Testing for adverse selection in insurance markets

Journal of Risk and Insurance

Volumn 77, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 39-84

  Cohen, Alma ^a,b   Siegelman, Peter ^c  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77949279263     PISSN: 00224367     EISSN: 15396975     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6975.2009.01337.x     Document Type: Article

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