Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation

International Congress of Mathematicians, ICM 2006

Volumn 3, Issue , 2006, Pages 1523-1540

  Nowak, Martin A ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolutionary dynamics; Evolutionary graph theory; Indirect reciprocity; Kin selection; Mathematical biology; Prisoner's Dilemma

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS; EVOLUTIONARY GRAPH THEORIES; INDIRECT RECIPROCITIES; KIN SELECTION; MATHEMATICAL BIOLOGY; PRISONER'S DILEMMA;

DYNAMICS; GRAPH THEORY; GROUP THEORY;

BIOLOGY;

EID: 77955967533     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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