Asymmetric information and adverse selection in mauritian slave auctions

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 76, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 1269-1295

  Dionne, Georges ^a   St Amour, Pascal ^b   Vencatachellum, Désiŕ ^c  

^a HEC MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LAUSANNE   (Switzerland)

^c AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK   (Tunisia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; ECONOMIC THEORY; PRICE DETERMINATION; PRICE DYNAMICS; SLAVE; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 70149111930     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00561.x     Document Type: Article

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