Welfare-improving asymmetric information in dynamic insurance markets

Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 113, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 121-150

  de Garidel Thoron, Thomas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INSURANCE INDUSTRY; WELFARE ECONOMICS;

EID: 15844383439     PISSN: 00223808     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/426039     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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