Regime cycles: Democracy, autocracy, and revolution in post-Soviet Eurasia

World Politics

Volumn 58, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 133-165

  Hale, Henry E ^a  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNISM; DEMOCRACY; POLITICAL CHANGE; POLITICAL INSTABILITY; POLITICAL REFORM;

ASIA; EASTERN EUROPE; EURASIA; EUROPE; GEORGIA (REPUBLIC); KYRGYZSTAN; UKRAINE; WEST ASIA;

EID: 33746423079     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/wp.2006.0019     Document Type: Article

References (186)

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2. Timothy J. Colton, "Politics," in Colton and Robert Legvold, eds., After the Soviet Union (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992);
3. M. Steven Fish, Democracy from Scratch (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995);
4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991);
5. Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe," International Social Science Journal 43 (June 1991);
6. Michael McFaul, Russia's Unfinished1 Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001);
7. Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Some Glances at Post-communist Countries," A World Development 21 (August 1993).
8. More recently, see Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, "A Normal Country," Foreign Affairs (March-April 2004).
9. Valerie Bunce, "Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience," World Politics 55 (January 2003);
10. Stephen E. Hanson, "Defining Democratic Consolidation," in Richard D. Anderson, Jr., M. Steven Fish, Stephen E. Hanson, and Philip G. Roeder, eds., Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001);
11. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996);
12. and Gerardo L. Munck, "The Regime Question: Theory Building in Democracy Studies," World Politics 54 (October 2001).
13. M. Steven Fish, "The Dynamics of Democratic Erosion," in Anderson et al. (fn. 2);
14. Philip G. Roeder, "Varieties of Post-Soviet Authoritarian Regimes," Post-Soviet Affairs 10 (January 1994).
15. Something like a manifesto for this school is Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," Journal of Democracy 13 (January 2002).
16. Other work on hybrid regimes includes Larry Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes," Journal of Democracy 13 (April 2002);
17. Jeffrey Herbst, "Political Liberalization in Africa after Ten Years," Comparative Politics 33 (April 2001);
18. Terry Lynn Karl, "The Hybrid Regimes of Central America," Journal of Democracy 6 (July 1995);
19. and Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," Journal of Democracy 13 (April 2002).
20. Adrian Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution," Foreign Affairs (March-April 2005);
21. Michael McFaul, "Transitions from Communism," Journal of Democracy 16 (July 2005);
22. and Vitali Silitski, "Beware the People," Transitions Online, March 21, 2005.
23. In political economy, see Alberto Alesina, Nouriel Roubini, and Gerald Cohen, Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997).
24. For example, Huntington (fn. 1);
25. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequlibration, An Introduction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978);
26. and Alexander Motyl, "Communist Legacies and New Trajectories," in Yitzhak Brudny Jonathan Frankel, and Stefani Hoffman, eds., Restructuring Post-Communist Russia (New York: Cambridge, 2004).
27. John Higley and Michael G. Burton, "The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns," American Sociological Review 54 (February 1989), 18.
28. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).
29. Slightly modifying Higley and Burton's (fn. 8) definition of "national elite," the simple term "elite" is defined here as "persons who are able, by virtue of their authoritative positions in powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind, to affect ... political outcomes [at the local or national level] regularly and substantially" (p. 18).
30. Vladimir Gel'man, "Regime Transition, Uncertainty and the Prospects for Redemocratisation," Europe-Asia Studies 51 (September 1999);
31. idem, "Uroki Ukrainskogo," Polis (January-February 2005);
32. Higley and Burton (fn. 8);
33. Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939);
34. Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society A Treatise on General Sociology (New York: Dover, 1935).
35. Higley and Burton (fn. 8), 19.
36. See the famous debate on presidentialism and parliamentarism involving Donald Horowitz, Arend Lijphart, Juan Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset, and others, reprinted in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993);
37. and also Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa (New York Cambridge University Press, 1997);
38. Gerald M. Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS," World Politics 49 (January 1997);
39. M. Steven Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005);
40. Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994);
41. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, "Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy," Comparative Politics 29 (July 1997).
42. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy 5 (January 1994);
43. also O'Donnell (fn. 1) For a discussion of Russia in light of these ideas, see Henry E. Hale, Michael McFaul, and Timothy J. Colton, "Putin and the 'Delegative Democracy' Trap: Evidence from Russia's 2003-04 Elections," Post-Soviet Affairs 20 (October-December 2004)
44. For a discussion of Russia in light of these ideas, see Henry E. Hale, Michael McFaul, and Timothy J. Colton, "Putin and the 'Delegative Democracy' Trap: Evidence from Russia's 2003-04 Elections," Post-Soviet Affairs 20 (October-December 2004).
45. The term "Patronal" is used instead of the common "patrimonial" or "neopatrimonial" since the latter frequently connote authority not only by selective material exchange but also by strong attachments rooted in extended kinship, territory, or tradition. Networks based on the latter attachments might be expected to be more stable than purely patronal networks and less susceptible to the dynamics described here, though this deserves further exploration. On these concepts and implications for regime change, see Bratton and van de Walle (fa. 13); The term "Patronal" is used instead of the common "patrimonial" or "neopatrimonial" since the latter frequently connote authority not only by selective material exchange but also by strong attachments rooted in extended kinship, territory, or tradition. Networks based on the latter attachments might be expected to be more stable than purely patronal networks and less susceptible to the dynamics described here, though this deserves further exploration. On these concepts and implications for regime change
46. and H. E. Chahabi and Juan J. Linz, Sultanistic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
47. Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski, and Gabor Toka, Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
48. This argument builds on several important theoretical works addressing the role of expectations about the future in stabilizing or destabilizing elite coordination around authoritarian or patronal leaders: Timur Kuran, "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989," World Politics 44 (October 1991); about the future in stabilizing or destabilizing elite coordination around authoritarian or patronal leaders: (October)
49. Luis Fernando Medina and Susan C. Stokes, "Monopoly and Monitoring: An Approach to Political Clientelism," in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, eds., Patrons or Policies? Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming);
50. Mancur Olson, "The Logic of Collective Action in Soviet-type Societies," Journal of Soviet Nationalities 1 (Summer 1990);
51. and Olga Shvetsova, "Resolving the Problem of Pre-Election Coordination: The 1999 Parliamentary Election as Elite Presidential 'Primary,"' in Vicki Hesh and William Reisinger, eds., Elections, Parties and the Future of Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
52. On focal points, see Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).
53. Shvetsova (fn. 17) coined this term. coined this term
54. The general insight that elite contestation can promote influence by the masses has been voiced in a host of works, including Easter (fn. 13); The general insight that elite contestation can promote influence by the masses has been voiced in a host of works, including (fn. 13)
55. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions: from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986);
56. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991);
57. Philip G. Roeder, Red Sunset: The Failure of Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
58. Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World," World Politics 54 (January 2002).
59. Robert K. Christensen, Edward R. Rakhimkulov, and Charles R. Wise, "The Ukrainian Orange Revolution Brought More Than a New President: What Kind of Democracy Will the Institutional Changes Bring?" Communist & Post-Communist Studies 38 (June 2005).
60. Stephen E. Hanson, "Instrumental Democracy: The End of Ideology and the Decline of Russian Political Parties," in Hesli and Reisinger (fn. 17). coined this term
61. The core logic was initially developed with reference to the Russian case and to certain of the theories cited above. Thus to some extent the analysis of the other post-Soviet cases does constitute a test. For present purposes, however, the case narratives that follow are presented not as an explicit test but as useful illustrations of the theory's potential. This will hopefully spawn further research and more precise and thorough testing than is possible in the scope of a journal artecle.
62. on the origins of this sort of clientelism in the former USSR and in other countries with legacies of patrimonial communism, see Kitschelt et al. (fa. 16).
63. George W. Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002);
64. Fish (fin. 13);
65. Eugene Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999).
66. As counted throughout most of the 1990s and early 2000s.
67. M. N. Afanas'ev, Klientelizm i Rossiiskaia Gosudarstvennost' (Clientelism and Russian statehood) (Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 1997);
68. Kimitaka Matsuzato, ed., Regiony Rossii: Khronika I Rukovoditeli (The regions of Russia: Chronicle and leaders) (Sapporo, Japan: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2003).
