What really happened in Kyrgyzstan?

Journal of Democracy

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 132-146

  Radnitz, Scott ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646725738     PISSN: 10455736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/jod.2006.0035     Document Type: Review

References (18)

1. Technically the term "revolution" in Kyrgyzstan is not accurate, signifying as it does major social and political transformation. A more accurate description is a change in government. Even to describe it as a "regime change" is premature, in that besides Akayev's family and immediate associates, the majority of individuals governing before still maintain influence, including the new parliament (which is mostly pro-Akayev), and the "rules of the game" have not changed substantially.
2. See Jonathan Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union (London: Ashgate, 2005).
3. For a leading instance of this type of analysis, see Kathleen Collins, "Clans, Pacts, and Politics in Central Asia," Journal of Democracy 13 (July 2002): 137-52.
4. This also explains why those candidates with the largest followings were officials or successful businessmen from the countryside but working in Bishkek, whose seat in parliament would ensure continued material support for the community.
5. Kelly M. McMann, "The Civic Realm in Kyrgyzstan," in Pauline Jones Luong, ed., The Transformation of Central Asia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004), 220.
6. One example is the student movement Kel-kel, which received significant press in the leadup to the elections (in part because its members gave numerous interviews), yet had small impact in reality. According to interviews with its leaders, it was only active in Bishkek and was responsible for bringing only 50 to 200 students to the protests on March 24, though it did assist in coordinating between organizers.
7. "Verkhovnii Sud Okazal'sya v Rukakh Storonnikov Proigravshikh Vybory Kandidatov" (The supreme court ended up in the hands of supporters of losing election candidates), www.akipress.org, 25 April 2005.
8. Pro-Akayev parties captured one-third of seats and another third of parliament is thought to have benefited from the government's assistance.
9. Text of Bakiyev's speech to the Constitutional Assembly, www.akipress.org, 13 October 2005.
10. Leila Saralaeva,"Kyrgyz Legal Battle," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 1 June 2005.
11. The last straw was Beknazarov's push to revoke the immunity of Akayev and other highly placed officials, which the parliament vehemently opposed. Leila Saralaeva and Aziza Turdueva, "Kyrgyzstan Reels at Prosecutor's Fall," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 21 September 2005.
12. Akyl Stamov, "Fergana: 100 Samykh Bogatykh Lyudei Kyrgyzstana 2004 Goda" (Fergana: The 100 richest people in Kyrgyzstan), www.akipress.org.
13. RFE/RL Newsline, 16 January 2006.
14. "D. Usenov: Ne Odin Kvartel'nii Mitr Zemli v Gorode Vydavat'sya ne Budet, Vydannie Ranyee v Chastnuyu Sobstvennost' Zemli Pereraspredelyat'sya ne Budet" (D. Usenov: Not one square meter of land in the city will be given out, and no previously awarded land will be redistributed), www.akipress.org, 28 October 2005.
15. Protests in support of members of Uzbek elites who have been targeted for government repression have occurred in Kashkadaryo, Jizzakh, Tashkent, and Andijan. Protests against painful economic policies have broken out in Kokand, Margilon, and Tashkent, among others. See "Uzbekistan: The Andijan Uprising," ICG, 25 May 2005;
16. and "Uzbekistan: A Year of Disturbances." Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 13 May 2005.
17. See "Ukraine's Political Crisis: And Then They Woke Up," Economist, 15 September 2005;
18. and "Georgia and Ukraine: An Odd Couple," Economist, 18 August 2005.