Redesigning teams and incentives in a merger: An experiment with managers and students

Management Science

Volumn 50, Issue 10, 2004, Pages 1379-1389

  Montmarquette, Claude ^a   Rullière, Jean Louis ^b   Villeval, Marie Claire ^b,c   Zeiliger, Romain ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^b GATE Lyon Saint Etienne   (France)

^c IZA   (Germany)

Author keywords

Executive and team based compensation; Incentives; Mergers; Real task experiment; Sorting; Subject pool effects

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; COSTS; MANAGEMENT SCIENCE; MANAGERS; OPTIMIZATION; SORTING; STRATEGIC PLANNING; STUDENTS;

EXECUTIVE AND TEAM-BASED COMPENSATION; INCENTIVES; MERGERS; REAL TASK EXPERIMENT; SUBJECT POOL EFFECTS;

MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS;

EID: 8344222083     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0280     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. Camerer, C. F., M. Knez. 1994. Creating "expectational assets" in the laboratory: "Weakest-link" coordination games. Strategic Management J. 15 101-119.
2. Camerer, C., R. A. Weber. 2003. Cultural conflict and merger failure: An experimental approach. Management Sci. 49(4) 400-415.
3. Carpenter, J., S. Burks, E. Verhoogen. 2003. Comparing Students to Workers: The Effects of Social Framing on Behavior in Distribution Games. Mimeo, Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT.
4. Charness, G., G. Frechette, J. Kagel. 2004. How robust is laboratory gift exchange? Experiment. Econom. 7(2) 189-205.
5. Cooper, D. J., J. H. Kagel, W. Lo, Q. L. Gu. 1999. Gaming against managers in incentive systems: Experimental results with Chinese students and Chinese managers. Amer. Econom. Rev. 89(4) 781-804.
6. Dickinson, D. L. 1999. An experimental examination of labor supply and work intensities. J. Labor Econom. 17(4) 608-638.
7. Dyer, D., J. H. Kagel, D. Levin. 1989. A comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions: A laboratory analysis. Econom. J. 99 108-115.
8. Erev, I., G. Bornstein, R. Galili. 1993. Constructive intergroup competition as solution to the free rider problem: A field experiment. J. Experiment. Soc. Psych. 29 463-478.
9. Falk, A., A. Ichino. 2003. Clean evidence on peer pressure. IZA discussion paper 732, Bonn, Germany.
10. Fehr, E., A. Falk. 2002. Psychological foundations of incentives. Eur. Econom. Rev. 46 687-724.
11. Fehr, E., J. A. List. 2002. The hidden costs and returns of incentives - Trust and trustworthiness among CEOs. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 2(5) Forthcoming.
12. Gneezy, U., M. Niederle, A. Rustichini. 2003. Performance in competitive environments: Gender differences. Quart. J. Econom. 118 (August) 1049-1074.
13. Hannan, R. L., J. H. Kagel, D. V. Moser. 2002. Partial gift exchange in an experimental labor market: Impact of subject population differences, productivity differences, and effort requests on behavior. J. Labor Econom. 20(4) 923-951.
14. Keser, C. F. van Winden. 2000. Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods. Scand. J. Econom. 102(1) 23-29.
15. Kreps, D. 1990. Corporate culture and economic theory. J. Alt, K. Schepsle, eds. Perspective on Positive Political Economy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 90-143.
16. Lazear, E. P. 2000. Performance pay and productivity. Amer. Econom. Rev. 90(5) 1346-1361.
17. Ledyard, J. O. 1995. Public goods: A survey of experimental research. J. H. Kagel, A. E. Roth, eds. Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 111-194.
18. Locke, E. A., L. M. Saari, K. N. Shaw, G. P. Latham. 1981. Goal setting and task performance: 1969-1980. Psych. Bull. 90(1) 125-152.
19. Meidinger, C., J. L. Rulliere, M. C. Villeval. 2003. Does team-based compensation give rise to problems when agents vary in their ability? Experiment. Econom. 6 253-272.
20. Nalbantian, H. R., A. Schotter. 1997. Productivity under group incentives: An experimental study. Amer. Econom, Rev. 87 314-341.
21. Prendergast, C. 1999. The provision of incentives in firms. J. Econom. Lit. XXXVII(1) 7-63.
22. Sillamaa, M. A. 1999. How work effort responds to wage taxation: An experimental test of a zero top marginal tax rate. J. Public Econom. 73 125-134.
23. Tajfel, H., C. Flament, M. G. Billig, R. P. Bundy. 1971. Social categorization and intergroup behavior. Eur. J. Soc. Psych. 1147-175.
24. van Dijk, F., J. Sonnemans, F. van Winden. 2001. Incentive systems in a real effort experiment. Eur. Econom. Rev. 45 187-214.