69. On different presidential elections, see Daniel Treisman, "Why Yeltsin Won: A Russian Tammany Hall," Foreign Affairs 75 (September-October 1996);
70. Henry E. Hale, "The Origins of United Russia and the Putin Presidency: The Role of Contingency in Party-System Development," Demokratizatsiya 12 (Spring 2004a);
71. idem,
72. "Russia's Presidential Election and the Fate of Democracy: Taking the Cake," AAASS NewsNet 44 (May 2004b).
73. Juliet Johnson, A Fistful of Rubles (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000);
74. and Michael McFaul, Russia's 1996 Presidential Election: The End of Polarized Politics (Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution Press, 1997).
75. On the oligarchs and their relationship to central authority, see Jerry F. Hough, The Logic of Economic Reform in Russia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2001);
76. and Johnson (fn. 30).
77. Henry E. Hale, "Explaining Machine Politics in Russia's Regions: Economy, Ethnicity, and Legacy," Post-Soviet Affairs 19 (July-September 2003);
78. Johnson (fn. 30).
79. Johnson (fn. 30).
80. On these elections, see McFaul (fn. 30);
81. Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2001); 1
82. and Treisman (fn. 29).
83. According to an August 20-24, 1999, nationwide survey by the VTsIOM agency, reported in Russian Election Watch 2, no. 2 (September 1999), 1, http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/ publication.cfm?program=CORE&ctype=paper&item_id=276 (last accessed February 19, 2006).
84. Hale (fn. 29, 2004a).
85. On these elections, see Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul, Popular Choice and Managed Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003);
86. Hale (fn. 29, 2004a);
87. and Shvetsova (fn. 17).
88. Hale (fn. 29, 2004b).
89. Audrey L. Alstadt, "Azerbaijan's Struggle toward Democracy," in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
90. This paragraph draws on Svante E. Cornell, "Democratization Falters in Azerbaijan," Journal of Democracy 12 (April 2001);
91. Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Azerbaijan: Aliev's Withdrawal Marks End of Political Era," RFE/RL News & Analysis, October 3, 2003, http:// www.rferl.com/features/2003/10/03102003170908.asp (last accessed February 19, 2006);
92. Opposition Gains Confidence as Azerbaijads Presidential Election Approaches," EurasiaNet, October 6, 2003, http://www.eurasianet.org/ departments/insight/articles/cav100603.shtml (last accessed February 19, 2006);
93. and Alec Rasizade, "Azerbaijan after Heydar Aliev," Nationalities Papers 32 (March 2004).
94. On Ukrainian privatization, see Robert Kravchuk, Ukrainian Political Economy: The First Ten Years (New York: Pallgrave MacMillan, 2002).
95. Kimitaka Matsuzato, "All Kuchma's Men: The Reshuffling of Ukrainian Governors and the Presidential Election of 1999," Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 42 (September 2001);
96. Lucan Way, "The Sources and Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in Ukraine," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 20 (March 2004).
97. Matsuzato (fn. 42);
98. Mikhail Pogrebinsky, "Kak Ukraina Shla k'Oranzhevoi' Revoliutsii," in Pogrebinsky, ed., "Oranzhevaia" Revoliutsiia: Versii, Khronika, Dokumenty (The "Orange" Revolution: Versions, chronicle, documents) (Kyiv: Otima, 2005).
99. Keith Darden, "Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine under Kuchma," East European Constitutional Review 10 (Spring-Summer 2001).
100. See also Dominique Arel, "Kuchmagate and the Demise of Kuchma's 'Geopolitical Bluff,"' East European Constitutional Review 10 (Spring-Summer 2001).
101. Some of the best such arguments include Darden (fn. 44);
102. Levitsky and Way (fn. 4);
103. Way (fn.42).
104. An exception is Taras Kuzio, "The 2002 Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine: Democratization or Authoritarianism," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 19 (June 2003).
105. As of the start of 2004, some 80 percent of citizens did not want Kuchma to continue as president. See Dmitry Vydrin and Irina Rozhkova, V Ozhidanii Geroia: Yezhenedel'nik Goda Peremen (While awaiting a hero: A weekly of the year of changes) (Kharkiv: Kankom, 2005), 19.
