On the positive correlation property in competitive insurance markets

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 43, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 597-605

  Koufopoulos, Kostas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Insurance markets

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248523886     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.01.001     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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