Automobile Insurance Contracts and Risk of Accident: An Empirical Test Using French Individual Data

GENEVA Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 97-114

  Richaudeau, Didier ^a  

^a Laboratoire de Finance Assurance   (France)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Automobile insurance contracts; Econometrics; Moral hazard; Risk of accident

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347020793     PISSN: 09264957     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008737416839     Document Type: Article

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