Unpacking the state's reputation

Harvard International Law Journal

Volumn 50, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 231-269

  Brewster, Rachel ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 69249118169     PISSN: 00178063     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (200)

1. See, e.g., JOSEPH MARGUUES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 140-44 (2006)
2. Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 112-20 (2004)
3. Gwyn Prins, 9111 and the Raiders of the Lost Ark, 35 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 611,617-21 (2002)
4. Nicholas D. Kristof, Let Them Be P.O.W.'s, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at A21
5. Anthony Lewis, Guantanamo's Long Shadow, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2005, at A21.
6. See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1995)
7. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)
8. Louis HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979); Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 Int'l Org. 175 (1993) [hereinafter Chayes & Chayes, On Compliance]
9. Martha Finnemore & Katherine Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887 (1998)
10. Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 Am. J. Int'l L. 705 (1988)
11. Ryan Goodman, The Difference Law Makes: Research Design, Institutional Design, and Human Rights, 98 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 198 (2004)
12. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004)
13. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997)
14. Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1500-01 (2003) [hereinafter Koh, On American Exceptionalism]
15. Harold Hongju Koh, The Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996).
16. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005);
17. ANDREW GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008) [hereinafter GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS];
18. ROBERT SCOTT & PAUL STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006)
19. David M. Golove, Leaving Customary International Law Where It Is, 34 Ga. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 333, 345 (2006); Andrew Guzman, Reputation and International Law, 34 Ga. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 379 (2006)
20. Oona Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469 (2005) [hereinafter Hathaway, Between Power and Principle
21. Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, Ill YALE L.J. 1935 (2002) [hereinafter Hathaway, Human Rights Treaties]
22. Laurence R. Heifer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1621-28 (2005); Laurence R. Heifer, Response, Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk, and Treaty Design, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 367, 369 (2006)
23. George Norman & Joel Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 541, 567 (2005)
24. Kal Raustiala, Refining the Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 423 (2006);
25. Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581 (2005)
26. Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL Stud. 179 (2002)
27. ; Robert Scott & Paul Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements and the Limits of Coercion, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 551, 590-93 (2004)
28. John K. Setear, Law in the Service of Politics: Moving Neo-libcral Institutionalism from Metaphor to Theory by Using the International Treaty Process to Define "Iteration," 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 641, 647 (1997)
29. Edward Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 307, 340 (2006) [hereinafter Swaine, Reserving] Edward Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559 (2002)
30. Joel P. Trachtman, The WTO Cathedral, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 127, 141-45 (2007).
31. This definition of reputation-that past behavior can be used to predict future behavior-is the one used in the economic and political science literatures. See Reinhard Selten, The Chain Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 127 (1978) (economics; using reputation as the monopolist's history of driving entrants out of the markec as a deterrent for future entrants into the market)
32. JONATHAN MERCER, REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 6 (1996) (political science; defining reputation as "a judgment of someone's character (or disposition) that is then used to predict or explain future behavior")
33. JAMES MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 241-44 (1994) (political science; noting that states will take costly actions in international relations to establish a reputation for toughness that is later useful to deter future challenges).
34. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 101 (stating that reputation "refers to other states' beliefs about the likelihood that the state in question will comply with a treaty")
35. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 3, at 73 (defining a reputation for compliance with international law as "judgments about an actor's past response to international legal obligations used to predict future compliance with such obligations")
36. George Downs & Michael Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S95 (2002) (defining reputation for compliance with international law as the state's past history of compliance and tracing the use of reputational analysis in the economics and political science fields)
37. Charles Lipson, Why Art Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT'L ORG. 495, 508-12 (1991) (discussing that a state's use of legal agreements rather than non-legal agreements is an attempt to indicate the seriousness of the state's commitment by invoking the state's reputation).
