Empirical contract theory: The case of insurance data

European Economic Review

Volumn 41, Issue 3-5, 1997, Pages 943-950

  Chiappori, Pierre André ^a   Salanié, Bernard ^b  

^a DELTA   (France)

^b CNRS   (France)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Asymmetric information; Contract theory; Econometrics; Insurance

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042227362     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00052-4     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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