons discussed elsewhere, I consider the distinction between hard and soft law to refer only to the decision whether to make an agreement legally binding.
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193
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77956096389
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supra note 15, at 890-91
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See Meyer, Delegation, supra note 15, at 890-91;
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Delegation
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Meyer1
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194
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77956109951
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Raustiala, supra note 5, at 582
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see also Raustiala, supra note 5, at 582.
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195
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Koremenos, supra note 4, at 292
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See Koremenos, supra note 4, at 292;
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196
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77956116667
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Setear, supra note 25, at 214
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Setear, supra note 25, at 214.
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-
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197
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77956118614
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Abbott & Snidal, supra note 4, at 446-47
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Abbott & Snidal, supra note 4, at 446-47;
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-
-
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198
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0035598074
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Alternative views of 'legalization': Richer views of law and politics
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750-51
-
Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope, Alternative Views of 'Legalization': Richer Views of Law and Politics, 55 INT'L ORG. 743, 750-51 (2001).
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Int'L Org.
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Finnemore, M.1
Toope, S.J.2
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199
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77956127289
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supra note 34, at 1599-1601
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See, e.g., Heifer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 34, at 1599-1601;
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Exiting Treaties
-
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Heifer1
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200
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77956113364
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Koremenos, supra note 4, at 291
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Koremenos, supra note 4, at 291;
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-
-
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201
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77956122604
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Raustiala, supra note 5, at 583
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Raustiala, supra note 5, at 583;
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-
-
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202
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36749064663
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Reserving
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311
-
Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 307, 311 (2006);
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Yale J. Int'L L.
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, pp. 307
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Swaine, E.T.1
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203
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77956117442
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Sykes, supra note 34, at 289
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Sykes, supra note 34, at 289.
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204
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Sykes, supra note 34, at 279
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See Sykes, supra note 34, at 279.
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205
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77956110521
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-
note
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Alternatively, where the declining state believes that the ascendant state overestimates the probability that it will develop a credible threat to exit in the future, compromising on exit costs may make sense because neither side views itself as making a significant concession. The ascendant state has preserved its future bargaining power and the declining state has obtained its preferred substantive rules at what it considers to be minimal risk.
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206
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Cf. Powell, supra note 3, at 127
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Cf. Powell, supra note 3, at 127.
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207
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77956106918
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note
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NPT, supra note 21, art. IX(3). The provision actually provides that a "nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967." That definition only captures the five mentioned states.
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208
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Id. art. X(2)
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Id. art. X(2).
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209
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77956121286
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See Koremenos, supra note 4, at 304-12
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See Koremenos, supra note 4, at 304-12.
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210
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Id. at 305
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Id. at 305.
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NPT, supra note 21, an. X(l)
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NPT, supra note 21, an. X(l).
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212
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77956116057
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Koremenos, supra note 4, at 312. The right to unilaterally exit the agreement remains and was exercised by North Korea in 2003
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Koremenos, supra note 4, at 312. The right to unilaterally exit the agreement remains and was exercised by North Korea in 2003.
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213
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4444295499
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Is there a broader-deeper tradeoff in international multilateral agreements?
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461
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Michael Gilligan, Is There a Broader-Deeper Tradeoff in International Multilateral Agreements?, 58 INT'L ORG. 459, 461 (2004).
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Int'L Org.
, vol.58
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Gilligan, M.1
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214
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35148822383
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Towards a human rights framework for intellectual property
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975, (noting that in the area of intellectual property developed nations are moving increasingly to regional or bilateral agreements that provide greater protections than even the most protective broad multilateral agreements)
-
See Laurence R. Heifer, Towards a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 975 (2007) (noting that in the area of intellectual property developed nations are moving increasingly to regional or bilateral agreements that provide greater protections than even the most protective broad multilateral agreements);
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(2007)
U.C. Davis L. Rev.
, vol.40
, pp. 971
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Heifer, L.R.1
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215
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38849175528
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The ties that bind? Regionalism, commercial treaties, and the future of global economic integration
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1350
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Chris Brummer, The Ties That Bind? Regionalism, Commercial Treaties, and the Future of Global Economic Integration, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1349, 1350 (2007).
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Brummer, C.1
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Set Gilligan, supra note 161, at 461
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Set Gilligan, supra note 161, at 461.
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218
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Raustiala, supra note 5, at 598-99
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Raustiala, supra note 5, at 598-99.
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219
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BARRETT, supra note 47, at 201-05
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See BARRETT, supra note 47, at 201-05.
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220
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77956110326
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note
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A third possibility, of course, is that the presence of shifting power will make it impossible to satisfy the participation constraint at the outset. In such situations, we would not necessarily observe either lower exit costs in multilateral agreements or higher rates of exit. Instead, states would simply not enter into agreements in situations in which exit costs would otherwise have to be low.
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221
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International commitment toward curbing global warming
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932
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Charlotte Booncharoen & John Gase, International Commitment Toward Curbing Global Warming, 4 ENVTL. L. 917, 932 (1998).