38. Guzman is explicit chat reputation is only useful when there is a lack of other information: If an observing state knew everything about the acting state, including the extent to which it preferred gains today over gains tomorrow (i.e., its discount rate) and the value for it of all possible interactions, the observing state would be able to calculate the acting state's payoffs and accurately predict its actions. Because these things are not observable, however, observing states form a judgment about an acting state's 'reputation,' which represents a measure of its willingness to comply with its international legal obligations. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 3, at 34.
39. Downs & Jones, supra note 5, at S99 (noting that discussion on reputation in international law is important because reputation "determines their attractiveness as a treaty partner both now and in the future")
40. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 3, at 35 (stating that his approach "assumes that states have no particular taste or preference for a good reputation, but rather are concerned with maintaining good standing within the international community only to the extent that changing one's standing or reputation affects payoffs").
41. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 100-06
42. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 3, at 71-118
43. Chayes & Chayes, On Compliance, supra note 2, at 177
44. Downs & Jones, supra note 5, at SI 13; Hathaway, Between Power and Principle, supra note 3, at 506-07
45. Heifer, supra note 3, at 369; Lipson, supra note 5, at 508-12;
46. Norman & Trachtman, supra note 3, at 567;
47. Swaine, Reserving, supra note 3, at 340.
48. See sources cited supra note 8.
49. See sources cited supra note 8.
50. Andrew Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1849 (2002) thereinafter Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory.
51. Id.
52. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 3, at 33-48. For an analysis of the potential benefits of sanctioning, see Alexander Thompson, The Sanctioner's Dilemma, Int'l Theory (forthcoming 2009).
53. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 11, at 1849.
54. Id. at 1848. Guzman finds that international law "works" because states act to preserve their reputations. See GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 3, at 71-118.
55. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle, supra note 3, at 506-07.
56. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3.
57. Id. at 101.
58. Id. at 90.
59. Norman & Trachtman, supra note 3, at 567.
60. David M. Golove, Leaving Customary International Law Where It Is, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 333, 345 (2006).
61. Id.
62. Downs & Jones, supra note 5.
63. W. at S109-12.
64. W. at S102-09.
65. W. at SI 13-14. International law scholars generally acknowledge this critique in their work but then continue with a unitary model of reputation. The most extended discussion of Downs and Jones's argument is in Andrew Guzman's book, How International Law Works. Guzman acknowledges that the effect of reputation will decline across issue areas but maintains that violations of any agreement have an impact for all agreements to a greater or lesser degree. See GuZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 3, at 100-06.
66. Downs & Jones, supra note 5, at SI 13.
67. 5a, e.g., Clair Gough & Simon Shackley, The Respectable Politics of Climate Change: The Epistemic Communities and NGOs, 77 INT'L AFF. 329, 335 (2001).
68. See Daniel W. Drezner, The New New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2007, at 34 (discussing the United States' reputation for unilateralism in many areas, including climate change);
69. Richard Holbrook, The Next President: Mastering a Daunting Agenda, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2008, at 2; James P. Rubin, Building a New Atlantic Alliance: Restoring America's Partnership with Europe, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2008, at 99; Strobe Talbott, How the US Can Fix Its Damaged Reputation Abroad, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Oct. 13, 2008), available at hrtp://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,583723,OO.html.
70. Edward Swaine argues that a state's reputation for compliance might be enhanced if the state attaches reservations to treaties-even though the state is refusing to take on the full legal obligations of the treaty-because the state is indicating that it will not sign onto provisions it does not expect to obey. See Swaine, Reserving, supra note 3, at 340. This Article addresses reservations in the fourth part of the Article. See infra Part IV.B.
71. Todd S. Purdam, Diplomatic Memo; A Wider Atlantic: Europe Sees a Grotesque U.S., N.Y. Times, May 16, 2002, at A3.
72. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
73. Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Is Set to Renounce Its Role in Pact for World Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2002, § 1, at 18.
74. Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307, 334-35 (2007).
75. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
76. Bradley, supra note 34, at 335.
77. David J. Scheffer, A Treaty Bush Shouldn't 'Unsign', N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 6, 2002, at A15; see also Lewis, supra note 33.
78. Jacob Katz Cogan, Non-Compliance and the International Rule of haw, 31 YALE J. INT'L LAW 189 (2006);
79. Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfare Approach, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 488 (2006).
80. U.N. Charter, arts. 42, 51, 2, para. 4.
81. See Paul Lewis, Conflict in the Balkans; Russia a Barrier to NATO Air Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1994, at A12.
82. Peter van Ham, The Rise of the Brand State: The Postmodern Politics of Image and Reputation, FOREIGN AFF. Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 2.
83. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 834 (1999); Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 847 (1999).
84. INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON § KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT 4 (2000).
85. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Good Reasons for Going Around the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at A33.
86. Id.
87. Id. Slaughter later argued that the invasion was neither legal nor legitimate because it failed on policy grounds. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Use of Force in Iraq: Illegal and Illegitimate, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. Proc. 262 (2004) [hereinafter Slaughter, The Use of Force in Iraqi. In the later article, Slaughter argues that the invasion of Iraq was illegitimate because (1) no weapons of mass destruction were found, (2) the Iraqi people viewed the American invasion as an occupation rather than a liberation, and (3) the United States turned to the United Nations for political support only after it was unable to broker a successful peace settlement on its own.
88. Id.
89. Slaughter, supra note 44; Slaughter, The Use of Force in Iraq, supra note 46.
90. This is the norm in studies of the relationship between reputation and compliance with international law. See Downs & Jones, supra note 5, at S98 (defining an actor's reputation as "a summary of its opponents' current beliefs about the player's compliance strategy or set of strategies in connection with various commitments");
91. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 101 (defining reputation as "othet states" beliefs about the likelihood that the state in question will comply with a treaty");
92. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 3, at 73 (defining states' reputations as "judgments about an actor's past response to international legal obligations used to predict future compliance with such obligations").
93. Koh, On American Excepiionalism, supra note 2, at 1500.
94. The prisoner's dilemma is frequently used in international relations theory to represent cooperative games. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984)
95. ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984)
96. James Morrow, Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information, 48 INT'L ORG. 387 (1994). The potential importance of reputation to the cooperative games has long been recognized by international relations scholars. International law scholars have also adopted the prisoner's dilemma to describe many situations in international law. Some have explicitly included reputation in the model.
97. See GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 3, at 73-78;
98. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 11; Norman & Trachtman, supra note 3.
99. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 29-32;
100. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 3, at 25-41.
101. KEOHANE, supra note 50, at 105-06.
102. Id. at 76-77.
103. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 100-06;
104. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 3, at 71-118;
105. Lipson, supra note 5, at 508-12; Hathaway, Between Power and Principle, supra note 3, at 506-07; Norman & Trachtman, supra note 3, at 567.
106. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 3, at 68-69.
107. Robert O. Keohane, International Law and International Relations: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 487, 496-99 (1997).
108. Robert Putnam discusses how having a credible domestic constraint can improve the state's bargaining position. See Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, in DOUBLE- EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 431 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993).
109. Andrew Moravcsik, De Gaulle Between Grain and Grandeur: The Political Economy of French EC Policy,1958-1970, 2 J. COLD WAR STUD. 117 (2000);
110. Jeffrey Vanke, Reconstructing De Gaulle, 2 J. COLD WAR STUD. 87 (2000);
111. Joseph H.H. Weiler, The European Community in Change: Exit, Voice and Loyalty, 3 IRISH STUD. Int'L AFF. 15, 18 (1990).
112. Leon N. Lindberg, Decision Making and Integration in the European Community, 19 INT'L ORG. 55, 61-62 (1965).
113. Simon J. Bulmer, The European Council and the Council of the European Union: Shapers of a European Confederation, 26 PUBLIUS 17, 25 (1996).
114. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 548 (1969).
115. KENNETH DAM, THE GATT-LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 260 (1970);
116. Charles Lipson, The Transformation of Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime Change, 36 INT'L ORG. 417, 435 n.59 (1982).
117. See JACKSON, supra note 61, at 548.
118. See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Apr. 30-May 9, 1992, Framework Convention on Climate Change, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992).
119. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 31, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22.
120. Heather Timmons, Britain Warns of High Costs of Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at A8. In 1997, the Senate also unanimously passed a resolution that stated that the United States should not sign onto the Kyoto Protocol or any international climate change agreement that did not also bind developing countries (which arguably increases the costs to the United States because it decreases the competitiveness of American industries relative to developing country producers) or would result in serious harm to the U.S. economy.
121. See A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the conditions for the United States becoming a signatory to any international agreement on greenhouse gas emissions under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
122. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 65, art. 31.
123. Carter Dougherty, Oil Companies Not Entitled to Payment, Bolivian Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2006, at C4.
124. Paulo Prada, Bolivian Nationalizes the Oil and Gas Sector, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2006, at A9.
125. Bolivia: Nationalised, Bus. LATIN AM., May 8, 2006, at 1, 1-2.
126. See David E. Sanger, Bush Puts Tariffs of as Much as 30% on Steel Imports, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2002, at Al.
127. See Elizabeth Olson, Europeans Press Fight in W.T.O. Against American Tariffs on Steel, N.Y. TiMES, May 28, 2002, at C4.
128. See Edmund L. Andrews, Angry Europeans to Challenge U.S. Steel Tariffs at W.T.O., N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 6, 2002, at C12
129. Youngjin Jung & Ellen Jooyeon Kang, Toward an Ideal WTO Safeguards Regime- Lessons from U.S.-Steel, 38 INT'L lAW. 919, 919-21 (2004)
130. Stephan Richter, Is This Europe's Hour to Lead on Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2002, at A19.
131. See Paul Meller, Europe Lists U.S. Imports It Plans to Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2002, at CI;
132. Richard W. Stevenson & Elizabeth Becker, After 21 Months, Bush Lifts Tariff on Steel Imports, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2003, at Al. The WTO dispute settlement system worked quickly because the legal issues in this case were relatively clear. The WTO found against the United States, and the Bush administration had to withdraw the steel tariff before the 2004 election to avoid retaliation. See id.
133. See generally Steven Erlanger, Germany's Leader Retains His Power After Tight Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002, at Al.
134. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 101.
135. SCOTT & STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF, LEVIATHAN, supra note 3, at 68-89, 118-119.
136. James A. Baker III, The Right Way to Change a Regime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002, at C9 (discussing the need for military force to achieve regime change in Iraq);
137. David Sanger & James Dao, U.S. to Press Afghan Rebels Not to Form Government, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, at Al (discussing the American plan to establish a new government in Afghanistan with a broad base of support);
138. see also Roger Morris, A Tyrant 40 Years in the Making, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 14, 2003, at A29 (comparing present and past attempts at regime change in Iraq).
139. Carlotta Gall, Meeting Bush May Lift Pakistani Leader's Prestige, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A6;
140. Editorial, General Musharrafs Visit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2001, at A20.
141. See MARGULIES, supra note 1, at 140-44;
142. Editorial, A Sudden Sense of Urgency, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, at A28;
143. Editorial, A Bad Bargain, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2006, at A20;
144. Bob Herbert, Op-Ed, Madness and Shame, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2008, at A19;
145. Kate Zernike, Administration Prods Congress to Curb the Rights of Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2006, at Al.
146. MICHAEL TOMZ, REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: SOVEREIGN DEBT ACROSS THREB CENTURIES (2007).
