The democratic choice of Kazakhstan: A case study in economic liberalization, intraelite cleavage, and political opposition

Demokratizatsiya

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 373-392

  Junisbai, Barbara ^a   Junisbai, Azamat ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Central Asia; Elites; Intraelite cleavage; Kazakhstan; Neopatrimonialism; Political change

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC POLICY; LIBERALIZATION; POLITICAL CONFLICT; POLITICAL PARTICIPATION;

ASIA; EURASIA; KAZAKHSTAN; WEST ASIA;

EID: 28144461463     PISSN: 10746846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3200/DEMO.13.3.373-392     Document Type: Article

References (51)

1. Muriel Atkins, "Thwarted Democratization in Tajikistan," in Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, 278 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
2. See Edward Schatz, Modern Clan Politics: The Power of "Blood" in Kazakhstan and Beyond (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004);
3. Kathleen Collins, "The Political Role of Clans in Central Asia," Comparative Politics 35 (2003): 137-52;
4. Kathleen Collins, "The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories," World Politics, 56, no. 2 (2004): 224-61;
5. and Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Arguing that informal politics, rather than formal institutions, matter most in Central Asia, Collins, for example, explains that the tenacity of clans is a major force working against democracy in Central Asia. Competition between clans over state resources is what drives politics in the region, and the kinship bonds that delineate clans from one another continue to persist, even in the face of government efforts to modernize the economy and society.
6. John Higley, Judith Kullberg, and Jan Pakulski, "The Persistence of Postcommunist Elites," Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2 (1996): 138.
7. Robert Dahl, "Development and Democratic Culture," in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, ed. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien, 36 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).
8. See Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 69-103;
9. Ross E. Burkhart and Michael Lewis-Beck, "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis," American Political Science Review 88, no. 4 (1994): 903-10;
10. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," World Politics 49, no. 2 (1997): 155-83;
11. Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, "What Makes Democracies Endure?" Journal of Democracy 7, no. 1 (1996): 39-55;
12. and M. Steven Fish, "The Dynamics of Democratic Erosion," in Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy, ed. Richard D. Anderson, Jr., M. Steven Fish, Stephen E. Hanson, and Philip G. Roeder, 54-95 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
13. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 19.
14. John Higley and Michael Burton, "The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns," American Sociological Review 54 (1989): 17.
15. Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, "The Political Economy of Democratic Transition," Comparative Politics 29, no. 3 (1997): 263-83.
16. Theories of patrimonialism have previously been applied to Central Asia. See, for example, Robert Kitschelt, "Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions," Party Politics 1, no. 4 (1995): 447-72;
17. and John T. Ishiyama, "Neopatrimonialism and the Prospects for Democratization in the Central Asian Republics" in Power and Change in Central Asia, ed. Sally Cummings (London: Routledge, 2001).
18. Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle, "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa," World Politics 46, no. 4 (1994): 463.
19. Ibid., 458.
20. Kazakh Commercial Television, November 20, 2001.
21. Mukhtar Ablyazov, "Vospominaniya M. Ablyazova," EurasiaNet, http://eurasia.org.ru/cgi-bin/datacgi/ database.cgi?file=News&report=SingleArticleRu&ArticleID=0003241 (accessed May 3, 2003).
22. Aldar Kusainov, "Kazakhstan's Critical Choice," EurasiaNet, January 13, 2003, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/ eav011303_pr.shtml (accessed September 2, 2003).
23. Kazakh Commercial Television.
24. Kazakh Commercial Television.
25. According to Ablyazov's memoirs, the movement's original planners, Ablyazov, Subkhanberdin, Yertlesova, and National Bank Chair Grigorii Marchenko, had set the announcement date for December 20, right after the tenth anniversary of Kazakhstan's independence. As the conflict with Aliev escalated and they found that they could not count on President Nazarbaev's support against Aliev, they were forced to hold the founding press conference sooner.
26. Interfax-Kazakhstan News Agency, "Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan to Lobby Tycoons' Interests," November 22, 2001.
27. Keith E. Henderson, "Halfway Home and a Long Way to Go: Russian and Kazakh Roads to Sectoral and Political Corruption," Demokratizatsiya 8, no. 4 (2000): 493.
28. Bulat Abilov, "Zakon odin dlya vsekh," Kub.kz, May 17, 2005, http://www.kub.kz/article.php?sid=9270 (accessed May 2005).