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, vol.4
, pp. 917
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Booncharoen, C.1
Gase, J.2
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222
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Should greenhouse gas permits be allocated on a per capita basis?
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61, (quoting International Energy Agency statistics from, 2006)
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Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on a Per Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REV. 51, 61 (2009) (quoting International Energy Agency statistics from 2006).
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, pp. 51
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Posner, E.A.1
Sunstein, C.R.2
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225
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note
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4.2, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. Although the UNFCCC is itself a binding agreement, the emissions reductions obligations are specifically couched in nonbinding terminology.
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226
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77956122399
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note
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First, the United States did agree to a specific reduction target and timetable: stabilizing output at 1990 levels by the year 2000. The UNFCCC is thus not a case in which the obligation reached was couched purely in terms of principles, although the UNFCCC does contain quite a bit of language calling on signatories to abide by various principles. Second, the United States dropped its resistance to providing financial support to developing countries. The text of the UNFCCC creates a legal obligation for developed states to provide financial aid to developing nations, and outside of the UNFCCC, the United States committed to a seventy-five-million-dollar figure. Finally, developing nations made no specific commitments-binding or otherwise-with respect to emissions targets. The United States had strongly favored some commitment from developing states.
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-
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227
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0033271314
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Indispensability and indefensibility? the united states in the climate treaty negotiations
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461-62, 465
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Shardul Agrawala & Steinar Andresen, Indispensability and Indefensibility? The United States in the Climate Treaty Negotiations, 5 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 457, 461-62, 465 (1999).
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Global Governance
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, pp. 457
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Agrawala, S.1
Andresen, S.2
-
228
-
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77956109750
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-
note
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The Kyoto Protocol included specific targets for Annex I countries, including, for the United States, a seven percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels by 2008-2012. These targets reflected a twin American victory. First, the time period agreed upon reflected exactly the American proposal, designed to ameliorate the effects of short-term fluctuations in economic or weather conditions that might affect a state's ability to meet a specific deadline. Second, the target itself reflects agreement on a standard very close to the American standard.
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229
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note
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Agrawala & Andresen, supra note 173, at 465. Perhaps the greatest success for the United States, however, came in the form of the Kyoto Protocol's emissions trading rules. A major emissions trading program was the chief concession that the United States demanded in exchange for accepting binding emissions targets.
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230
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Sustainable development and market liberalism's shotgun wedding: Emissions trading under the kyoto protocol
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34-35
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David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism's Shotgun Wedding: Emissions Trading under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 IND. L.J. 21, 34-35 (2008);
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Ind. L.J.
, vol.83
, pp. 21
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Driesen, D.M.1
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231
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0040766063
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Analysis of the kyoto protocol to the U.N. Framework convention on climate change
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133 (Feb. 4, ). The Kyoto Protocol involves three distinct emissions trading programs. Under Article 16, developed countries may trade their national allowances at the state-to-state level. Moreover, Article 6 allows the parties, or private actors within the state- parties, to buy and sell emissions reductions units created by projects within a country (this method of emissions trading is known as "joint implementation").
-
James H. Searles, Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, 21 INT'L ENV'T REP. 131, 133 (Feb. 4, 1998). The Kyoto Protocol involves three distinct emissions trading programs. Under Article 16, developed countries may trade their national allowances at the state-to-state level. Moreover, Article 6 allows the parties, or private actors within the state- parties, to buy and sell emissions reductions units created by projects within a country (this method of emissions trading is known as "joint implementation").
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(1998)
Int'L Env'T Rep.
, vol.21
, pp. 131
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Searles, J.H.1
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232
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note
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For example, a private firm that creates a carbon sink may essentially sell the resulting emissions reductions to a firm in a different country, with the latter country receiving credit for the reduction. A similar mechanism, known as the Clean Development Mechanism ("CDM"), is established by Article 12. Under CDM, developed countries or private firms within developed countries can purchase certified emissions reductions from firms in developing countries, despite the fact that developing countries have no emissions reductions obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. Thus, under the agreement, states can trade their legally allotted allowances with one another, and they can also invest in reductions in other countries, both developed and undeveloped.
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-
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233
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Collectively, these measures are known as the Kyoto Protocol's "flexibility mechanisms." Driesen, supra, at 34-35
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Collectively, these measures are known as the Kyoto Protocol's "flexibility mechanisms." Driesen, supra, at 34-35.
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note
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A continuous sticking point for the United States during climate change negotiations, that in part led to its failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, has been the inclusion of binding targets for developing as well as developed nations.
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In 1997, by a vote of ninety-five to zero, the Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which provided in relevant part that the United States should not agree to any binding emissions targets "unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties.", 105th Cong.
-
In 1997, by a vote of ninety-five to zero, the Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which provided in relevant part that the United States should not agree to any binding emissions targets "unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties." S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted).
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(1997)
S. Res.
, pp. 98
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