106. Sergei Danilochkin, "Ukraine: Kuchma Cleared to Run for Third Term," RFL/RL Features, December 30, 2003.
107. Vydrin and Rozhkova (fn. 46), 193-94, 200, 220, 257.
108. Ibid., 212.
109. Kuzio (fn. 45).
110. See Serhii Leshchenko, "Petro Poroshenko v Inter'eri Kartyn i Kartynok," Ukraiins'ka Pravda, www2.pravda.com.ua, January 11, 2005, 19:36.
111. Viacheslav Nikonov, "'Oranzhevaia' Revoliutsiia v Kontekste Zhanra," in Pogrebinsky (fn. 43), 100;
112. author interview with Pogrebinsky, Kyiv, August 12, 2005;
113. author interview with Dmitry Vydrin, Kyiv, August 12, 2005.
114. Pogrebinsky (fn. 43), 116.
115. Also author interview with Pogrebinsky (fn. 52); 96 Mikhail Pogrebinsky, "Kak Ukraina Shla k'Oranzhevoi' Revoliutsii," in Pogrebinsky, ed., "Oranzhevaia" Revoliutsiia: Versii, Khronika, Dokumenty (The "Orange" Revolution: Versions, chronicle, documents) (Kyiv: Otima, 2005).
116. Vydrin and Rozhkova (fn. 46), 227;
117. author interview with Vydrin (fn. 52).
118. Vydrin and Rozhkova (fn. 46), 387;
119. Daniil Yanevsky, Khronika "Oranzhevoi" Revoliutsii (Chronicle of the "Orange" Revolution) (Kharkiv: Folio, 2005), 76.
120. Nikonov (fn. 52), 100.
121. Taras Kuzio, "Yushchenko Victory to Speed Up Ukraine's Democratization and Europeanization," Eurasia Daily Monitor, December 17, 2004
122. Yanevsky (fn. 54).
123. Dominique Arel has powerfully argued that the regional differences at work in the Orange Revolution most fundamentally reflect differences in national identity. See Arel, "Ukraina Vybyraet Zapad, No Ne Bez Vostoka," Pro et Contra (July-August 2005);
124. an English-language version, "The Orange Revolution: Analysis and Implications of the 2004 Presidential Election in Ukraine," February 25, 2005, is available at http://www.uottawa.ca/academic/grad-etudesup/ ukr/pdf/Are_Cambridge.pdf (last accessed February 20, 2006).
125. Aleksandr Litvinenko, "'Oranzhevaia Revoliutsiia: Prichiny, Kharakter i Rezultaty," in Pogrebinsky (fn. 43), 13;
126. Yanevsky (fh. 54), 58, 64.
127. Author interview with Pogrebinsky (fn. 52). 96 Mikhail Pogrebinsky, "Kak Ukraina Shla k'Oranzhevoi' Revoliutsii," in Pogrebinsky, ed., "Oranzhevaia" Revoliutsiia: Versii, Khronika, Dokumenty (The "Orange" Revolution: Versions, chronicle, documents) (Kyiv: Otima, 2005).
128. Table of official election results in Central Election Commission of Ukraine, Vybory Prezydenta Ukraiiny 2004 Roku: Elektoral'na Statystyka (Elections for the president of Ukraine 2004: Electoral statistics) (Kyiv: Central Election Commission, 2005), 496-97.
129. Maksim Strikha, "Ukrainskie Vybory: Do i Posle," in Pogrebinsky (fn. 43), 155. 96 Mikhail Pogrebinsky, "Kak Ukraina Shla k'Oranzhevoi' Revoliutsii," in Pogrebinsky, ed., "Oranzhevaia" Revoliutsiia: Versii, Khronika, Dokumenty (The "Orange" Revolution: Versions, chronicle, documents) (Kyiv: Otima, 2005).
130. Eidt poll results can be found in Vydrin and Rozhkova (fn. 46), 391.
131. Mykhailo Slaboshpyts'kyi, Peizazh dlia Pomaranchevoii Revoliutsii (A landscape for the Orange Revolution) (Kyiv: Yaroslaviv Val, 2005), 84, 86-88.
