Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 147-156

  Penna, Paolo ^a   Ventre, Carmine ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SALERNO   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Algorithmic mechanism design; Collusion; Transferable utilities

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMIC MECHANISM DESIGN; APPROXIMATION FACTOR; COLLUSION-RESISTANT MECHANISMS; DOMINANT STRATEGY; IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS; INTERDOMAIN ROUTING; MECHANISM DESIGN; NON COLLUSIONS; OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS; SIDE-PAYMENTS; SOLUTION CONCEPTS; STRATEGYPROOF MECHANISM; TASK-SCHEDULING;

ELECTRIC CONDUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; OPTIMAL SYSTEMS; OPTIMIZATION;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 77950589427     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1566374.1566396     Document Type: Conference Paper

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