Chapter 11 The anatomy of health insurance

Handbook of Health Economics

Volumn 1, Issue PART A, 2000, Pages 563-643

  Cutler, David M ^a   Zeckhauser, Richard J ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

adverse selection; agency problems; HMOs; I10; indemnity insurance; intertemporal insurance; managed care; moral hazard; pooling equilibrium; separating equilibrium; supplier induced demand

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956727027     PISSN: 15740064     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0064(00)80170-5     Document Type: Chapter

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