132. Ibid., 86-88;
133. Yanevsky (fn. 54), 55-56.
134. Kyiv State Rada, Rishennia 733/2143, "Pro Zahostrennia Suspil'no-Politychnoi Sytuatsii v Misti Kyevi, Iaka Sklalas'ia Pislia Proholoshennia Tsentral'noiu Vyborchoiu Komisieiu Rezultativ Povtornoho Holosuvannia po Vyborakh Prezydenta Ukraiiny," November 22, 2004, reprinted in Kiev State Administration, Pomarancheva Revoliutsiia i Kyiivska Vlada: Pohliad Kriz' Pryzmu Fakfiv (The Orange Revolution and Kyivan power: A look through the prism of the facts) (Kyiv: Kyiv State Administration, 2005), 4-5;
135. Yanevsky (fn. 54), 97.
136. Kyiv State Administration, Rozporiadzhennia no. 2132, "Pro Zakhody Shchodo Zabezpechennia Hromads'koho Poriadku v Stolytsi Ukraiiny - Misti-Heroi Kyevi," November 24, 2004, reprinted in Kiev State Administration (fn. 64), 9-11;
137. author interview with Oleksandr Petik, head of the Kyiv city administration's main directorate for internal politics, August 11, 2005;
138. Slaboshpyts'kyi (fn. 62), 88-89.
139. Author interview with Petik (fn. 65);
140. author interview with Pogrebinsky (fn. 52);
141. Yanevsky (fn. 54), 82, 88.
142. Kyiv State Administration, Rozporiadzhennia no. 2132, in Kyiv State Administration (fn. 64);
143. author interview with Petik (fn. 65).
144. Arel (fn. 57);
145. Taras Kuzio, "Did Ukraine's Security Service Really Prevent Bloodshed During the Orange Revolution," Eurasian Daily Monitor, January 24, 2005.
146. Author interview with Petik (fn. 65).
147. RFE/RL Newsline, April 11, 2002.
148. Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., "Georgia's Rose Revolution," Journal of Democracy 15 (April 2004).
149. RFF/RL Newsline, February 11, 2005.
150. On the revolution and reconsolidation, see also Georgi Derlugian, "Georgia's Return of the King," Working Paper no. 22, Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (Washington, D.C.: csis, 2004), http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/ruseur_wp_022.pdf (last accessed February 20, 2006);
151. and Fairbanks (fn. 71), who notes that Saakashvili has effectively replaced Georgia's "superpresidential" constitution with a stronger "hyperpresidential" one. who notes that Saakashvili has effectively replaced Georgia's "superpresidential" constitution with a stronger "hyperpresidential" one
152. RFE/RL Newsline, February 28, 2005;
153. Aaron Rhodes, "Akaev's Acrid Legacy," Transitions Online, February 23, 2005, www.tol.cz;
154. TOL, "A Second Round Beckons," Transitions Online, February 28, 2005;
155. Erica Marat, "Mass Protests, Little Change after Kyrgyz Parliamentary Runoff," Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 15, 2005.
156. Nur Omarov, cited in Kabar (Kyrgyzstan), http://www.kabar.kg/rus, June 30, 2005, 09:40.
157. RFE/RL Newsline, March 16, 2005;
158. RFE/RL Newsline, March 22, 2005;
159. "Kurmanbek Bakiyev becomes Kyrgyz Prime Minister and Acting President," Times of Central Asia, March 25, 2005, 01:40, http:// www.times.kg/news/Protests/Kyrgyzstan/2005/03/25/0068147;
160. Erica Marat, "Kyrgyz Crisis Reaches Bishkek - Rumors Suggest Akayev Has Fled Country," Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 21, 2005.
161. RFE/RL Newsline, July 12, 2005.
162. Kurmanbek Bakiev, "Kurmanbek Bakiev," interview, Gazeta.Kg (Kyrgyzstan), June 28, 2005, 21:06.
163. While the author was an observer for the OSCE in the Kyrgyzstan presidential election, the views expressed in this paper are those of the author only and not necessarily those of the OSCE. The OSCE final report on the election can be found at http://www.osce.org/documents/ odihr-e1/2005/12/17585_en.pdf (last accessed February 19, 2006).
