Coevolutionary games on networks

Physical Review E - Statistical Physics, Plasmas, Fluids, and Related Interdisciplinary Topics

Volumn 66, Issue 5, 2002, Pages 8-

  Ebel, Holger ^a   Bornholdt, Stefan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KIEL   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; LARGE SCALE SYSTEMS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; MONTE CARLO METHODS; PERTURBATION TECHNIQUES; PHASE TRANSITIONS; PROBABILITY; RANDOM PROCESSES;

COMPLEX BEHAVIOR; GALTON-WATSON PROCESS; MUTATION PROBABILITY; NASH EQUILIBRIA;

GAME THEORY;

ARTICLE;

EID: 41349103440     PISSN: 1063651X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.66.056118     Document Type: Article

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41. The resulting number of links (Formula presented) (rounded to an integer value) is distributed randomly with equal probability among all (Formula presented) possible pairs of nodes leading to a constant probability (Formula presented) that an arbitrary pair of nodes is connected.
42. Since (Formula presented) the game defined by (Formula presented) is not a Prisoner’s dilemma in a strict sense [cf. Eq. (2)]. Furthermore, getting the same payoff in case of a defecting opponent leads to coexistence of cooperative and defective domains in the subcritical regime.