The color of money: Privatization, economic dispersion, and the post-soviet "revolutions"

Comparative Politics

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 127-146

  Radnitz, Scott ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77749341505     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5129/001041510X12911363509396     Document Type: Article

References (78)

1. For the mainstream (pessimistic) view, see Chrystia Freeland, Sale of the Century: Russia's Wild Ride from Communism to Capitalism (New York: Crown Business, 2000);
2. Marshall I. Goldman, The Piratization of Russia: Russian Reform Goes Awry (London: Routledge, 2003);
3. and Stefan Hedlund, "Property without Rights: Dimensions of Russian Privatization," Europe-Asia Studies, 53 (March 2001): 213-37.
4. More bullish views are expressed by Timothy Frye, "Markets, Democracy, and New Private Business in Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs, 19 (January-March 2003): 24-45;
5. and Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, "A Normal Country: Russia After Communism, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (Winter 2005): 151-174
6. The term "colored revolutions" entered the political lexicon following Ukraine's "orange" revolution.
7. For an overview of the state of the debate, see M. Steven Fish and Omar Choudhry, "Democratization and Economic Liberalization in the Postcommunist World," Comparative Political Studies, 40 (March 2007): 254-282
8. See, for example, Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution," Journal of Democracy, 16 (April 2005): 117-30;
9. Debra Javeline, Protest and the Politics of Blame (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003);
10. James L. Gibson, "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition," American Journal of Political Science, 45 (January 2001): 51-68;
11. Robert G. Moser, Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties and Representation in Russia (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburg Press, 2001).
12. Marc Morjé Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003);
13. Stephen Crowley, "Comprehending the Weakness of Russia's Unions," Demokratizatsiya, 10 (Spring 2002): 230-55;
14. Henry Hale, Why Not Parties in Russia? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006);
15. Jeffrey Kopstein and David A. Reilly, "Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World," World Politics, 53 (October 2000): 1-37.
16. See Richard Rose, "Russia as an Hour-Glass Society: A Constitution without Citizens," East European Constitutional Review, 4 (Summer 1995): 34-42.
17. Michael McFaul, "Transitions from Postcommunism," Journal of Democracy, 16 (July 2005): 5-19.
18. Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, "Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions," Journal of Democracy, 17 (October 2006): 5-18;
19. Mark R. Beissinger, "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions," Perspectives on Politics, 5 (June 2007): 259-276
20. Joshua A. Tucker, "Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions," Perspectives on Politics, 5 (September 2007): 535-551
21. Henry Hale, "Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia," World Politics, 58 (October 2005): 133-165
22. See Hale, "Regime Cycles," pp. 140, 141, and 143.
23. Lucan A. Way, "Authoritarian State-Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine," World Politics, 57 (January 2005): 237.
24. See Kelly McMann, Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
25. Kenneth F. Greene, Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
26. Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 111-112
27. Douglass North and Barry Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," Journal of Economic History, 49 (December 1989): 803-32;
28. Hilton Root, "Tying the King's Hands," Rationality and Society, 1 (October 1989): 240-258
29. Willem H. Buiter, "From Predation to Accumulation?: The Second Transition Decade in Russia," Economics of Transition, 8 (November 2000): 603-622
30. McMann, Economic Autonomy and Democracy.
31. M. Steven Fish, Democracy from Scratch (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994);
32. and McMann, Economic Autonomy and Democracy.
33. Kathleen Kuehnast and Nora Dudwick, "Better a Hundred Friends than a Hundred Rubles?" World Bank Working Paper No.39 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004).
34. Andreas Schedler, "The Menu of Manipulation," Journal of Democracy, 13 (April 2002): 36-50.
35. Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 3.
36. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufmann, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 53-55.
37. Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander J. Motyl, and Charles Graybow, eds., Nations in Transit 1998: Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999), pp. 269-270
38. Jonathan Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution (London: Asghate Press, 2005), p. 106.
39. Jaba Devdariani, "As Business Support Ebbs, Georgian President Adjusts Tactics," accessed on April 21, 2003, http://www.eurasianet.org/ departaients/business/articles/eav042103.shtml.
40. Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening, p. 185.
41. See Mark R. Beissinger, "Promoting Democracy: Is Exporting Revolution a Constructive Strategy?" Dissent (Winter 2006): 84-89.