164. Liz Fuller, "Democracy or Oligarchy?" RFE/RL Newsline, v.1, no.122, pt. 1, September 22, 1997.
165. Paul Goble, "Why Ter-Petrossyan Fell," End Note, RFE/RL Newsline, February 6, 1998;
166. Emil Danielyan, "Armenian President's Resignation Likely to Cause Policy Changes," RFE/RL Newsline, February 5, 1998;
167. RFE/RL Newsline, November 3, 1997.
168. This case shows that the elite contestation phase does not necessarily play out in the electoral arena.
169. On the Tajikistan election, see Zafar Abdullaev and Kambiz Arman, "To the Rulers, Victory," Transitions Online, February 28, 2005;
170. and the OSCE's final report, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/ html/pdftohtml/14852_en.pdf.html (last accessed February 19, 2006).
171. TOL, "Sidelining the Opposition," Transitions Online, February 26, 2005.
172. On Rakhmonov's perceived popularity, see Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2004, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/ NISPAcee/UNPAN017051.pdf (last accessed February 20, 2006).
173. Thus, while nearly all unpopular leaders in Eurasia's patronal presidential countries attempted repressive behavior in order to win elections, we see that they were successful in doing so (maintaining the necessary elite loyalty) only when they were not lame ducks or when the chosen successor was broadly popular in his own right (for example, Putin in Russia).
174. Christensen, Rakhimkulov, and Wise (fn. 22).
175. Not just any dispersion of power will have a long-run democratizing effect, of course, since a badly designed division of authority or a muddling of authority could produce instability and a reversion to autocracy; see Paul D'Anieri, "What Has Changed in Ukrainian Politics? Assessing the Implications of the Orange Revolution," Problems of Post-Communism 52 (September-October 2005).
176. In Ukraine, President Yushchenko has hinted that he would like to alter the deal struck in late 2004, and many of his present and former associates have made even stronger statements to this effect, although for now elites generally expect power to be divided in the future. As D'Anieri points out, however, it is unclear at the time of this writing exactly how power will be divided. The case of Moldova's parliamentary system represents a sort of middle-ground case: its parliament elects the president. This gives the opposition greater opportunity to gain a stake in power and hence increases scope for contestation: the incumbent party lost the first parliamentary election under these rules in 2001 and the new incumbent party, seeking reelection in 2005, had to strike a deal with members of another party to stay in power. But once installed, the president has a great deal of authority to exercise power and constrain opposition, much like the Westminster system whose potentially antidemocratic effects are ably described by Horowitz, in Diamond and Plattner (fn. 13).
177. Kyrgyzstan is presently in something of a limbo, with Bakiev having promised a diminution of presidential authority in favor of the prime minister (Kulov), but so far without this being institutionalized in an amended constitution. On these cases and issues, see Henry E. Hale, "How the Mighty Fall: The Colored Revolutions and Eurasia's Democratic Prospects" (Paper presented at the 11th annual world convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, New York City, March 23-25, 2006).
178. Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model," Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970).
179. On postcommunist cases, see Timothy Frye, "A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post-Communist Presidencies," Comparative Political Studies 30 (October 1997);
180. McFaul (fn. 1).
181. I explore some of the latter issues in Hale (fn. 87). Democratic Prospects" the Study of Nationalities New York City, March 23-25). I explore some of the latter issues in
182. On Russia, see Henry E. Hale, Why Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
183. On how parties (among other things) can stem elite defection, see Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?" Annual Review of Political Science 2 (June 1999);
184. and Lucan A. Way, "Authoritarian State-Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine," World Politics 57 (January 2005).
185. That economic liberalization and diversification might dampen "consolidation" phases even in countries with patrimonial communist legacies is suggested in Barbara Junisbai and Azamat Junisbai, "The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan: A Case Study in Economic Liberalization, Intraelite Cleavage, and Political Opposition," Demokratizatsiya 13 (Summer 2005).
186. On how clientelism might decline in a country, see Kitschelt and Wilkinson (fn. 17). forthcoming); On how clientelism might decline in a country, (fn. 17)