147. Id at 15.
148. Id.
149. Id, at 17.
150. Id. at 39-113.
151. Id. at 18-28.
152. Id. at 11-12, 20-1
153. Id. at 21-22.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 18-28.
156. Id. at 22.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 14.
159. Id. at 18-28.
160. MERCEr, supra note 4, at 6.
161. Downs & Jones, note 5, at S95.
162. Id at S108.
163. U at S97 ("While states have reason to revise their estimate of a state's reputation, following a defection or pattern of defections, they have reason to do so only in connection with agreements that they believe (1) are affected by the same or similar sources of fluctuating compliance costs (or benefits) and (2) are valued the same or less by the defecting state.").
164. Set John Jackson et al., Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of Changing International Economic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REV. 267, 313 (1982).
165. James M. Markham, Bonn Voting: Second Look, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1983, at Al. The Green Party became a part of the ruling coalition in 1998 when Gerhard Schroeder (leader of the Social Democrats) came to power and formed the first "Red-Green" coalition. The Green Party leader, Joschka Fischer, became the foreign minister.
166. See Roger Cohen, German Green Evolves from Revolutionary to Pragmalist, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1998, at A10; Richard Bernstein, The German Question, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2004, § 6, at 52.
167. Governments do not normally advertise "increased compliance" with treaties, just as they do not advertise non-compliance, because it implies that the government was not fully complying with the treaty in earlier periods.
168. Even this is unlikely to occur as governments with the worst human rights records are still regularly invited to join new human rights treaties. Gabriela Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law, 49 HARV. INT'L LJ. 323, 340 (2008).
169. Downs & Jones, supra note 5, at S97.
170. Hathaway, Human Rights Treaties, supra note 3, at 2002.
171. See Adriaan Lanni, The Laws of War in Ancient Greece, 26 L. & HIST. REV. 69, 474-76 (2008).
172. David Sanger & Elisabeth Bumiller, U.S. to Pull Out of ABM Treaty, Clearing Path for Antimissile Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at Al.
173. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. XV(2), May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435.
174. Sanger & Bumiller, supra note 106.
175. See Patrick E. Tyler, Global Reaction to Missile Plan Is Cautious, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2001, at A10.
176. See generally Patricia Hewitson, Nonproliferation and Reduction in Nuclear Weapons: Risks of Weakening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Norm, 21 BERKELEY j. INT'L L. 405, 410-35 (2003) (discussing international response to the ABM withdrawal announcement).
177. See KEOHANE, supra note 50, at 26;
178. BETH YARBROUGH & ROBERT YARBROUGH, COOPERATION AND GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 38 (1992).
179. See GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 3, at 36-40;
180. Heifer, supra note 3, at 369.
181. For instance, Heifer discusses the differing effects of exiting versus violating a treaty on the state's reputation. Heifer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 3, at 1621-28.
182. Swaine, Reserving, supra note 3, at 340.
183. Heifer, supra note 3, at 369.
184. Id. at 374 (footnotes omitted).
185. International relations theorists tend to be uninterested in the legal status of an agreement, with the notable exception of Charles Lipson. See Upson, supra note 5. Attempts by political scientists to categorize "legalization" have also included "obligation" as one of three characteristics of legalization. JUDITH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 17-28 (2001).
186. Dante B. Fascell, The Helsinki Accord: A Case Study, 442 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD, of POL. & Soc. Sci. 69, 71-72 (1979).
187. See ANTHONY D'AMATo, INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES: COLLECTED PAPERS 136-38 (1997) (discussing views on the legal status of the agreements);
188. see also Lipson, supra note 5, at 533-34.
189. 119- See generally Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 3;
190. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, supra note 3;
191. KEOHANE, supra note 50;
192. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 11;
193. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle, supra note 3; Lipson, supra note 5;
194. Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819 (2000).
195. See generally KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979);
196. John J. Mear- sheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT'L SECURITY 5 (1994).
197. Downs & Jones, supra note 5, at S102-09.
198. Id.
199. See id. at SI 13.
200. See Tomz, supra note 81, at 14-36.