Initiating private-collective innovation: The fragility of knowledge sharing

Research Policy

Volumn 39, Issue 7, 2010, Pages 893-906

  Gächter, Simon ^a   von Krogh, Georg ^b   Haefliger, Stefan ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Experimental economics; Innovation; Knowledge sharing; Open source software; Private collective innovation model

Indexed keywords

ACTION MODELS; BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS; EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS; INITIAL SITUATION; INNOVATION PROCESS; INNOVATION THEORY; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION; INVESTMENT MODELS; KNOWLEDGE-SHARING; MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIUM; OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE; OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT; PRIVATE-COLLECTIVE INNOVATION MODEL; PUBLIC GOODS; PUBLIC SUBSIDIES; SOCIAL PREFERENCE;

COMPUTER SOFTWARE; ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; INVESTMENTS; KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT; OPEN SYSTEMS; SOFTWARE DESIGN;

INNOVATION;

EID: 77953808894     PISSN: 00487333     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2010.04.010     Document Type: Article

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