'Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 44, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 134-144

  Weber, Roberto A ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Feedback; Games; Learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 18244389572     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00002-2     Document Type: Article

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