Inflation and central bank independence: A meta-regression analysis

Journal of Economic Surveys

Volumn 24, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 593-621

  Klomp, Jeroen ^a   de Haan, Jakob ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

^b University of Groningen   (Germany)

Author keywords

Central bank independence; Inflation; Meta analysis

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; INFLATION; META-ANALYSIS; REGRESSION ANALYSIS;

EID: 77955093170     PISSN: 09500804     EISSN: 14676419     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6419.2009.00597.x     Document Type: Article

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