Self-serving behavior in managers' discretionary information disclosure decisions

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 227-251

  Lewellen, Wilbur G ^a   Park, Taewoo ^a   Ro, Byung T ^a  

^a PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Capital markets; Corporate performance; Information disclosure; Securities regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030124007     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4101(95)00417-3     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. Antle, R. and A. Smith, 1986, An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives, Journal of Accounting Research 24, 1-39.
2. Baiman, S. and J.S. Demski, 1980, Economically optimal performance evaluation and control system, Journal of Accounting Research 18 (Suppl.), 184-234.
3. Bizjak, J.M., J.A. Brickley, and J.L. Coles, 1993, Stock-based incentive compensation and investment behavior, Journal of Accounting and Economics 16, 349-372.
4. Byrd, J., M.F. Johnson, and S. Porter, 1995, Discretion in financial reporting: The use of self-constructed peer groups in proxy statement performance graphs, Working paper (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI).
5. DeAngelo, L.E., 1988, Managerial competition, information costs, and corporate governance: The use of accounting performance measures in proxy contests, Journal of Accounting and Economics 10, 3-36.
6. Dechow, P.M. and R.G. Sloan, 1991, Executive incentives and the horizon problem: An empirical investigation, Journal of Accounting and Economics 14, 51-89.
7. Diamond, D.W. and R.E. Verrecchia, 1982, Optimal managerial contracts and equilibrium security prices, Journal of Finance 37, 275-287.
8. Dye, R.E., 1992, Relative performance evaluation and project selection, Journal of Accounting Research 30, 27-52.
9. Fama, E.F., 1980, Agency problems and the theory of the firm, Journal of Political Economy 88, 288-307.
10. Gaver, J.J., K.M. Gaver, and J.R. Austin, 1995, Additional evidence on bonus plans and income management, Journal of Accounting and Economics 19, 3-28.
11. Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy, 1990, Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43, 30s-51s.
12. Healy, P.M., 1985, The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions, Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 85-107.
13. Healy, P.M. and K.G. Palepu, 1990, Effectiveness of accounting-based dividend covenants, Journal of Accounting and Economics 12, 97-123.
14. Holmstrom, B., 1982, Moral hazard in teams, Bell Journal of Economics 13, 324-340.
15. Holthausen, R.W. and R.W. Leftwich, 1983, The economic consequences of accounting choice: Implications of costly contracting and monitoring, Journal of Accounting and Economics 5, 77-117.
16. Holthausen, R.W., D.F. Larcker, and R. G. Sloan, 1995, Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings, Journal of Accounting and Economics 19, 29-74.
17. Janakiraman, S.N., R.A. Lambert, and D.F. Larcker, 1992, An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation hypothesis, Journal of Accounting Research 30, 53-69.
18. Jensen, M.C. and K.J. Murphy, 1990, Performance pay and top-management incentives, Journal of Political Economy 98, 225-264.
19. Lambert, R.A. and D.F. Larcker, 1987, An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts, Journal of Accounting Research 25 (Suppl.), 85-125.
20. Lewellen, W.G. and B. Huntsman, 1970, Managerial pay and corporate performance, American Economic Review 60, 710-719.
21. Lewellen, W.G., T. Park, and B.T. Ro, 1995, Executive stock option compensation: The corporate reporting decision, Managerial and Decision Economics 16, 633-641.
22. Manne, H.G., 1965, Mergers and the market for corporate control, Journal of Political Economy 73, 110-120.
23. Mehran, H., 1995, Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance, Journal of Financial Economics 38, 163-184.
24. Murphy, K.J., 1985, Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis, Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 11-42.
25. Murphy, K.J., 1993, Executive compensation in corporate America: 1993 (United Shareholders Association, New York, NY).
26. Murphy, K.J., 1996, Reporting choice and the 1992 proxy disclosure rules, Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance 11, forthcoming.
27. Murphy, K.J. and J.L. Zimmerman, 1993, Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover, Journal of Accounting and Economics 16, 273-315.
28. Pourciau, S., 1993, Earnings management and nonroutine executive changes, Journal of Accounting and Economics 16, 317-336.
29. Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny, 1986, Large shareholders and corporate control, Journal of Political Economy 95, 461-488.
30. Sloan, R.G., 1993, Accounting earnings and top executive compensation, Journal of Accounting and Economics 16, 55-100.
31. Soffer, L.C., 1995, The effectiveness of the proxy rules on performance disclosure, Working paper (Northwestern University, Evanston, IL).
32. Watts, R.L. and J.L. Zimmerman, 1986, Positive Accounting Theory (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ).
33. Weisbach, M.S., 1988, Outside directors and CEO turnover, Journal of Accounting and Economics 20, 431-460.
34. Zmijewski, M.E. and R.L. Hagerman, 1981, An income strategy approach to the positive theory of accounting standard setting/choice, Journal of Accounting and Economics 3, 129-149.