29. Mark Beissinger, "State Building in the Shadow of an Empire-State," in The End of an Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective, ed. by Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, 157-85 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
30. Bratton and Van de Walle, "Neopatrimonial Regimes," 464.
31. Ablyazov, "Vospominaniya M. Ablyazova."
32. One could argue that kinship ties played an important part in President Nazarbaev's decision to ally with his son-in-law, Aliev, against Ablyazov. According to Ablyazov, Nazarbaev explained his decision as such: "The president began to explain that he could not do anything else regarding Aliev because of the family ... how could we ask that he cut off his own hand? 'Mukhtar [Ablayzov's first name], you also have children. You must understand me!"' Yet, this in itself does not completely support the notion that kinship ties were paramount in guiding the players' actions. Earlier, Nazarbaev had asked Zhakiyanov, another DCK founder, to conduct an investigation against Aliev, who had been leaking and publishing private information about the president and his family on the Internet.
33. Rustem Kadyrzhanov, personal communication, December 31, 2004, and Ak Zhol Web site, http://www.dpkakzhol.kz (accessed December 5, 2004). According to Dr. Kadyrzhanov, for this generation of Moscow-educated elites, clan identity is not as salient as for previous generations. Some, like Jandosov, are not fluent in the Kazakh language, and because most are urbanized (gorodskie), traditional kinship ties are relatively weak.
34. An article critical of the DCK published in Novoe Pokoleniye, November 30, 2001, stresses the DCK founders' diversity and their common interests: "The first thing that strikes you is how eclectic they are ... they never associated with one another previously. Both Ablyazov (Temirbank) and Subkhanberdin (Kazkommertz Bank) head different financial-industrial groups. And even the former governor of Pavlodar oblast' Zhakiyanov mostly kept aloof before. You cannot help but feel that these gentlemen got together because they perceived a threat to their businesses."
35. Martha Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 116.
36. See also Nurbolat Masanov, The Political Elite of Kazakhstan: Changes of Kazakhstani Political Elite during the Period of Sovereignty (Washington, DC: International Eurasian Institute for Economic and Political Research, 2000), http://iicas.org/english/publs_22_11_0.1htm.
37. Kusainov, "Kazakhstan's Critical Choice."
38. The emergence of the DCK and the potential for democratization that it represents indirectly lends support to Gregory Gleason's argument that "the prospects for democracy in Kazakhstan should be regarded as comparatively bright" (376). Gleason, however, explained Kazakhstan's democratic prospects in terms of the leadership's focus on compromise and moderation, as well as its model of "Asian liberalism." See Gregory Gleason, "Prospects of Kazakhstan's Asian Liberalism," Demokratizatisiya 8, no. 3 (1997): 376-85.
39. John Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 25.
40. Rustem Kadyrzhanov, "The Ruling Elite of Kazakhstan in the Transition Period," in The New Elite in Post-Communist Eastern Europe, ed. Vladimir Shlapentokh, Christopher Vanderpool, and Boris Doktorov, 145 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999).
41. Olcott, Kazakhstan, 89.
42. Dosym Satpaev, Respublika, December 27, 2001, 4.
43. In interviews, both Roza Otunbaeva, leader of the Ata Jurt party and the acting foreign minister, and Kurmanbek Bakiev, the acting president and prime minister, expressed surprise at how events unfolded.
44. "Massive Looting Engulfs Kyrgyz Capital after Government Ousted," Agence France Presse, March 24, 2005.
45. "Southerners Unhappy about More than Flawed Polls," United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), March 24, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org/ report.asp?ReportID=46299&SelectRegion=Asia&SelectCountry= KYRGYZSTAN (accessed March 2005).
46. "Uzbekistan: From Businessmen to Prisoners to Refugees - Escaped Andijon Prisoners Tell Their Tale," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 21, 2005, http://rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/5/ 05998A78-9C9D-4B29-AE34-2083513D8850.html (accessed May 2005).
47. Bratton and Van de Walle wrote that "most African leaders have demobilized voters and eradicated popular associations except those headed by hand-picked loyalists. Therefore, when political protest does erupt in neopatrimonial regimes, it is usually spontaneous, sporadic, disorganized, and unsustained" ("Neopatrimonial Regimes," 462).
48. See Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Central Asia Report 4, no. 44 (December 2, 2004) for a summary of Central Asian opposition figures' comments regarding the Kazakh opposition's strength during a conference held at Columbia University in November 2004.
49. Bratton and Van de Walle, "Neopatrimonial Regimes," 461.
50. Gleason, "Prospects," 378.
51. Sergei Duvanov, "Yesli snyat' oranzhevye ochki," Zhuma Taims, January 14, 2005, http://www.kub.kz/article.php?sid=8039 (accessed January 2005).