Advantageous selection in insurance markets

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 249-262

  De Meza, David ^a   Webb, David C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EXETER   (United Kingdom)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041035945     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2696408     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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2. CHASSAGNOM, A. AND CHIAPPORI, P.A. "Insurance Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Case of Pure Competition." Mimeo, University of Chicago, 1997.
3. CHIAPPORI, P. "Economic Models of Insurance Under Asymmetric Information." In G. Dionne. ed., Handbook of Insurance. Kluwer, 1998.
4. _ AND SALANIE, B. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108 (2000), pp. 56-78.
5. DE MEZA, D. AND SOUTHEY, C. "The Borrower's Curse: Optimism, Finance and Entrepreneurship." Economic Journal, Vol. 106 (1996), pp. 375-386.
6. DIONNE, G. AND DOHERTY, N.A. "Adverse Selection, Commitment, and Renegotiation: Extension to and Evidence from Insurance Markets." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102 (1994), pp. 209-235.
7. JULLIEN, B., SALANIE, B., AND SALANIE, F. "Should More Risk Averse Agents Exert More Effort?" Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Vol. 24 (1999), pp. 19-28.
8. _, _, AND _. "Screening Risk-Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard." Mimeo, University of Toulouse, 2000.
9. KAHNEMAN, D. AND TVERSKY, A. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk." Econometrica, Vol. 47 (1979), pp. 263-291.
10. LANDSBERGER, M. AND MEILIJSON, I. "Monopoly Insurance Under Adverse Selection When Agents Differ in Risk Aversion." Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 63 (1994), pp. 392-407.