42. Irakly Areshidze, Democracy and Autocracy in Eurasia (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2007), p. 289.
43. Areshidze, Democracy and Autocracy, pp. 151, 165.
44. Daan van der Schriek, "A Gangster at Large," Transitions Online, accessed on February 25, 2004, http://www.tol.cz/look/TOLrus/article. tpl?IdLanguage=l&IdPublication=4&NrIssue=55&NrSection= 2&NrArticle= 11642.
45. Zaal Anjaparidze, "Georgian Media Shackled after Rose Revolution," Jamestown Foundation, accessed on July 29, 2004, http://www.jamestown.org/publications-details.php?volume-id=401&issue-id= 3032&article-id=2368328.
46. Author's interview with Georgian party activist.
47. Areshidze, Democracy and Autocracy, p. 105.
48. Beissinger, "Structure and Example," p. 271.
49. Karatnycky et al., Nations in Transit 1998.
50. Anders Aslund, "The Ancien Regime: Kuchma and the Oligarchs," in Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough, ed. Aslund and Michael McFaul (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2006), p. 18.
51. Aslund, "Ancien Regime," p. 20.
52. Nadia Diuk, "The Triumph of Civil Society," in Aslund and McFaul, p. 79;
53. Adrian Karatnycky, "The Fall and Rise of Ukraine's Political Opposition: From Kuchmagate to the Orange Revolution," in Aslund and McFaul, p. 39.
54. Way, "Kuchma's Failed Authoritarianism," p. 143.
55. Even the Interior Ministry defected, ensuring that the security services would not use force against the crowds. See CJ. Chivers, "Back Channels: A Crackdown Averted; How Top Spies in Ukraine Changed the Nation's Path," New York Times, January 17, 2005.
56. Zenon Zawada, "President assures Ukraine's businessmen: relations with the government will change," Ukraine Weekly, October 23, 2005.
57. "Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution," International Crisis Group, May 4, 2005.
58. Author's interviews with organizers in Osh and Jalalabad Oblasts, April 2005.
59. The People's Movement of Kyrgyzstan (PMK), an omnibus political party hastily assembled before the election, was led by former prime minister Kurmanbek Bakiev and former foreign minister Roza Otunbaeva. See Scott Radnitz, "What Really Happened in Kyrgyzstan?" Journal of Democracy, 17 (April 2006): 132-146
60. Karatnycky et al., Nations in Transit 1998, p. 94.
61. Leila Alieva, "Azerbaijan's Frustrating Elections," Journal of Democracy, 17 (April 2006): 148.
62. "Opposition Gains Confidence as Azerbaijan's Presidential Election Approaches," eurasianet.org, accessed on October 6, 2003. International observers criticized the election. For the full array of abuses, see the OSCE report at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2003/10/806-en.pdf.
63. Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Azerbaijan: Security Forces Remain on High Alert after Yesterday's Election Violence," accessed on October 17, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/features/2003/10/17102003161539.asp.
64. Karatnycky et al., Nations in Transit 1998, p. 115.
65. Weir quotes 10,000, while Silitski cites 20,000. See Fred Weir, "Cries of Fraud in Belarus, but no 'Orange Revolution,'" Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 2006;
66. and Vitali Silitski, "Belarus: Learning From Defeat," Journal of Democracy 17 (October 2006): 138-152.
67. A 1999 analysis by the EBRD placed Kazakhstan's level of privatization of medium-sized and large enterprises equal to Kyrgyzstan and above Ukraine. "Transition Report 1999: Ten Years of Transition," EBRD, p.32.
68. Sally N. Cummings, Kazakhstan: Power and the Elite (New York: I. B. Taurus, 2005), pp. 31-33.
69. Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, "The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition," Demokratizatsiya, 13 (Summer 2005), p. 380.
70. Cummings, Kazakhstan, p. 123.
71. Bhavna Dave, "Kazakhstan's 2004 Parliamentary Elections: Managing Loyalty and Support for the Regime," Problems of Post-Communism, 52 (January-February 2005): 5-6.
72. Richard Weitz, "Kazakhstan: The Emerging Middle Class Thinks Money, Not Democracy," eurasianet. org, accessed on March 11, 2008, http://www.eurasianet.org/departrnents/insight/articles/eav031108a.shtrnl.
73. Bruce Pannier, "Kazakhstan: Nazarbaev Warns Foreign NGOs Ahead of Presidential Election," RFE/ RL, accessed on September 13, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/features/features-Article.aspx?m=09&y=2005&id= lB97E849-3C86-4862-815C-69DD0596C54B.
74. As applied to politics, this refers to a situation in which state control over extractable resources gives regimes easy access to external rents, which are used to buy off potential oppositions, shore up the coercive apparatus, and neglect the development of political institutions, thus making authoritarianism more likely. See Michael L. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" World Politics, 53 (April 2001): 325-61.
75. For diverging views as applied to Russia, see M. Steven Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
76. Obvious examples include the "Asian tigers"-Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea- and China since the early 1980s. On regime tactics, see the April 2002 issue of Journal of Democracy.
77. Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Resisting the State: Retrenchment and Reform in Post-Soviet Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
78. Graeme B. Robertson, "Strikes and Labor Organization in Hybrid Regimes," American Political Science Review, 101 (November 2007): 781-799